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Disarmament Conference Summer Session Previewed

PM2206114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kosinskiy: "Disarmament Session"]

[Text] The summer session of the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva's Palais des Nations usually lasts from June through August. The relatively fleeting nature of this annual concluding stage in its work does not allow the observers and correspondents attending the conference any time to relax. Time rushes by and everyone tries to find the most interesting angle for their review, article, or commentary to allow people to form an opinion on what is happening behind the doors of the auditorium allocated for the sessions of conference delegates, who are familiarly known among journalists as "the disarmament lot."

If I were to talk about the present paramount concerns of this category of delegates in the Palais des Nations while avoiding the traditional enumeration of the long list of items on the summer session agenda, I would perhaps put the search for a solution to the problem of chemical disarmament at the top of the list. The signing of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. Agreement on the Elimination of Chemical Weapon Stockpiles at the recent Soviet-U.S. summit meeting is seen by UN diplomatic observers as an encouraging, inviting gesture to other participants in the conference. In their opinion, it is natural to expect a corresponding step forward in the conditions of the diminishing danger of war and growing openness and trust between states.

Under the signed agreement, the elimination of Soviet and U.S. chemical weapon stockpiles stretches over the period 1992-2002. There would appear to be still plenty of time to prepare for this. But, with its awareness of environmental dangers heightened by Chernobyl, the public is going to become increasingly tough and persistent about the question of the conditions of putting the elimination program into effect. Commenting on this problem and answering a question by your correspondent, S.B. Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Disarmament Conference, said that the program for eliminating Soviet chemical weapons has already been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet for ratification. This answer is only comforting up to a point. After all, we still have no information about the discussion of the above document and one gets the impression that our parliamentarians are not in any hurry. Perhaps the situation will become somewhat clearer at the beginning of July when there is going to be a meeting between representatives of the U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet in Geneva to discuss these bodies' involvement in preparations for the forthcoming destruction of the two countries' chemical weapons. This will be the first such meeting at which the two states' parliamentarians have to give an account of their work to one another.

The second most important problem being discussed at the conference is that of a nuclear test ban. It is well known that the United States has not responded to the Soviet Union's repeated unilateral initiatives regarding a temporary moratorium on nuclear tests, whereas a positive response to these initiatives could hasten the corresponding multilateral decision. The lack of progress in the U.S. position is making other nuclear states mistrustful of the idea of ending tests.

The next most topical disarmament problem under discussion at the session is that of preventing an arms race in space. So far, despite certain very promising initiatives (the introduction of "traffic regulations" in space and so forth), the conference participants have progressed no further than recognizing the importance of the problem. Progress is being held up by the U.S. stand. The Americans are inclined to regard even useful initiatives from their Western allies as just another dangerous trap for their SDI space program.

As in previous years, the conference participants are faced with the same task of improving the conference's structure and work organization. Many are no longer satisfied with the system of biannual conference sessions—in winter and summer. In the opinion of some conference participants, it would be more justified to base its work on the principle of the Vienna talks so that sessions could be held more regularly throughout the year. It is proposed to scale down the agenda—which is bulging with various problems—to discussing primarily questions in whose solution some progress has been made.

Defense Ministry on Chemical Arms Destruction

LD2206231890 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] It's common knowledge that as a result of the Soviet-American summit in late May and early June an agreement was reached about sizeable cutbacks and elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. We turn for details to a military expert, Colonel Vladimir Nazarenko of the Ministry of Defense:

[Nazarenko, in Russian with superimposed English translation] At present, according to some American estimates, more than 20 countries have their armies equipped with war gases or have facilities for their production. And by the year 2000 at least 16 developing countries will have the technology to manufacture ballistic missiles, that is, weapons capable of carrying chemical warheads. It's very important that the USSR and the United States do not wait for the completion of talks at

the disarmament conference in Geneva where a convention is being drafted on comprehensive and full destruction of chemical weapons. Moscow and Washington have reached an accord on bilateral disarmament which will certainly urge other countries to conclude large-scale international agreement. Both sides agree to retain 5,000 tonnes of war gases each until the international convention has been concluded in Geneva on full destruction of chemical arms. It's also important that the USSR and the United States have agreed not to produce any more chemical weapons. In view of the coming elimination of nuclear arms the USSR and the United States face some technical problems.

The task of eliminating tens of thousands of tonnes of lethal agents is a difficult one. The United States has even offered technical aid to the Soviet Union which it really needs. Both sides have also agreed to cooperate in a search for the safest forms ecologically of destroying war gases. It's true, though, that the deadline for action on the accord is somewhat discouraging with its beginning scheduled somewhere late in 1992 and with the destruction completed by the year 2002. The period is really long. But, in any case, you'll agree that the move taken by the leaders of the two powers ought to be regarded as a major breakthrough in ridding mankind of the threat of chemical warfare.

Shevardnadze NEW TIMES Interview Published

LD2206173990 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister and member of the Presidential Council Eduard Shevardnadze supported the creation of new all-European security institutions and structures in an interview with the NEW TIMES weekly, published in its latest issue.

This is especially necessary today, when the divided Europe is being united, border fortifications along the East-West line have been removed, Germany is being united and Soviet troops are being withdrawn from East European countries, he said. Shevardnadze went on record in favour of the intensification of the all-European dialogue, regular summit meetings and more frequent conferences of foreign ministers.

According to Shevardnadze, new European security structures should be created with due account of the interests of all 35 countries, with their consent and on the basis of the Helsinki process and principles set forth in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He pointed to the need to "create a centre or several centres to prevent and settle crisis situations" in the military sphere among European countries. He positively assessed the transformation of blocs into political alliances, which recently started, as well as the possibility of concluding a "politically binding agreement" between them, which was mentioned at the recent Soviet-U.S. summit. Shevardnadze believes that political-military alliances will continue to be part of the future European structure.

He dwelt on the possible creation of structures that would guarantee European security irrespective of what takes place in separate countries and regions. "If worst comes to the worst and a military threat emerged, the European structure can serve as an instrument of the collective defence, recognized by the U.N. Charter," he said. Pointing out that the world is confidently outgrowing "friend-or-foe" stereotypes, the Soviet foreign minister spoke in favour of speeding up talks on the reduction of military arsenals.

Touching upon the German problem, he pointed out that Germany's membership in NATO would pose a problem to Soviet interests. "Our attitude to the future European structure is practically identical with that of the GDR and West Germany. As for NATO, we maintain a dialogue with this alliance and are discussing possible cooperation agreements.... At the same time, it is a fact that NATO opposes us, relying on an impressive military machine, on doctrines and the strategy directed against us". If NATO is actually transformed, the issue of Germany's military-political status would take on a different dimension.

"I shall not hesitate to state on everybody's behalf that the Warsaw Treaty in its present form suits nobody, including the Soviet Union," Shevardnadze stressed. It is to reduce its military aspects and strengthen political ones. It should become a democratic alliance of equal, sovereign states relying on the interests shared by all of them. Shevardnadze linked the depth of the reorganisation of the Warsaw Treaty's military activities with resolutions and agreements, that will be reached at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments in Europe, in which 23 countries are taking part, and at the London session of the NATO Council.

GDR's Meckel Discusses German Unification

LD2406180690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0650 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Interview with GDR Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Meckel by TASS correspondent Vadim Chudov; place and date not given]

[Text] Berlin, 24 Jun (TASS)—GDR Foreign Affairs Minister M. Meckel has expressed support for the proposal of USSR Foreign Affairs Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, tabled at the Berlin meeting on the two-plus-four formula, on the four powers' withdrawal of troops from greater Berlin within six months after the creation of a single German Government and parliament.

In answer to a question on the results of the Berlin meeting on the two-plus-four formula, Meckel said this forum had demonstrated the whole complexity of the current situation and the dissimilarity in the approaches toward the resolution of a whole series of problems. Nevertheless, the minister said, it is better to discuss these problems beforehand than to wait and make hasty decisions. Such a situation would not favor stability in Europe.

In Meckel's opinion, the level of discussion on the issues that have come to a head should also be demarcated. There must be agreement on which of these are to be resolved within the framework of the two-plus-four mechanism and which at other forums, whether this be the Vienna talks, the CSCE conference, or in bilateral agreements. Experts from "the six" will now be engaged in elaborating an appropriate catalogue.

[Chudov] "What do you see as the first steps on the road toward the sovereignty of the future single Germany?"

[Meckel] "I consider that the statements by the parliaments of both of the German states on the issue of the western border of Poland serve as a very important manifestation of sovereignty. Their pledge not to produce, not to keep, not to use, and not to locate on German territory nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons might become another such manifestation. The GDR is also coming out in favor of establishing an upper limit on the numbers in the national armed forces of the future united Germany, of up to 300,000 people. These proposals emanate from us, ourselves, and they are directed toward achieving progress at the Vienna disarmament talks, taking into account the well-founded

interests of the Soviet Union—and they will not serve Germany's isolation but the provision of its sovereignty."

[Chudov] "The impression is sometimes formed that some ministers of foreign affairs in the West are speaking about issues concerning the internal political aspects of the construction of German unity more as Germans than the Germans themselves...."

[Meckel] "Such an impression is made by the fact that the FRG and the Western powers feel they are close NATO allies. The interests of the FRG are, for them, their own interests. Looking ahead, it may be supposed that the planned long-term renunciation by the four victorious powers of WWII of their rights in relation to Germany could lead to the Soviet Union, under the changes which the Warsaw Pact is undergoing, not retaining any legal grounds for maintaining its military presence on German soil while NATO forces maintain theirs. A well-considered and well thought-out approach which excludes the appearance of new complications is required here."

[Chudov] "What might the internal political consequences be of the restoration of the land structure on the territory of the GDR?"

[Meckel] "It seems to me that regional structures will play a greater and greater role in the future united Europe. National states will have to bring part of their own sovereignty both to the altar of pan-European unity as well as to the benefit of these structures. The Germans, for example, will to a greater and greater extent see themselves not only as Germans but also as Saxonians, Bavarians, Mecklenburg citizens, and so on."

German Unification Under Article 23 Discussed

PM2106150090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 24, 12-18 Jun 90 pp 16-17

[Dispatch by Nikita Zholkver: "Paragraphs and Politics. On the Way to State Unity"]

[Text] Bonn—Some time ago, representatives of the Soviet embassies in East and West Germany presented similar informal notes to the governments of the host countries. The main message of the notes was that the Soviet Union objected to the use of Article 23 of the West German Constitution as the tool to unify the two German states.

The Problem Paragraph

The West German constitution, the preamble of which binds the Germans to seek unification, suggests two possibilities for state and legal unification. The first possibility is the application of that same Article 23 which enumerates all the states where the constitution is in force and declares that the constitution "shall come into force in all other parts of Germany after their unification." It is implied that either the East German People's Chamber declares the republic's entry under the umbrella of the West German constitution, thus becoming another state of West Germany, or the same is done by each of the five state parliaments newly established in East Germany. From the purely formal, constitutional and legal point of view this will mean not the creation of something new but simple expansion of one part at the expenses of the other.

The other way towards unification is offered by Article 146 of the West German constitution. It says that the constitution's force ends when the German people, expressing their free will, adopt a new Basic Law. This means that first all the citizens in both parts of Germany must elect a common constitutional assembly which will adopt a new constitution for the whole country.

Both ways towards unification have their active supporters in West Germany. The discussion on this score is going on not only in constitutional and legal circles, but also in the press among politicians. Federal President Richard von Weizsaecker seems to have been the only one to warn against giving preference to one of the two ways, in particular Article 23, and to urge to wait and see how things develop. Weizsaecker said the discussion of constitutional paragraphs should not become a political squabble. Nonetheless, both the Bonn cabinet and the new government of East Germany have officially declared that they intend to achieve German unity on the basis of Article 23. This declaration resulted in the Soviet diplomatic demarche. The Soviet objections have not as of yet been taken into account. The preamble of the State Treaty between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. on the establishment of a financial, economic and social alliance signed on May 18 of this year refers to Article 23 of the West German constitution.

Convincing arguments are being offered in support of this variant of unification. First, the proponents insist, Article 23 was successfully applied in 1957 when Saarland, which had remained under the French protectorate since the end of WW2 joined West Germany and received the status of a state. Second, according to Article 23, after unification of Germany, the highly commendable West German constitution will remain in force.

Initially designed as the fundamental law of the transition period, the forty-year-old West German constitution has proved its vitality. It guarantees a stable state and legal democracy combined with reliable protection of basic rights and freedoms of the citizens, serves as the basis of a workable parliamentary and government system and an effective federal pattern of the country, and it vastly provides for the well-being and social security of the people. It is no coincidence that Spain, Portugal and Greece took the West German constitution as a model for their own democratic constitutions following their liberation from totalitarianism. In my opinion, Soviet lawmakers who are now drafting a new Soviet constitution, should pay greater attention to the main body of and commentaries to the West German Constitution.

The third set of arguments for Article 23 is purely practical. The construction of German unity will undoubtedly require great economic, financial and juridical efforts. Naturally, it is easier to solve all these problems on the basis of the existing and time-tested Basic Law than to parallelly create a new constitutional and legal foundation.

Fear in Vain

The variant of unification according to Article 146 is also widely advocated in West Germany. Although not questioning the objective merits of the existing constitution, the supporters of the variant justly note that no constitution is ideal and that any constitution may be improved upon further. One example is environmental protection. Shouldn't the ecological policy be constitutionally sealed? There are other questions which are ignored in the present constitution, for instance the problem of referendums. Many West German states are unlikely to object to a serious revision of the constitutional articles dealing with the federative pattern of the country and would like to check how up-to-date these articles are.

In my view, the latter is the only strong argument of the advocates of Article 146. Their other arguments are more or less politically and emotionally coloured. They insist, for instance, that the G.D.R.'s joining West Germany on the basis of Article 23 will mean the "Anschluss" of the former and that this will be an act of diktat in relation to a weaker partner. They also say this variant ignores the role the East German people played in advancing unification. Besides, advocates of Article 146 fear that the G.D.R. may be sold down the river and turned into a region of cheap labour and that the unification is progressing too quickly.

In fact, unification in accordance with Article 23 does smack slightly of discrimination of the stronger party over the weaker, although the weaker one does not seem to mind. The factor of discrimination, however, can be minimized if the matter is approached with a maximum amount of caution and mutual respect which forceful Bonn politicians so often lack. In substance, however, there will be no "Anschluss" or "selling of East Germany down the river." As for a "cheap workforce," Article 72 of the West German Constituion binds the federation to ensure approximatley equal living standards in all the constituent states. In order to maintain this approximate equality, Bonn is pumping state finances from richer states into poorer ones. The Basic Law of West Germany includes a reliable mechanism of levelling well-being in different states, and after unification will not widen the existing gap, but will help bridge it.

The Anschluss thesis too is not above criticism. No one can force the East German People's Chamber or future Landtags in the G.D.R. to join West Germany contrary to the popular will. It will be a sovereign decision of the People's Chamber or Landtags and according to the constitution West Germany will not be able to refuse admittance, but will simply have to take the decision into account.

A Flexible Transition

What then was the reason for the Soviet diplomatic demarche? Formally, the G.D.R.'s joining West Germany on the basis of Article 23 will automatically make it a part of the latter with all the ensuing foreign political consequences, in particular membership of the European Community, NATO and other West European organizations and institutions which West Germany participates in. At the same time, according to the international law, the G.D.R.'s membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization will end. When it joined the WTO in 1955, the G.D.R. made a reservation that in case of a unification, Germany would be free of all allied commitments to the WTO. As for the treaties of friendship with the U.S.S.R. and other East European countries, with their vows to uphold socialist ideals, it is only a matter of time before they fall by the wayside, and, in all probability, these treaties will not be prolonged.

In such a situation, the Soviet Union will have fewer levers by which to influence the military-political status of Germany. I believe that this was the reason why Moscow suggested the separation of the problems of domestic unification, which are under the competence of East and West Germany, from international aspects. In other words, Moscow wanted for a while an intact four-lateral responsibility for united Germany and opportunities to influence the formation of Germany's foreign political status.

It seems to me, however, that foreign political fears connected with Article 23 are unjustified. The G.D.R.'s joining West Germany does not mean an immediate change of the status quo at all. In my article published in NT No. 18 of this year, I wrote that German unification will pass three stages. The final, third stage will begin after the formation of formal state unity with a common parliament and government. This will be the stage of final levelling of economic structures, living standards and the solution of foreign political questions. In the case of Saarland this stage took three years, and before the decision to join West Germany was arrived at in conformity with the Article 23, a referendum was held there. It appears that such a referendum could be advisable in the G.D.R. or some of its states. I would also note that the Deutscher Mark was not introduced in Saarland until 1959, that is after the three-year transition period, and not at the beginning of it. In case of the G.D.R. that procedure is reversed, which is dictated by a number of specific features, in particular the East Germans' craving for the Deutsche Mark.

Unlike with Saarland, unification with the G.D.R. will probably take more time. West Germany and the G.D.R. have lived through an epoch of historically separated development and that is why their unification will require great and thorough efforts. A group of prominent

West German lawyers believe that the application of Article 23 provides more opportunities for a smooth and gradual joining of East with West Germany. The current legislation will remain in force in East Germany for a while and it will be gradually brought in conformity with the common constitution. The starting point of the progress towards unified legal systems and legislation will be a common constitutional minimum including such basic aspects as protection of the honour and dignity of people, the free development of one's person, basic rights and freedoms, indpendence of the courts, presumption of innocence, civil legal action against the state, the supremacy of the law, free elections, etc. In other words, Article 23 opens the way to a flexible transition, makes it possible to slow down unification or to accelerate it, depending upon circumstances. All this fully applies to foreign political aspects of German unification and the inıroduction of changes to the current West German constitution. The constitution is not a sacred cow. What advocates of Article 146 propose, can be adopted in the course of normal parliamentary work on the common constitution. In any case, in order to avoid ambiguity in the future, Article 23 itself must be omitted from the constitution after it has carried out its historic mission: there will be no more candidates for unification.

One last remark: a purely pragmatic consideration can be used as an argument in favour of the West German constitution. This constitution provides sufficient guarantees of domestic stability and international predictability of the Germans, despite whatever frictions may arise in the European arena. The elaboration of a new Basic Law is like a plunge into cold water, a political equation with a many unknown quantities.

FRG, GDR Approval of Union Treaty Viewed

PM2506101190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

["Topical Theme" feature comprising 21 June dispatches from correspondents Ye. Grigoryev in Bonn and M. Podklyuchnikov in Berlin: "Day of Important Decisions"]

[Text] **In Bonn...**

Many Bundestag speakers described today as a special, even historic day. The point is that the agenda for this parliamentary sitting included not just the discussion but the resolution of a number of most important questions directly linked with the process of German unification. This includes the ratification of the state treaty between the FRG and the GDR on the creation of currency, economic, and social union.

Another question which which the parliament concerned itself was the identical resolution submitted to the two German states' legislative organs on the definitive recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.

Federal Chancellor H. Kohl presented a government statement. He described the adoption of the state treaty and the resolution as decisive steps along the path of the restoration of Germany's state unity. At the same time the chancellor acknowledged that the period ahead will be difficult for GDR citizens and that some sacrifices will be required of FRG citizens.

The chancellor spelled out his views on "the architecture of Europe." He included the galvanization of the all-European process, disarmament, the creation of all-European structures, and effective economic cooperation as the underpinnings of the future European edifice. H. Kohl argued the need to take account of the Soviet Union's security interets. At the same time he sees Germany's unification only within NATO.

H.-D. Genscher also spoke about acknowledging the USSR's security interests. His central idea was that German unification must become a catalyst of all-European unification and that there must be no gap between West European integration and all-European cooperation. He also advocated a "European confederation from the Atlantic to the Urals."

...And in Berlin

The GDR Volkskammer has approved the state treaty on currency, economic, and social union between the GDR and the FRG by an overwhelming majority—302 votes out of 385. It comes into force 1 July. The GDR is abandoning its own monetary unit and switching to the West German Mark.

The country's parliament had recently amended a number of fundamental provisions of the GDR Constitution in accordance with West German laws governing the country's economic and social life. The first real step along the path of the unification of the two German states is being taken. Radical changes are about to occur in the GDR population's life. They are preparing for them with an increasing feeling of anxiety.

On the eve of the ratification of the treaty, GDR Volkskammer President Sabine Bergmann-Pohl spoke on television. She stated that she understands people's apprehension and uncertainty. At the same time she called for consolidation in the face of the present and future difficulties.

There are long lines at all savings banks at the moment—people are filling out and handing in currency exchange forms. Green and white armored vans, known among the people as "fat Minnas," are moving around the streets of Berlin with reinforced guards. They are delivering West German banknotes around the country.

In the fall, when the idea of concluding currency, economic, and social union with the FRG had just seen the first light of day and was beginning to gather momentum, a considerable proportion of the population believed that union would bring only benefits—a solid currency and stores full of goods. Since then, however,

the negative features of currency union have been showing increasingly graphically. The country's industry and agriculture will have to face up to competition from West German concerns. Not everyone will survive the leap into the cold waters of the free market. Economists calculate that only one-third of GDR enterprises will stay afloat and one in five will go bankrupt immediately. Unemployment is the prospect for millions. Already 130,000 unemployed have been registered in the country. Hundreds of thousands have received layoff notices. And whereas the first wave of this calamity hit former Socialist Unity Party of Germany officials, state apparatus employees, officers released from the army or the state security organs, teachers of Marxism-Leninism, and social science and Russian language teachers in schools, we are now talking about skilled workers.

The unification of the two German states affects the interests of all the European peoples. It requires circumspection and considered decisions. The "two-plus-four" meeting scheduled for Berlin tomorrow will be devoted to seeking such decisions.

German Unification, Bloc Relations Discussed

LD2206141390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0930 GMT on 22 June broadcasts its regular "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program moderated by Valentin Gubernaterov, foreign political commentator of all-Union radio, with commentators Viktor Levin, Yuriy Isayev, Sergey Pravdin, and Aleksandr Zholkver, and journalist Lyubov Myatyanina from the Europe Plus USSR radio station.

The program begins with Gubernaterov inviting Zholkver to answer listeners' and World War II veterans' letters on their fears about the rebirth of fascism once the two Germanies are reunited and on whether Germany really can be trusted. Zholkver stresses the changes which have taken place in Germany since the war and the rise of a new generation raised on "new democratic principles." He admits, however, that while working as a correspondent in Germany he has encountered the "machinations of Nazis old and new." Zholkver goes on to point out that it is not possible to forbid the unification of Germany and that anyway after the war the USSR also supported the idea of a united Germany.

Zholkver then answers a listener's letter on the West's support for a united Germany's membership in NATO and whether Soviet-U.S. relations might become strained because of it. Zholkver cites the results of the recent Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session and the NATO decisions and notes that the upcoming NATO summit in London will "create completely different prerequisites for examing the question of the military and political status of a future united Germany." He suggests that while the Warsaw Pact and NATO exist a united Germany could have "associative membership" of the two organizations, as suggested by Gorbachev.

Viktor Levin then answers a listener's letter on why the Soviet Army is leaving the countries which it liberated, in particular why Hungary no longer regards the day of its liberation from fascism as a national holiday. Levin cites the view held by Hungarians that "liberation from fascism did not bring genuine freedom to Hungary or its people, but marked the triumph of Stalinism." They think that the Stalinist regime was foisted on them and he points out that Soviet troops came up against Hungarian fascism in the country, too. He says that the fact that memorials to Soviet soldiers there are defiled is a "childish" reaction. Levin says that the people will come to see that the heroic feat performed by Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil was turned by Stalin against the Hungarian people through the administrative-command and totalitarian system of those days and that wreaths will be laid once again at the memorials to Soviet troops in Hungary and other countries, too. However, he says, if that is to happen more quickly, one must try to understand what is happening in the countries of East Europe. "I cannot forget the words of General Makashev which he pronounced at the Russian congress of the Communist Party," Levin says, quoting the general as saying that the Soviet Union is being driven from the countries which it liberated. Just because we liberated them does not mean that we received the eternal right to order them about, Levin says.

"If the people raise the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territory—and that is the sovereign right of the people—does that mean that the people have to be better?" Levin asks. "There is no turning back history with tanks. We have already been through that. Moreover, nothing good will come of that, not just for the people against whom the tanks are used but for the Soviet people either. And I get the impression that nothing has done General Makashev any good—neither Czechslovakia in 1968, nor Tbilisi in 1989," Levin says.

"Many of our generals do not like to be reminded of Tbilisi and view that as slander of the Soviet Armed forces, as the undermining of security," Levin remarks. But one must respect other peoples' as well as one's own, he notes. "It is also necessary to remember that it is not the people which exists for the army, but the army for the people," Levin says.

Gubernatorov says that many military men are objecting to the way in which the country's defense capability is being guaranteed. Levin replies that various factors are of great importance in assuring the country's security. Economic development is the first vital factor of security, too, and political factors are also important for guaranteeing security. "The Afghan adventure cost us losses, political losses on a huge scale. The world regarded us as an aggressor, as an unpredictable country which might perform such acts on any of its neighbors," Levin says, noting that this did not strengthen our security because, in reply, states bordering on us increased their military expenditure too.

The Warsaw Pact has 55,000 tanks against 33,000 on the part of NATO, Levin says. This did not make us feel any better. "Just that in the eyes of West European states we looked like a country preparing for aggression," and how could they trust us when we had so many weapons directed westwards, he says. We now have to destroy more missiles than the Americans because we have more than they do, Levin says.

Levin goes on to point out that diplomacy is also a vital factor of security, "a sensible and constructive foreign policy". The vast changes which have occurred over the years of perestroyka consolidate our security most directly, he notes.

Finally, the NATO bloc itself is changing. The change in the Warsaw Pact itself, "its politicization," and the fact that its political aspects are aquiring more weight than military ones is influencing NATO too, Levin says. We look forward to the NATO summit in July where a change in strategy is on the agenda, Levin remarks. "The threat of a military attack on the Soviet Union is falling and this is the result, in the fist place, of that domestic and foreign policy being carried out by the Soviet Union recently in the years of perestroyka," he notes.

Soviet relations with many East European countries were "artificial" in many ways, based on an idealistic ideology, but now relations are developing naturally between states based on the "coincidence" of state interests, Levin says, and cites the USSR's "splendid" relations with Poland despite the fact that its government is opposed to a communist government there. Hungary says it wants to leave the Warsaw Pact, but other Pact members realize more and more that it must exist as long as NATO does, but it should involve itself more with unification and "strengthen these states politically, Levin claims.

Yuriy Isayev then replies to listeners' questions on the decision by the president of Nicaragua to reduce the country's army and on the contras' laying down their weapons.

Sergey Pravdin replies to listeners' questions on the build-up of Japanese naval forces. He points out that the build-up of military strength contradicts the Japanese Constitution. He quotes the Japanese press and THE WASHINGTON POST on the strength of the country's navy and a recent survey in the Japanese press which showed that 60 percent of the country is against a military build- up.

The program cocludes with Lyubov Myatyanina talking about the Europe Plus USSR joint Soviet-French radio station which, apart from radio broadcasting, will also organize cultural events and set up radio personnel training centers, she says. Its chairman will be a representative of the French side while the general-director will be a Soviet citizen.

She says the style of the program is a comletely new version of commercial radio for Soviet citizens. French journalists in Moscow broadcast music which is popular in the whole of Europe, "from Julio Iglesias to the Rolling Stones, excluding heavy metal, weak pop, and bad records". It also broadcasts brief information on countries "which strive to implement the ideas of the common European home". But music is the most important thing, she says.

English-language music accounts for 70 percent of the overall volume of music broadcast. Sociological research has shown that most of its listeners are in the 25-40 age group. It plans to broadcast advertisements of Soviet and foreign companies and this will provide the main income of the joint venture. She says it broadcasts on the air daily from 1900 to 0100 [1500 till 2100 GMT] on 69.8 MHz VHF in stereo and 1,116 KHz on medium wave.

'Interdependent' Nature of Europe Viewed

PM2206141490 Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by Valentin Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department: "The World Is Interdependent"]

[Text] The creation of European security systems is on the agenda. They are intended to replace the existing bloc systems and will have to provide a more constructive and more reliable solution to the problems facing the peoples in terms of peace and war, life and death.

I am convinced that the problems relating to the role of a reunified Germany in European affairs, and its membership in a particular military and political bloc, will be solved by respecting the interests of all the parties concerned, the commitments which the GDR currently has toward the Waraw Pact and the FRG toward NATO. We must find a fair balance between these interests. Until the external aspects of reunification are settled, it will continue to be outstanding, its settlement will drag on for a long time, or complications could even arise; of course the Soviet side wants to avoid that.

I think that complications could be avoided provided the four powers, which have initial rights and responsibilities stemming from decisions made during the war and after the war, place their interests on the same side of the scales without giving priority to any of the parties. Otherwise the party whose interests have been undermined may rightly prefer the current situation to the one which would result from a settlement. And that is equally valid for the USSR as for the three other participants. However, if the decisions favor the development of positive processes which we welcome in that they create a new climate of confidence in Europe based on cooperation and not confrontation, then everything will go well.

All these factors must be taken into consideration. We must avoid anything which dooms the European process to failure or at least which places obstacles in its path. We will only succeed if we behave as responsible men, in

other words without pursuing egoistical national objectives or bloc objectives. Otherwise we will fail and everything positive which has already been achieved so far, everything which can be settled will be wiped out or reversed. The Soviet objective is still the same: our starting point is that the world is indivisible and interdependent; we are in favor of solving all problems not on the basis of positions of force but by political means on the basis of a balance of interests without resorting to threats or violence. We are convinced that there is no alternative: we must have an approach which is responsible and carefully considered and—even more important—perspicacious and forward-looking.

Personally, I think that the last war in Europe has taken place. There should be no more war on our continent, neither nuclear nor conventional. This requires us to draw a conclusion: if there are to be no more wars, the mountains of weapons accumulated on the European continent are no longer necessary. We must rid ourselves of them and the sooner the better to ensure that a climate of confidence, calmness, and prosperity reigns finally on our ancient land. We will then be able to devote our efforts to solving urgent problems such as the protection of the environment. This question is particularly important because an ecological disaster could be as serious for the European continent as a war. From this viewpoint, Europe is more vulnerable than any other part of the world.

Problems of Collective European Security Viewed

PM2206145990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Markushin "Observer's Comments": "Remembering the Lessons of History"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The idea of creating a system of collective security in Europe is once again on the agenda today. The German question is once again one of the components of this system. Nowadays we at the editorial office receive a considerable number of readers' letters expressing alarm over the impending German unification. It is mostly people of the older generation—veterans who served in the war or who ruined their health on the labor front in the rear services—who write in. The theme of their letters is simple and understandable: are we, who lost 27 million people in the last war, destined to drink again from that most deep and bitter cup? Will the current assurances that only peace will emanate from German soil in the future become nothing but fresh unpredictable complexities?

To be frank, the situation in central Europe today does not seem to be comparable with that of the thirties. Politically speaking, it is quite simply more healthy, reliable, and "sensible." One should not, of course, disregard the grim historical experience gained by the Germans and their neighbors. In the purely military respect, so to speak, we are all still kept on our guard by a far more important danger than "Wehrmacht divisions armed to the teeth." You only have to consider the potential threat posed to everything animate and inanimate by just a single tactical nuclear missile division. Yet Europe is laden to the gills with these missiles.

The "purely military" aspects of the present situation can only, of course, be separated from the political aspects in theory since the military's decisions and orders have always been preceded by politicians' conclusions and intentions. That is why we must not delay in resolutely advancing the processes linked with the formation of qualitatively new structures of all-European security, mindful once again of the factor of German unification.

Some people view the idea of collective security as "bureaucratic formalism." People try to brush it aside like a troublesome fly, pointing to a ready-made, virtually ideal security structure—NATO—under whose supervision no German colossus will allegedly be able to return to the old ways of the quest for Lebensraum. The Bonn leadership's recent statement about the inviolability of the Polish borders indisputably inspires some optimism. But on the other hand, declarations and resolutions alike—however impressive and sincere they might sound—can hardly be seen as complete guarantees. Incidentally, the FRG chancellor himself does not, after all, consider it necessary to promise on behalf of future German governments that they will not return to the policy of territorial claims. Thus, more tangible structures based on the agreement of absolutely all interested parties and universal European consensus would seem to be the guarantees here.

What is seen as the main advantage of a system of collective security over bloc security? It resides in the fact that blocs—however politicized they are and whatever defensive doctrines they proclaim—will nevertheless continue their rivalry and preserve the spirit of confrontation on the continent—albeit even in a considerably enfeebled form. The superbloc organs that have been set up and which operate permanently, on cooperative principles, involving both the Europeans and the United States and Canada, may be a powerful stabilizing factor.

It is well known that the Soviet side is proposing to set up a European center to guarantee stability in the military-political sphere as one such organ. This center would, for instance, collect and circulate the necessary information for an evaluation of European states' military activity, coordinate inspection activity, resolve contentious and conflict situations, and so on.

Last, there is this element. The attitude to German unification cannot be developed without considering the Bundeswehr's numerical strength, equipment, and training. I could cite a whole number of statements by our readers, who put the question pointblank, so to speak. I will confine myself to the most characteristic and typical of them. Major A. Vashchenko, a test engineer, writes the following: "Germany must not have an army and a military industry, in other words the base on

which two world wars were unleashed and which would upset military equilibrium in Europe after unification."

It is perhaps unrealistic today to expect this development of affairs, this outcome in Germany. But it is probably realistic to hope to revise military policy in line with the changes taking place in the Warsaw Pact. For instance, it is probably realistic to hope for a renunciation of the forward-line strategy, cuts in offensive arms systems, and the withdrawal of all mass-destruction weapons from German territory.

Why indeed should the FRG leadership not show good will in this respect? This step would provide the best evidence of Bonn's peaceful aspirations and would remove many of the questions that have been raised now regarding the external aspects of German unification. Christian Democratic Union Secretary General V. Ruehe said recently that anyone who wants disarmament should not retard the unification process. But can we not put the question differently: the unification process must proceed in tandem with the disarmament process.

So, 22 June is a day when this wish seems quite natural.

'Roundtable' Discusses Major International Issues

LD2406194790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 24 June carries its weekly 30-minute "International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Gennadiy Vedenyapin, with Boris Andrianov, all-Union radio foreign affairs commentator; and Rudolf Kolchanov, deputy editor-in-chief of TRUD.

The panellists begin by viewing recent discussions on Germany. Kolchanov notes that Bonn is forcing the pace of German unification. This haste is complicating an already complex situation. The possibility of a new wave of emigration from the GDR to the FRG will exacerbate problems in West Germany. This could be prevented if the FRG pumps a lot of money into the GDR, but ordinary West Germans are not too happy about this idea.

Andrianov notes that this is a domestic matter for the Germans themselves, but the external aspects of German unification are of profound concern to many other countries. He mentions the anniversary of Hitler's attack on the USSR in this regard. Vedenyapin reminds listeners that the Soviet people fought not for the dismemberment of Germany, but for the destruction of fascism. Kolchanov acknowledges that times have changed. Most Germans favor democracy and understand the pointlessness of war. The threat of war emanating from German soil is no longer great, but there must still be guarantees for military security. According to Andrianov, the most important of these is the guarantee on borders. At long last, both German parliaments have adopted a resolution on final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.

Kolchanov notes, however, that the question of German membership of NATO has still not been settled. The West is insisting that Germany be a member of NATO. Vedenyapin recalls a recent article in NOVOYE VREMYA which suggested that German membership in NATO, in its present form, would upset the balance of power in Europe. Andrianov notes that, while calling for Bonn to be a full member of NATO, Kohl is advocating the creation of pan-European structures and greater economic cooperation. Genscher, according to Kolchanov, is saying that German unification must be the catalyst for a European confederation from the Atlantic to the Urals. Vedenyapin reiterates that full German membership of NATO is unacceptable to the USSR. Andrianov says that European public opinion believes that German unification should be harnessed to the creation of pan-European security structures.

The panellists summarize the results of the two-plus-four talks in Berlin, the new Soviet proposals, Shevardnadze's speech there, and the final press conference. Kolchanov says that success in these would have a favorable impact on the whole situation in Europe. Some progress has been made in the Vienna talks on conventional forces in Europe, in particular on tanks and armored fighting vehicles. Vedenyapin summarizes recent Franco-Polish proposals on the reduction of vehicles. However, Andrianov notes there are still major disagreements on the number of planes and helicopters to be allowed as well as on verification and other matters. Nevertheless, he says clear progress has been made.

Vedenyapin says that the situation in Europe is new and requires innovative approaches and unorthodox solutions dictated by new political thinking; this is all the more so, in that the ideas of mutual security, nonoffensive defense, and the common European home have received broad public support.

Kolchanov says: "I am not giving away any secret, of course, when I say that the member countries of the Warsaw Pact have taken a serious, constructive step in this direction. It is being fundamentally reorganized. At the recent conference of the Political Consultative Committee it was decided to embark on a revision of the character, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact on its democratization. The participants in the conference spoke about the need to overcome the bloc model of security and the division of the continent. In the new circumstances, the objectives of the Warsaw Pact will be to facilitate disarmament and the creation of a pan-European security system. No sensible person is likely to dispute the fact that, apart from anything else, such a reorganization is in keeping with the needs of the pan-European process. It creates one of the conditions for it to make decisive progress."

Andrianov says: "Yes, a broad and decisive step has been taken from the eastern side of our continent. Have the Western countries made preparations for reciprocal steps? After all, both sides have to move toward each other if beneficial objectives are to be attained. In NATO

they acknowledge, of course, that immense changes have taken place in Europe. They consider that their alliance has to be modified in conformity with these changes.

"What are they saying? They are saying, in particular, that the political role of the North Atlantic alliance has to be strengthened and that there has to be a fundamental review of NATO strategy, as they put it. In this connection I remind you that next month there will be a meeting of the NATO Council at heads of state and government level. I think this will show how far the Western bloc is going to go in its transformation. We will not have long to wait for the answer to this."

Vedenyapin says: "When we started talking about this topic, I mentioned the radical changes in the political landscape of our continent. Disarmament processes are gathering momentum in Europe against the background of these changes. By all accounts, London does not want to remain aloof from these either. A week and a half ago the British newspaper, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, reported that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had instructed Alan Clark, the minister of state for defense procurement, to draw up radical proposals for reductions in the country's armed forces and to prepare recommendations for an alternative military strategy, both for Great Britain itself and for NATO as a whole. According to the newspaper, Margaret Thatcher informed Clark of her thinking on this during a meeting with him at Downing Street after her visit to the Soviet Union. Incidentally, during her visit to Moscow, the British premier discussed the problem of reducing armaments, not just with political leaders but also with military leaders of our country."

Kolchanov notes that it is no secret that what must be a very thorough review of priorities in the military sphere is currently under way under the general supervision of the head of the British Government. This is shortly to take the form of a concrete document named "Options for Change." "As far as Alan Clark is concerned, the British press believe that he is one of the brightest and most independent-minded ministers in Thatcher's cabinet. He advocates a significant cut in the surface fleet and the British Army of the Rhine, stationed in the FRG. This, the London press asserts, has horrified the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense. However, the British premier evidently values him as an expert in his field."

Andrianov says that it is probably no coincidence that Margaret Thatcher took Clark's advice when she was preparing for her speech at the Scottish town of Turnberry where a meeting of the NATO Council was recently held at foreign minister level. "At this session, she spoke in particular of the need to review the strategy of the North Atlantic alliance in the light of steps being taken by the Soviet Union to reduce its military presence in East Europe and the possibility of agreement on conventional armaments in Europe at the talks in Vienna. Such a review, she said, will have a direct impact on the number of British servicemen stationed in Europe. But at the moment London is being cautious in this respect."

Vedenyapin notes that the House of Commons of the British Parliament is currently debating the country's military policy. Minister of Defense Tom King spoke in the debate at the beginning of last week. "He announced that, because of the high level of inflation, his department will cut its budget for the current year by 600 million pounds. One could, of course, say that London has taken the first step towards joining in the disarmament process taking place throughout Europe. But how significant is this step?" he asks.

Kolchanov says he would even reword this question. "How decisive is this step? After all, 600 million pounds is about three percent of total military spending. At any rate, I think this gave the British press reason to be sceptical about the announcement made in the House of Commons by Tom King. Even commentators well known for their pro-government stance expressed the view that the minister of defense has decided to make savings in areas of secondary importance. Well, as the saying is, they are in a position to know. They consider that this is not a real reduction in Great Britain's military budget for the current year but merely an abandonment of the three per cent increase for inflation. And, evidently, it is no accident that opposition representatives, speaking in the House of Commons, have accused the government of having drawn out the process of reviewing the country's military policy and demonstrating indecisiveness in the matter of working out specific recommendations on decreasing the military potential. So, if London seems to have shifted from dead center in the disarmament process, then the pace of this shift so far is manifestly lagging behind the rapid development of events in the world."

Andrianov notes that whether or not by coincidence, it so happened that the British defense minister made his announcement in the House of Commons last Monday and on the next day Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, presented general proposals to the Congressional leadership on the possible reduction of U.S. Armed Forces by 25 percent during the next five years. "I will not adduce the details of this plan by which such an objective may be achieved. They have been adduced in our press. I will merely talk about one aspect. When the head of the Pentagon spoke in front of journalists he pointed out that this project, prepared at the request of the legislators, should be studied, in his words, merely as an illustration of possible reductions of U.S. Armed Forces and not as new proposals by the administration on the military budget. As if to say, don't build up your hopes and don't create any illusions on this account. And indeed, the project put forward envisages a diminution of the total military expenditure of the United States over the next five years by 10 percent. And this means that in reality it preserves approximately the same levels of military appropriations which the White House proposed to Congress five months ago," says Andrianov.

Andrianov goes on to note that a number of influential legislators, including Les Aspen, chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee, advocate that U.S. defense expenditure should be reduced by 18 and even 20 percent over the same five-year timescale. Commenting on the Cheney proposals, the NEW YORK TIMES said that the main emphasis in them is on more mobile combat sub-units and an impressive navy and not on the ground forces with heavy armaments in Europe.

Vedenyapin says: "I think it is hardly possible to agree with the assessement of this American newspaper. You see, it omits such an important aspect, which incidentally Cheney himself emphasized, that his plan does not affect the present modernization program of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and does not provide for reduction in allocations to the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Nonetheless, this is a more than substantial circumstance.

"Incidentally, here is the latest confirmation there," Vedenyapin continues. "It has not been given by the head of the Pentagon himself, but by General John Chain. He is commander of the American Strategic Air Command. So this general has made a bellicose appeal uncharacteristic, it must be said, of present times to strengthen U.S. nuclear potential. It was only last Monday that the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER published his letter. In it John Chain emphasized that, despite all the changes in the modern world, the United States as before needs powerful nuclear deterrent forces. In contrast to many American politicians, this general considers that as before a massed, powerful, modern strategic threat emanates from the Soviet Union. And therefore, he points out, the United States must modernise its strategic forces. Moreover, the commander of Strategic Air Command calls for particular attention to be devoted to realizing the construction program of the new B-2 Stealth strategic bomber. Its special design characteristic consists in the ability, as is asserted across the ocean, to as it were slip unnoticed through the enemy's air defense system and deliver an unexpected nuclear strike."

Kolchanov says: "I do not know whether I am right, colleagues, but I am getting the impression that in developing military construction plans in the United States, the Pentagon is now not being guided by considerations of the country's security, nor by the military-political situation in the world, but primarily by the technological capabilities which have appeared for the creation of new means of mass destruction. All the innovations of military technology are put into production and only later are various strategic justifications adapted to them. The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR has recently adduced a whole inventory of such projects. There is everything but the kitchen sink there: maneuverable nuclear warheads, which are supposed to possess the capability of overcoming an anti-ballistic missile defence; an ultrasonic gliding missile invulnerable to the enemy's defense means; and a cruise missile with ultrasonic speed possessing the same characteristic. And all of these are patently destabilizing means intended for delivering the first nuclear strike. Thus, according to the logic of the Pentagon, it transpires that whatever the conditions in the international situation, the production of modern nuclear weapons must increase and improve."

Vedenyapin says in conclusion that of course it is no secret that, from the point of view of military capabilities, the United States and the Soviet Union can destroy each other. "These mutual capabilities still remain to be lowered and brought to a level which is appropriate to political realities. Therefore, indubitably, it is necessary to speed up negotiations on the reduction of military arsenals. You see, our world is confidently growing out of the friend-and-foe stereotype and is progressing to a concept of the commonality of interests of humanity."

Commentary Views Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

OW2406050190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Commentary by military commentator Kalinin]

[Text] Listeners, the 30th anniversary of the effectuation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty [JST] falls on 23 June. In this connection, Moscow Radio military commentator Kalinin writes as follows:

It is no exaggeration to say that since the very beginning of the JST's effectuation, it has become and has continued to serve as the basis of Japanese foreign policy. Therefore, the U.S. Government has taken it as a matter of primary concern to maintain the treaty. When Prime Minister Kaifu visited the United States last March, President Bush stressed that, under current conditions, the significance of the JST had become even greater.

Both Japan and the United States have attempted to support efforts to maintain this treaty as a peaceful cause in its nature. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Baker has termed this treaty as the foundation for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. However, it is hardly possible to approve of such a positive statement. It will be sufficient merely to recall the U.S. large-scale intrusion into Vietnam from the 1960's to the 1970's. During this period, the JST failed to play its role of guaranteeing peace as stated in the treaty. On the contrary, it virtually turned Japan into a U.S. accomplice in the invasion. Based on this treaty, Japan was turned into an Air Force base—that is, the foothold to guarantee its combat operations.

Even today, it seems that there are no grounds at all for us to talk about the Japanese-U.S. military alliance making any positive contributions to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan itself. On the contrary, we can say that based on the JST Japan has been drawn more extensively into U.S. war preparations. As a result, Japan now ranks number three in the world in its military expenditures, and military experts estimate that the Japanese Self-Defense Force [SDF] now ranks No. 10

in the world in quality. Moreover, the SDF has continued to improve. The Security Council of Japan began studying the next defense buildup program this week. It is expected to appropriate record-high defense expenditures amounting to over 23 trillion yen for this program.

All these facts lead to the view that, contrary to statements by its official representatives, Japan has started taking the road toward becoming a military power. Furthermore, we have to point out that during the past few years Japan has come to play a rapidly growing role in U.S. military strategy. Let us cite a few examples. Japan now has the duty of monitoring sea lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles off Japan; has signed a treaty on providing to the United States its advanced technology applicable for military purposes; and has also decided to join in realizing the SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative, of the United States. It has also expanded its contacts with all members of the NATO bloc, with Japan and the United States at its center. Recently, Japanese delegates have participated in the seminar on the security issue sponsored by the NATO bloc.

It is quite obvious that the discrepancy between Japanese policy and the current trend of relaxation in tensions in East-West relations has become more and more vast. At this juncture, it is quite natural that the future of the security treaty has become a topic for heated argument in Japan. People have expressed various opinions, including the need to intensify further the treaty's military factor and the call for immediate abolition of the treaty.

In any case, it seems that more and more people have now come to understand that the security treaty's military role must be downgraded. Former Foreign Minister Abe, who is currently visiting the United States as special emissary of the government, has also disclosed that he holds such a view. If practical steps should be taken in consolidating this approach, we cannot but unconditionally welcome them. As pointed out by the KYODO NEWS AGENCY, under the current conditions, adherence to the Japanese-U.S. military alliance based exclusively on the philosophy of the cold war era will lead inevitably to a dangerous anachronism.

Commentary Views Soviet-PRC Efforts on Cambodia

OW2306232790 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 15 Jun 90

[By station commentator Nikolayev]

[Text] Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Rogachev said at a press conference in Beijing that a compromise might be reached soon on the settlement of the Cambodian question. He made this remark at the end of his meetings with Chinese officials.

Naturally Cambodia's internal affairs can be handled properly only by the Cambodian people themselves. On this, our station commentator Nikolayev writes:

The course of the 11-year conflict in Cambodia has proven this point. However, due to various reasons the conflict reflects, in a concentrated form, the contradictions between countries. Therefore these countries hope that the parties concerned will assist, at varying degrees, the settlement of problems in Cambodia.

The Soviet Union and China belong to the countries cited above. Before the normalization of their relations, the two countries consulted with each other and made joint efforts to this end. The joint statements made at high-level meetings, held when the two countries (?closed the door to each other), announced that the Soviet Union and China should help seek an early, just, and fair political settlement of the conflict in Cambodia.

A few important steps have been taken over the past year toward solving the Cambodian conflict: Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia; meetings were held in Paris and Jakarta on the Cambodian question; representatives of all parties in Cambodia began contacting one another; and efforts were made to seek a compromise. It should be especially pointed out that Hun Son and Sihanouk at a Tokyo meeting signed a joint statement on a ceasefire.

Of course, much remains to be done in order to bring the war to a complete end. For example, in the near future, a supreme national committee of Cambodia should be inaugurated, with the participation of the Phnom Penh regime and the Khmer Rouge opposition factions. The establishment of this committee will mark the beginning of reconciliation. The committee should exercise management of state affairs, represent Cambodia in the United Nations, and be a symbol of the country's (?sovereignty) and independence. It is also important for the committee to solve the problem of assigning (?the number of representatives from various factions) to the committee, prepare elections for a government to represent Cambodia in the United Nations, and facilitate the signing of an agreement to stop military supplies to all warring factions.

It is time to end the longstanding conflict, Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Rogachev said in Beijing. He exchanged views with the Chinese officials on this question. Although the Chinese and Soviet sides have not yet reached a complete understanding on certain points, their common ground has been broadened after each meeting. This is gratifying.

The Soviet deputy foreign minister expressed the hope that all final obstacles in settling the situation in Cambodia will be removed in the near future, possibly toward the end of this year.

NATO Spokesman Cited on 'Teamwork-90'

LD2206055690 Moscow TASS in English 0540 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Orekhov]

[Text] Washington June 22 TASS—NATO's navies will take part in large-scale Teamwork-90 joint exercises to be held in the North Atlantic and in the coastal waters of Norway from September 6 to 23, this year.

According to a NATO spokesman, the Teamwork-90 exercises pursue the aim of training naval, air force and amphibious units of NATO countries in operations in this "important geographical area."

The exercises will involve the Navies and Air Forces of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Britain and the United States as well as ships and aircraft of France and Spain that are not members of NATO's military structure.

During the exercises large U.S. naval forces will cross the Atlantic from the bases on the U.S. eastern coast, heading towards the shores of Norway while constantly holding naval and air exercises during the voyage. A large-scale amphibious landing operation on the Norwegian coast is also planned.

The exercises will involve an aggregate of 195 ships, 364 combat aircraft and 39,000 NATO servicemen, including 11,000 participants in an amphibious operation.

Shevardnadze Greets Nonaligned Nations Meeting

LD2406200190 Moscow World Service in English 1900 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has welcomed the consistent and constructive efforts of the nonaligned nations to improve the situation in the Mediterranean and turn it into a zone of peace, security, and cooperation. He points out in a message for a conference of Mediterranean nonaligned foreign ministers that will open in Algeria this coming Monday that these tasks are consonant with the unchanging goals of Soviet foreign policy, and are reflected in what the Soviet leader had to propose in Belgrade and Rome. This country favors a large-scale conference on the Mediterranean, similar to the European security conference. Shevardnadze confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue a dialogue with the nonaligned Mediterranean countries and to have a productive exchange of views and constructive cooperation.

United States & Canada

UN Shares Hope for Resumption of U.S.-PLO Talks

LD2106135390 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] President Bush has announced his intention to suspend dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. He explained that he found insufficient the PLO statement about the landing attempt by a group of armed Palestinians on Israeli shores. The statement by the PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat denied the organization's involvement in the attempt, and condemned every act of violence committed against civilians. We have this commentary from Aleksandr Pogodin:

Direct contacts between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Oranization were establishd in December 1988, and assessed as a good sign for peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In establishing them, Washington defied angry protests from Israel, implying that Israel too must seek talks with the Palestinians. Most recently Secretary of State James Baker denounced Tel Aviv's reluctance to do so. And now we are seeing an about-face. What repercussions can it have?

Predictably, Israel has voiced satisfaction with the move, which it took for encouragement of its hardline policies. And a PLO spokesman has noted that the move can activize Palestinian extremist groups which can by no means promote peace in the Middle East. In short, the prospects are gloomy. We can do little more than share the hope voiced by the United Nations secretary general that the dialogue between Washington and the Palestinians—crucial to a Middle East settlement—will eventually resume.

U.S. Military Cuts, Simultaneous Increases Noted

LD2306073390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Commentary by TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] The attention of the world public has been caught by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's statement on a possible 25-percent reduction in U.S. Armed Forces over the five-year period of 1992-1997. Vladimir Bogachev, a TASS military observer, gives his opinion of this plan:

[Begin Bogachev recording] The figures in the Pentagon plan are truly impressive. The U.S. regular forces would be cut by (?42,000); the number of tactical aircraft and naval ships would be reduced. This includes two aircraft carriers.

True, Cheney stressed that this is not a specific plan, but merely an illustration of possible U.S. actions which could be taken under certain circumstances. It is perfectly clear that the U.S. plan is a somewhat belated reaction on the part of the Pentagon to the unilateral reductions of Soviet troops, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. If Cheney's plan is implemented, it will be an important step on the road to reducing the level of military confrontation in the world.

That said, one fact stands out: This illustration does not affect the current U.S. program to modernize the United States nuclear forces. This is a very important element in U.S. military organizational development. The United States is examining a project to create evasive nuclear warheads for strategic missiles that would have the ability to overcome anti-missile defenses. This is quite an old project—back in the seventies the U.S. Administration turned it down because a treaty had been signed limiting anti-missile defense systems, and evasive warheads lost their significances.

It is worrisome that now, with the sharp reduction in tension in international relations, Washington has returned to this project. The U.S. plans envisage the creation of deep ground penetration nuclear charges to strike at the opposition's well-defended command centers. The United States is building a nuclear depth charge to strike at submarines. Plans are being drawn up to deploy supersonic cruise missiles that would be invulnerable to the enemy's defense systems.

So, it transpires that, with one hand the Pentagon chief is signing draft plans to cut conventional forces, while with his other hand he is signing definite plans to improve his strategic nuclear weapons.

What we see here is the old principle that any reduction of U.S. armaments in one sphere must unfailingly be compensated for by a buildup of arms in another sphere. One gets the impression that the modernization of nuclear weapons has become for the United States an end in itself which is no longer governed by national security considerations. The logic of the Pentagon is that the United States' new nuclear weapons should be built irrespective of the military-political situation in the world, come hell or high water as the saying goes. [end recording]

Ambassador Bessmertnykh on U.S. Relations

2306035490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1815 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Interview with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States, by political observer Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin; in Washington in June 1990; on the "Undiplomatic Conversations" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Zorin] Hello there, comrades. Until now, we've held our undiplomatic conversations with representatives of the diplomatic service and politicians of foreign countries. I think it's time we spoke to Soviet diplomats as well, in order to clarify their positions and views about politics and life. It would generally be a good thing for our viewers to have an idea of the people who act on behalf of our homeland abroad, not just in an

abstract sense as mere names and titles, but as real, living people. And it is quite natural to start our conversations with Soviet diplomats with a conversation with the new Soviet ambasador the United States, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh. First a few words about him. He was born in the Altay in 1933. In 1957, he graduated from the Institute of International Relations, and since then he has been a career diplomat, although he also has an academic background: Aleksandr Alexsandrovich is a candidate of legal sciences. And all these years he has held various posts in our country's diplomatic service. Did I get all that right, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich?

[Bessmertnykh] I think it was all accurate.

[Zorin] So let's start our conversation with the following question. You have found yourself in a rather particular situation—you were thrown in at the deep end, so to speak. Immediately on your arrival in Washington—I think you just had time to present your letters of credence to the president—the seventh Soviet-American summit began. It was, of course, a difficult situation. My question is this. You were not just a witness of, but also a direct participant in, all seven meetings of Soviet and American leaders in recent years. You were at the negotiating table and you were privy to all the nuances. What were the special features of the latest Washington meeting—if you can draw a comparison—and what do you think was its main significance? How would you put it, briefly?

[Bessemertnykh] The meeting that recently ended in Washington, or rather in the United States—because it was broader than just Washington—was without doubt a higher point in the development of Soviet-American relations. It undoubtedly bears the imprint of the times, and that is its special feature. I'd put it like this. All the previous summits were step-by-step preparations for major changes in international life and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. By and large, these changes came to pass, and this meeting took place at a moment when the wind of change was already whistling at the windows during the talks. Secondly, I'd say that a characteristic feature of these talks was that the two leaders had the opportunity finally to have a few hours of peace and quiet. Previously, unfortunately, they did not as a rule manage this—to talk about the future of our relations from a long-term, historical perspective, about the place that the United States and Soviet Union would occupy at, say, the end of the century, and about how we should be building our relations, even now, to ensure that these future relations are reliable, stable, and meet the interests of the Soviet and American peoples. And the third and final point is, of course, the actual extent of the accords, understandings, and mutual understanding that were the tangible result of the meeting. It needs to be said, all the same, that for the first time in history, two states agreed to reduce strategic offensive armaments. Evidently, everyone knows about this, of course, but one can scarcely say that everyone recognizes how historic and how staggeringly novel this is. The fact that the two presidents agreed on the main provisions of the future treaty, which is to be signed towards the end of the new year [as heard] is a very important event. Until now, we have merely limited strategic offensive weapons, and now we have got down to reducing them—and what is more, immediately reducing them by half. And finally, I would also class among the specific positive features of the recent meeting the fact that for us, it was geared to tackling specific concerns associated with restructuring. The agreements on trade, on civil aviation, on maritime shipping, and the many, many other accords concluded here are designed, if I can put it like this, to service our needs at this point in time from the direction of the United States as much as possible. I hope this will help.

[Zorin] The following question arises here, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich: After 50 years of what was officially called, say, confrontation and hostility, after 50 years of our countries being adversaries engaged in the cold war, now we speak not simply of normalizing relations but of cooperation, according to what you have already mentioned. We are ceasing being adversaries and are becoming partners. Is this more than rhetoric, is there real content here, is it possible? Imagine several families occupying the same apartment—cooperation is very seldom in evidence there whereas conflicts are more frequent in such situations. And in our case, we have two great powers distinguished by numerous diverging interests and different ideologies, and suddenly such an abrupt turn-about occurs. Is it real or are we indulging in wishful thinking?

[Bessmertnykh] You know, to have peace in the kitchen one needs fairly reasonable living conditions in the communal apartment. Over the past decades, our diplomacy has worked on creating such conditions, our dipldomacy and, naturally, Americans, too. You know all this very well, being a professor, and have written quite a lot on this subject. Let us recall the 1960's, the surprise and inspiration everybody felt after Kennedy's speech at an American university when he said that they were going to improve relations with the Soviet Union in general. A long road has been passed. It took a very long time to establish dialogue. But dialogue is, on the whole, the key used by diplomacy in its work. One could say that it has no other tools, in fact. Therefore, when dialogue with the United States was established, naturally the next stage was to establish understanding and mutual understanding of our own tasks and of those of others. Then a degree of interaction emerged, somewhere on the horizon, when the two sides started thinking about doing, perhaps, something together for each other and for the rest of the world. Those were not just words, it was not pure rhetoric even at that stage. I do not mention the agreements that were concluded, such as, taking recent times, joint actions aimed at normalizing a number of grave conflict situations. I do not mention the fact that we are reducing weapons and that the two sides are, at last, starting to reduce military budgets. All this is very palpable, all this shows that our foreign policy is paying off from the viewpoint of our

own interests. Now we are approaching the stage which could be described as a stage of increasing interaction. Perhaps, we have not yet attained partnership. I would think that this is the next phase to be attained yet, a phase of interaction between two states based on greater understanding of each other's interests and trust. Partnership requires trust, you cannot become partners without trust, if you constantly suspect each other. So I think we are somewhere between the stage of increasing interaction and the future stage which you have described as partnership. This is neither demagogy nor rhetoric. In this case, diplomacy and foreign policy are making maximum efforts aimed at filling this with specific content. I think that people see and appreciate this now.

[Zorin] You mentioned confidence. This is very important, of course, but confidence is not an abstract thing, confidence is between people, confidence between politicians: policy is made by people. And in this connection, there is a question: For many years you and I have been working under those conditions. We were brought up under those conditions, we conceived certain stereotypes, and my question is as follows: Are people of this generation capable of thinking in a truly new way and carrying out these essential breakthroughs? Or are we going to have to wait until the next generation comes onto the arena?

[Bessmertnykh] This is a very deep question. It seems to me that every generation is heterogeneous. It has within itself elements that are obsolete, elements that are becoming obsolete and also something of the future. All revolutions and all changes have always been done by people of the present, not by people of the future, that is to say they have been carried out by those people who have considered themselves to be capable of recognizing the need for changes or for revolution, say, and who have considered it possible to concentrate their efforts upon the realization of such possibilities. I think that the present generation which has lived during the difficult period of the cold war, confrontation, and disputes—you rightly mentioned the tough stereotypes—well, it has found within itself the strength to change these nations.

[Zorin] A part of it has, at any rate.

[Bessmertnykh] A part of them, if only the part that I was talking about, the front-ranking part of any generation which is capable of seeing the need of the present day and of the next day, too, perhaps. Then you also have to proceed from the fact that stereotypes or concepts that are imposed are not always accepted deeply and sincerely by everyone. I think that among thinking people, the concept of the cold war provoked internal skepticism if not indignation. Who was the author of this cold war is a different matter. On this we still continue to argue.

[Zorin] But the scepticism is both here and in our own country?

[Bessmertnykh] There is definately skepticism on both sides. I know many Americans who, from the very beginning, felt this skepticism within themselves and tried to overcome it in some way, so to speak, and the same thing happened among our own thinking group of people engaged in foreign policy. They understood that it was in the interests of the Soviet Union to break off the self-imposed isolation, to get out of this cold war which brings with it a colossal burden for the people and its economy and for its future. This does not mean that they were mystic prophets of some kind. They were simply people more closely linked with reality and who felt that all of this would flow on, so to speak. I think, therefore, that our generation has taken upon itself the very complex task of mastering itself and of mastering the trend in the direction of a more worthy life, both internationally and nationally, and also as individuals, if you like.

[Zorin] My next questions relates to your activity as an ambassador, but I would like to begin with a delicate matter, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich. It doesn't matter whether I ask it or not, many of our viewers are asking it themselves. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. And then suddenly ambassador to the United States. What is this—a demotion, how should it be seen?

[Bessmertnykh] You know it is very interesting that you have asked this question. I was asked it by one deputy in the Supreme Soviet when hearings of the newly appointed ambassadors were taking place for the first time. Both then and now, I will give my full personal conviction in this connection. To be an ambassador is the dream of any professional diplomat. I don't know what comparisons I can make to make it understandable. Imagine someone working as secretary of the Union of Writers. This is a very honorable thing, there is a lot of work, certainly, it is well known, it carries a lot of responsibility. And then suddenly he is given an opportunity to work professionally on the writing of a book. It's just the same for an ambassador. It is an extremely professional position. To a certain extent, it is a position that isolates one, if one may put it like that, and in which you have full opportunity for showing what you are worth from the point of view of what you say, your opinions, your judgments, your assessments and proposals. It is a position which carries with it a colossal amount of risk, in so far as the responsibility placed upon you is very great. Behind your back is the entire state. You represent the Soviet Union before the country where you are staying and before the government with which you are working. But it is generally recognized that working in Washington, the number one spot in Soviet foreign policy, is of of course a matter of special responsibility and honor.

[Zorin] One could say that, on the whole, people treat the rank of ambassador with great respect, it is a long-standing Russian tradition and Petr Alekseyevich [Peter the Great] used to appoint the most intelligent boyars as ambassadors. But I am afraid that our viewers have only the most general ideas about the concrete work of ambassadors and its content: receptions, diplomatic notes, and talks. But, putting in a nutshell—although I

understand that one could speak about this at length—what is an ambassador's everyday activity, what components does it include?

[Bessmertnykh] You are absolutely right. Many people regard diplomatic work as very easy, full of receptions, clinking glasses, and so on. These things are part of it, too, but not a large and not the best part of our work, although a necessary one because through receptions and other events of this kind, we have an opportunity to communicate with the broadest strata of society in which we live and with which we work. Well, the main work of a diplomat or an ambassador consists, first of all, in the invisible, behind-the-curtains part which is linked, primarily—taking a working day an example—with information. In other words, an ambassador in Washington works for about 14-15 hours. I never leave the study before 11 or 12 at night and the same is true of my predessors. The ambassador begins his working day by studying the latest world and U.S. events and the information contained in coded messages from Moscow. In other words, it is a prompt analysis of the day from the point of view of the problems you have to face independently of your will. You can never plan your activity because you simply do not know what the next day will bring. You can plan only approximately. And right from the morning, you run into a number of problems that require an immediate response, solution or explanations. This is the first part of work: sifting incoming information through your brain, first of all, from the point of view of its importance for our state, of whether it needs be clarified and so on. Analysis is the next phase, of course. One needs to know how the United States ticks, so far as you work in the United States, and Moscow must be in the know about the feelings among the U.S. Administration, the Congress, or the public and so on. This requires constant contacts; in other words, during the working day, the ambassador has to communicate with representatives of most different strata, talk with them and then there is a great deal of paperwork, serious paperwork, in earnest, when you have to roll up your sleeves, and there we give an analysis of some problems. Moscow needs not only information but also clarification of what is behind it, the hidden springs and causes of events. These are general aspects, so to speak. Our everyday relations require an enormous amount of work. After all, now our relations are based on about 50 agreements. A huge number of protocols and accords between us are in effect. This implies everyday work with departments of the U.S. Government and with our own ministries, and very often it is more difficult to work with our ministries than with American departments. So I would say, you have to perform the functions of a pusher, to a degree, pushing through the things we regard as important and so on. Then there is work with the Congress and senators where the future of many treaties and accords is decided, work with the public and various representatives of intellectuals and so on. This fills your day. I must say that the ambassador is very lucky if at the end of the day he has a couple of hours for thinking things over. [passage omitted]

Post-Summit Marked by Improved U.S. Relations

LD2406115990 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Announcer-read commentary written by Political Observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] Almost three weeks have elapsed since the end of the Washington summit, but today it seems I see its significance even more clearly than during the summit itself. It has been aptly noted that significant events can be seen in their full stature from a certain historical distance. In an interview for Soviet television during the Washington summit, President Gorbachev spoke highly of relations of trust and understanding established with President Bush. I regard this as a very important circumstance. It has been known for quite some time that personal relations between statesmen play far from the last role in world politics. However it is also important that the mutual trust established between the two presidents, as well as between their aides and assistants, reflect the process of favorable development of USSR-U.S. relations.

The past summit was the seventh between Soviet and American leaders, and I had the good fortune to attend and directly observe the course of all these seven meetings. Because of this, I can rely on my evaluations not only on official documents, which of course is very important, but also on my personal impressions. for example, in Iceland and in Malta, no official documents were signed, and, so, if one tries to draw a diagram of all the seven meetings starting from the one in Geneva and ending with the last in Washington, it would be impressive. One could draw a conclusion from the diagram not only about a sharp upward curve in relations between our two countries; one can make a statement of fact about a drastic turn that has fully changed both the Soviet-American relationship and the entire international-political situation. The path traversed since Geneva has milestones along it. At first there was total distrust passing into mutual hatred. Then there was a normalization of relations. Following that a search was made for a path to cooperation, and finally, now, we are on this path to broader interaction and partnership.

I do not want to run ahead and assess the future in relations between our two countries, the less so there are quite a few visible and invisible obstacles on these paths. But judging by the results of the Washington summit, I believe it is possible to say quite definitely that Moscow and Washington have started broad cooperation in many areas, and the areas of mutually advantageous ties are increasing all the time. That is not just my view, several days ago, speaking in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and summing up the results of the meeting, Secretary of State Baker noted that both sides were now looking for areas of mutual benefit in developing their relations.

In general I would like to stress in conclusion once again how strikingly the current level of Soviet-American

relations differs from the one at the first summit in Geneva 1985. In a comparatively short time, our two countries have managed to cover quite a long path, meeting each other half-way for the sake of promoting peace and advancing cooperation.

U.S. Nuclear Specialists Visit Chelyabinsk

LD2206052790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1255 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk, 21 Jun (TASS)—One can make the world safer while applying nuclear power engineering by pooling the efforts and experience of the Soviet and American sides. This was the conclusion reached today by those attending a meeting of specialists from the two countries, which has ended in Chelyabinsk Oblast (southern Urals).

The American delegation toured a defense-industry complex producing weapons-grade plutonium. The visitors were particularly interested in the methods and effectiveness of the bural of radioactive waste. They also visited Lake Karachay, into which some 120 million curies of radionuclides had been discharged.

"We saw all that interested us, and heard precise answers to all questions," said Leo Duffy, U.S. deputy energy secretary [title as received]. "This will speed up the compilation of programs for further joint action. We are following parallel policies, and the technology of both sides is quite reliable. But we have to work together to see that it becomes safer still."

After inspecting the work of staff at a research station of the USSR Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry, and visiting plantations in a local reserve, Frank Parker, a member of the U.S. National Academy, noted that it was one of the best sites that he had seen. He had been favorably impressed by the relatively fast recovery of local land from the consequences of the 1957 accident, as a result of which considerable areas had been polluted by radioactive waste.

U.S. Chemical Weapons Experts, Counterparts Meet

LD2206133490 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin]

[Text] San Francisco June 22 TASS—A group of American and Soviet diplomats and experts on chemical weapons met in Salt Lake City, Utah.

They inspected a new U.S. complex for chemical weapons destruction at Toole military base, where over 40 percent of U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles are kept.

The visit by a group of Soviet experts is the first of seven visits envisaged by the Soviet-American memorandum regarding the bilateral experiment to control and exchange data, signed last September by the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state.

The current meeting is part of building confidence and establishing glasnost in the military areas, says a statement of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States. The meeting helps create a basis for the exchange of specific data and the inspection of facilities where chemical weapons are kept.

Gorbachev Message to Meeting of Young Leaders

PM2306185590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 p 1

[M. Gorbachev message "To the Participants in the Meeting of USSR and U.S. Young Leaders"; date not given]

[Text] I cordially greet you, young people preparing yourselves to take over from the present generation of state and political figures. I am sincerely pleased that the dialogue begun in Philadelphia two years ago is continuing.

You will have to apply your knowledge and gifts in unique conditions.

The changes which have embraced the entire world open up unencompassable horizons of interesting and useful work for the benefit of your countries and the world community. You will have to tackle unprecedented tasks. Therefore your desire to know more about each other and understand better the different conditions in which each of us will have to operate is encouraging. And it is very important that you do not lose the contacts which are being established at this time—in youth they are particularly strong and productive.

The recent Soviet-American summit brought the USSR and the United States to a new level of relations. We will cherish these relations and fill them with the content which our peoples and everyone in general need.

The building of a new world needs the imagination and initiative of young people. I wholeheartedly wish your meeting success.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev

Bush Meets Abe, Praises U.S.-Japanese Treaty

LD2206075190 Moscow TASS in English 0743 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Washington June 22 TASS—President George Bush met former Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in the White House on Thursday.

Abe is currently in the United States as a special envoy of the Japanese prime minister at the festivities marking the 30th anniversary of the conclusion of the American-Japanese Treaty on Cooperation and Security.

During the 20-minute meeting, Bush and Abe discussed the situation in the Pacific Ocean region, bilateral relations, as well as the "global partnership between the United States and Japan", according to Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater.

During a brief photo session, President Bush referred to the American-Japanese treaty "as a cornerstone in a very important relationship".

He said that the United States, just as Japan, remained firmly committed to the treaty provisions, and that, apart from everything else, the treaty justified the presence of U.S. military bases on Japanese territory.

China

Tiananmen Protestors Still Held Without Charge

PM2506100390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Savenkov: "Dissidents Held Prisoner"]

[Text] Beijing—As many as 355 participants in last year's disturbances in Beijing are still in jail. This was said at a news conference by Zhang Husheng, a representative of the PRC National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee. At the beginning of June, public security bodies released 860 people who were involved in last year's riots.

Zhang Husheng was asked whether it is legal to hold people in jail for more than a year when they have not been charged. His reply was this: Chinese legal bodies judge cases and pass sentences in line with Chinese laws. This is the country's internal affair and no interference will be tolerated.

It was announced at the news conference that Zhao Fusan, a member of the NPC Standing Committee, has been stripped of his powers as deputy. He has already been removed from his post as vice president of the PRC Social Sciences Academy. According to a spokesman for the NPC Standing Committee, "while abroad, Zhao made written and oral statements defaming the CPC and the Chinese Government, which is in breach of the PRC constitution and PRC laws."

In May last year, before the imposition of martial law in Beijing, Zhao Fusan, a well known authority on religion and one of China's representatives in UNESCO, flew to Paris for a session of this international body. He did not return to China and now lives in the West.

Opening of Border Areas With PRC 'Irreversible'

OW2306120190 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Interview with Major General (Bukinko), a "senior officer of the Far Eastern border defense district," by station's Far Eastern correspondent (Kovton) "recently"; place not given—from the "Soviet Union Today" program]

[Text] [(Kovton)] How do you evaluate the significance of the invitation that Soviet border defense troops extended to their Chinese counterparts to mark their day on 28 May?

[(Bukinko)] I fully endorsed the invitation. It shows that peace and friendship have been restored between our two peoples, undoubtedly a most important development. It has been several years now since the Amur and the Ussuri became rivers that bring the two peoples together, instead of separating them. This is not a temporary phenomenon, but a very stable situation. Our border defense soldiers are the first to feel the restoration of the friendly traditions. I can recall the situation during the first few years following the founding of the Soviet Government. In those days, Soviet people in the Far East could cross the border to exchange products with Chinese people. Although the situation today is somewhat different, the border defense troops are pleased with the tranquility that has been established because it is the foundation of the constantly developing economic, cultural, and scientific ties between the Soviet Union and China.

[(Kovton)] Despite the rapid development of contacts, our two countries are still separated by barbed wire and alarms. Moreover, more of such unpleasant things are found on the Soviet side than on the Chinese side.

[(Bukinko)] We are thinking of this issue and we have done something about it. It is possible today for Khabarovsk residents to travel to the border defense areas, and people in the (?Leninskoye) areas may travel on the Amur and Ussuri. We have simplified the procedures for entering the border defense areas, and we have provided the local residents with greater possibilities to engage in production, fishing, and recreational activities on the Amur and Ussuri. Issues relevant to irrigation and immigration [yi min] in the border areas are being settled. Since 1 June, and scheduled to last for one month, we have been permitting people to come to the border areas to look at the facilities there. No new obstacles are being built this month. The border defense troops also have invited villagers living in border areas to particpate in all kinds of activities, especially in preserving the ecology and in repairing roads and bridges. This is significant. People can see for themselves that we are removing the obstacles in the border areas, and this may make them think differently. They may begin to think in terms of border tranquility and the development of friendship between the peoples of the two countries. We have been opening up to each other, and the process of opening the border areas is becoming irreversible.

Relations With China Called 'Stable, Lively'

OW2406201890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Commentary by station observer Mitin from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] Soviet-Chinese relations today cannot be better described than with the two words stable and lively. What are the characteristics of the two countries' relations today? How are the two countries' relations today different from in the 1950's? We now invite our station observer, Mitin, to comment on these questions:

[Begin Mitin recording] Listeners, how are you? Before I answer these questions, I want to ask this question: Can we say it is a good phenomenon if two friendly countries share totally identical points of view toward domestic and foreign policies? I think it is good if they can do so. I want to ask another question: Is it really necessary for two countries to share identical stands and viewpoints in order to establish normal friendly relations? In case the two countries differ on certain issues, can we say it is impossible for them to cooperate because of their differences? I am afraid that only people who stick to old ideological dogmas will think that countries holding different views cannot maintain friendly relations.

We remember that, during the 1950's, both Moscow and Beijing considered it irrefutable truth that they must see eye to eye on everything. In those days, they maintained that since the CPSU and the CPC were both ruling parties sharing the same ideology, their views should be totally the same. Needless to say, this dogmatic attitude carries within itself very complex issues. Sure enough, the Soviet Union and China began to have ideological differences in the late 1950's. They considered each other's ideology heresy. Consequently, the two parties severed their ties and relations between the two countries deteriorated.

Both the Soviet Union and China have learned a lesson from this experience and have learned what to do in the future.

Today, ideological requirements no longer play a role in Soviet-Chinese relations. Our starting point is that nobody has the right to impose his viewpoints on others. It is a fact that countries differ. Today, neither Moscow nor Beijing uses this fact as an excuse to reject the development of good neighborly relations.

The principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs—which is one of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that Soviet and Chinese leaders have time and again reiterated—is [words indistinct]. This shows that we have established our footing on realism and that our mental state is sound. I think this is a good assurance of a beautiful future. [end recording]

Economic Minister Views Chinese Cooperation

OW2506074?90 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0200 GMT 24 May 90

[Second part of talk by (Lukov), official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations—read by announcer]

[Text] Yesterday, we broadcast a talk by (Lukov), responsible person of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. He introduced the program of cooperation and development between the Soviet Union and China in the fields of economy, trade, and science and technology until the year 2000 signed by the Chinese Government leader during the period of his visit to our country. Today, we shall invite him to talk about other agreements signed during Premier Li Peng's visit.

[(Lukov) heard speaking briefly in Russian, fading into announcer translation in Mandarin] The government loan agreement signed between the governments of the two countries on China's providing loans to the Soviet Union for consumer goods for every day use will play an important role in the history of Soviet-Chinese economic relations and trade. The Soviet Union signed the loan agreement mainly for the purpose of importing textile products, food, household electric appliances, and Chinese handicraft articles. Cooperation in space exploration became an individual topic of discussion during the period of the Chinese leader's visit to the Soviet Union. We might as well say that it signals a new stage in efforts by the two countries to expand their economic contacts. Both sides mentioned a number of cooperation items in such fields as conducting experiments with instruments made by the Soviet side and jointly by the two sides on the "Mir" space station in orbit, China purchasing individual accessory parts of cosmonaut's life protection system, and Chinese cosmonauts possibly participating in a joint flight on the "Mir" space station in orbit in the near future.

The issue of conducting cooperation in building nuclear power stations was also discussed during his visit. Our country already explored the possibility of cooperation in this respect as early as 1984. However, it is not until now that the outlines of the prospect of cooperation have become visibly distinct. Both sides already have started to discuss a specific cooperation project—namely, the nuclear power station project in Liaoning Province—and signed a relevant memorandum for it.

During his Soviet visit, the Chinese leader not only discussed the documents that had been prepared in advance but also explored the prospect for agreements to be signed in the future. For instance, the issue of using a Chinese labor force on Soviet soil was listed in the agenda. At present, Chinese workers and experts are participating in labor in the Soviet Union. If an agreement is entered into on the basis of the experiences acquired in this field of endeavor, it will be conducive to systemizing the work in a planned way and under a legal

agreement. In addition, both sides were greatly interested in the plan to make joint efforts to explore and utilize boundary rivers. The two countries also began their initial cooperation in the field of military technology. So far, their cooperation is limited to space technology only. Thus, it can be seen that the visit became a powerful impetus to expanding bilateral contacts in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, credit loan, and finance. It now depends on the responsible authorities and enterprises [words indistinct] to turn these conditions into concrete realities.

Northeast Asia

DPRK Human Rights 'Infringements' Criticized

OW2306064990 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 0300 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA, on sale from 23 June, carries an article charging that human rights are infringed upon in the DPRK. The article calls on the Soviet Government to review its relationship with the country, saying that there are no common points between it and the present Soviet Union.

The article, signed by NOVOYE VREMYA editor (Leonid Muretin), criticizes the human rights infringements of North Korea, stating that it believes the Amnesty International report that there are many concentration camps in North Korea, and more than 100,000 people, including political prisoners, are detained there.

The article adds that there are no common aspects between the Soviet Union and the DPRK with respect to social reform, parliamentarianism, the multiparty system, and freedom of speech. Noting that the alliance relationship is limited to military strategy and that the existing military alliance relationship in fact is contributing to maintaining the cold war structure in the Far East, the article calls for revision of the military alliance relationship.

This is the first time that one of the Soviet mass media has made such a clear comment against the DPRK.

On the other hand, the article calls for early establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROK, saying that diplomatic relations with the ROK will bring an end to the structure of tensions in the Far East.

Lessons of Korean War Analyzed on Anniversary

SK2506050690 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] June the 25th marks the 40th anniversary of the beginning of the fratricidal war between North and South Korea, one of the most tragic events in the lives of the Korean people.

This war, started in 1950 and continued until 1953, took the lives of millions of people. Concerning this, station commentator (Sergey Petrov) writes:

Forty years have passed since the beginning of this war. The passage of time has rendered the tragic pain caused by loss and the suffering of the families and relatives less painful, but has failed to completely erase the tragedy.

The Korean people and American people, the Chinese people and the Russian people, and peoples of some other countries have laid down their lives in the land of Korea.

Approximately 54,000 Americans died and some 103,000 were wounded during this war. The number of the Chinese People's Volunteers who died or were wounded reached a combined total of about one million. These figures are not believed to be the total number of people who died or wounded in this war.

The most shocking figure, however, concerns the Korean people. The war took a toll of 9 million Korean lives in total. Of them, 84 percent were civilians. The fierce battles, bombings, and deaths during the three-year war have not made the Korean people any happier; national reunification has not been achieved; and even now North and South Korea stand in confrontation.

Now, what did North and South Korea fight against each other for? What kind of ideals were they trying to defend? It may sound strange, but both sides wanted freedom. Nevertheless, each of the two sides understood freedom in its own way. Also, lurking behind each of the two sides were major powers that have different political systems.

Chinese and Soviet military specialists defended the freedom and independence of the DPRK, while the United States and its allies did exactly the same in South Korea. The Korean war was the first armed dispute between the allies of an earlier era. But at this juncture, I would like to emphasize some other aspects as well. In other words, the 1950-53 Korean war graphically demonstrated that any one party to war cannot achieve military superiority, nor can it sacrifice its own people.

Unfortunately, this first objective lesson has not been appreciated and later it was completely forgotten. As a result, Vietnam and Afghanistan and other regional disputes and wars have taken place. Once again, several thousand lives had to be sacrificed to (make gains of a systematic and progressive revolutionary nature).

So, the sad 40 years since the beginning of the war that perpetuated the division of Korea have once again reminded us of the fact that it is necessary to figure our ways of coordinating the disputes on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means.

The past should not be used as a motive to wreak revenge upon another. Moreover, it should never be obstructive to holding dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul.

In recent years, the DPRK has put forward new peace proposals and in many aspects the proposals from South Korea are similar to the former. Contacts have become conspicuously active among the former parties to the war—that is to say, the United States, the DPRK, the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea.

What is more, the Soviet president and the South Korean president had their first meeting ever. All this has created good preconditions for conducting encouraging dialogue in the Far East.

I hope that this opportunity should not be missed and that Pyongyang and Seoul will finally move toward each other and advance together toward their national reunification.

The tragedy that started on 25 June 1950 should not be allowed to repeat itself.

Hokkaido Governor's Visit Continues

LD2206001190 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Yuzhnt-Sakhalinsk June 21 TASS—The islands of Sakhalin and Hokkaido are divided by the narrow La Perouse Strait. However, this waterway should be a link, rather than a dividing line, between the two neighbouring islands. This idea, as well as a joint quest for new possibilities for economic cooperation, were the centrepiece of a visit to Sakhalin by Takahiro Yokomichi, governor of the Hokkaido prefecture.

During his meeting with the chairman of the regional soviet, deputies to local Soviets and economic (?executives) the sides frankly discussed a wide range of problems dealing with inter-regional relations. They expressed confidence that such contacts would become an integral part of the agreement on friendly partnership between the Russian Federation and Hokkaido, signed during Yokomichi's visit to Moscow.

Takahiro Yokomichi met with ethnic Japanese living in Sakhalin and visited the Japanese cemetery.

Visit Ends, Termed 'Fruitful'

LD2206215790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0815 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Khabarovsk, 22 Jun (TASS)—The Soviet Far East and the Japanese island Hokkaido can use their opportunities for differect kinds of cooperation more actively. This opinion was expressed by Takahiro Yokomichi, governor of Hokkaido, on ending his visit to the USSR. In Khabarovsk the delegation led by him talked to the leaders of the Khabarovsk Kray.

Specific guidelines for partnership were outlined during the meeting with representatives of the groups of people's deputies, which deal with the issues of scientific and technical progress and foreign economic ties. The Japanese delegation went home today.

Assessing the results of the visit, Takahiro Yokomichi called it useful and fruitful. The agreement on cooperation between Hokkaido and the Soviet Far East, which has been signed in Moscow, will become a program of activities for the near future already, the guest stated. We agreed to set up working groups on both sides to carry out a detailed investigation of the potential for forming committees for business cooperation in 1991.

The rights which have been given to territories in the USSR to carry out foreign economic activities independently, going over to the market economy can become a good spur to the revival of our ties, the Japanese governor said. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the influence of the center, especially in planning and carrying out major policies. We face the same situation in Japan as well.

We have great hopes of settling relations between our countries, the governor continued. The coming trip by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Japan followed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit should open up new aspects for the future which looks favorable and hopeful.

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on Soviet Response to Iran Earthquake

Gorbachev Sends Condolences

LD2306082990 Moscow TASS in English 0816 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev sent a message of condolences to President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani of Iran, expressing sincere compassion in connection with the natural calamity that hit the country—an earthquake that claimed numerous human lives.

Mikhail Gorbachev asked the Iranian president to convey his deep condolences to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in the earthquake.

Scope of Aid Viewed

LD2506131990 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Excerpts] It's painful to hear reports coming from Iran. [passage omitted] Tehran asks for aid and its call has not remained unanswered. Yuriy Solton comments:

Compassion and charity know no borders. They step over enmity that politicians generated and were later helpless to overcome. The planes that landed at Tehran's airport on Sunday included an American airliner, the first aircraft after the crisis that broke out between the two countries in 1980 when American diplomats in Tehran were taken hostage. The leadership of Iraq, which was at war with Iran for eight years, has expressed condolences and offered aid. Other countries, whose

relations with Iran were far from friendly, have reacted in the same way. [passage omitted]

Today, Soviet aid has been sent to Iran. Large groups of Soviet medics and rescue workers are already there, working with the experts from other countries.

According to reports, one of Iran's spiritual leaders, upon seeing the efforts of foreign rescue workers, said with tears in his eyes: we in Iran didn't know how many friends we had. Maybe after this terrible tragedy we'll be able to restore our relations with other nations broken long ago, he added. And probably this is what will happen. Disasters have two faces: one tragic, and the other reminding you that you are not alone in this world.

Quake Relief Aid Arrives

LD2206210290 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—A special Aeroflot flight took off from Moscow for Iran today with a team of doctors and rescue workers who will help clear the aftermath of the earthquake that hit the country on the night between June 20 and 21.

In addition to rescue workers, the aircraft carries relief aid—tents, blankets, and bandages—from the USSR Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Commentary Views Issue of Jewish Emigration

LD2306065190 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Commentary by Aleksey Zlatoruskiy: "Israel and the Emigration Issue"]

[Text] When Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir announced the program of his new government, he said that its main task would be to encourage the emigration of Jews to Israel by all means. Later on, Shamir spoke at the meeting of the Zionist action committee in Jerusalem and said that his government will spare no efforts to step up the emigration of Jews and incorporate them into Israeli society.

Not very long ago, Shamir for the first time talked about the emigration of Jews to Israel and allowing them to settle in the occupied areas; this aroused a stormy reaction in Arab countries. The discussion of this question occupied a prominent place in various conferences and discussions, including the recent Baghdad summit.

The spearhead of criticism was directed to a greater extent toward the Soviet Union because the greater part of Jewish emigration has been and still is coming from the Soviet Union. But time went on. What can be said about the current situation?

I would refresh memories by saying that the Soviet Union adopted several measures to reduce the zeal of those who benefit from the Jewish emigrants who would settle in occupied areas. A demand by Israel and its protectors for opening a direct air link between Moscow and Tel Aviv was rejected.

The question of upholding Soviet citizenship for the Jews who have been going to Israel so that they can return or travel to any other country is being discussed. Finally, Israel was (?appraised) at the highest level. The Soviet President Mikhael Gorbachev announced that if Israel did not put forward guarantees not to settle emigrants in the occupied areas, the Soviet Union would be compelled to think if it is better to defer the granting of exit visas to its Jewish citizens.

Israel recently celebrated the arrival of the 50,000th emigrant as of 1 January this year. Has anyone of them settled in the occupied areas? Yes. But at the rate of less than one percent—that is slightly more than 150 persons—most of whom were relatives of those who left earlier and settled in the Israeli settlements. This is despite the fact that there is a frenzied move for settlement in the occupied areas among the emigrants and especially those who arrived from the Soviet Union.

The Gush Imunim organization published special maps and a collection of post cards in Russian depicting the advantages of living in Jewish settlements in the occupied areas. But this had no benefit. Social tension has been increasing day after day in Israel itself. The prices of apartments and houses have been rising and unemployment has increased alongside a rise in crime. As a result of this, more and more want to leave the country to which they had come believing the Zionist propaganda that it is a Jewish paradise.

The number of those who want to return to their country of origin is steadily increasing. Those who exploit the souls of human beings in other countries do not hesitate to exploit this situation. For example, it was learned recently that a network of agents who were recruited by South Africa is actively working in Israel. They have been making tempting offers of apartments and high salaries and social protection, all that anyone would like have and wish to have, on condition that he or she agrees to go to South Africa.

The Israeli Knesset expressed concern in this connection. Last year, 14,000 persons left Israel and this number is expected to increase a great deal this year. Many Jews discovered that the promised land is not as hospitable as they used to believe.

Commentary on Israel's Settling of Immigrants

TA2406174390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Commentary by Prof. Vyacheslav (Shatrov) read by announcer, who at the end of the commentary notes that (Shatrov) is "expressing the attitude of official Soviet authorities vis-a-vis Israel and the problem of the territories"]

[Text] The prolonged conflict in the Middle East has recently been exacerbated, and official circles in the Soviet Union hold Israel responsible. According to these circles, Israel has been violating international law and its commitments to the United Nations. Today we have the opinion of Vyacheslav (Shatrov), an official spokesman and professor of international law:

By settling the occupied territories with newly arrived immigrants, including immigrants from the Soviet Union, Israel this time has challenged the entire Arab world and the international community at large. A long series of international treaties unambiguously defines the status of occupied territory. For example, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention on the rights of the civilian population in times of war bans an occupier from settling its citizens on the territory of an occupied country. This same international treaty obliges the occupier to behave humanely and not to violate the rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

What I say is that Israel has intentionally and continuously been violating international treaties which bear its signature and which are binding on it, not to mention the violation of other international documents such as the UN Security Council resolutions on the Middle East. The fact that Israel settles immigrants in the occupied territories only exacerbates the situation and the violation of human rights—in this case the rights of Palestinian Arabs. If we add the fact that the intifadah broke out in response to the deportation of Palestinians, we will see the two sides of the coin: the local inhabitants are uprooted first, and then the area is Judaized by settling it with immigrants.

There is another facet to this illegal policy which affects the Soviet Union and the Arabs. I am referring to the talk about settling Soviet immigrants in the territories. Israel is betting on driving a wedge in the traditionally friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Arabs. The Soviet Government's statement with regard to the illegal settlement of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and our consultations with the Arab leaders constitute an unequivocal response to Israel's provocative intentions. It was none other than the Soviet Union that initiated a discussion in the Security Council of the illegal action of the Israeli authorities with regard to the settlement of the occupied territories.

At times it is suggested to us that we restrict or ban the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. This would call for a violation of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and for giving up on the new political thinking. It is not up to the Soviet Union to take restrictive measures, but up to Israel to stop violating the elementary norms of international law. The international community is entitled to demand as much from Yitzhaq Shamir—it is entitled to demand the abrogation of all the resolutions that contradict the spirit of the treaties governing the political behavior of countries and nations.

Finland Stops Soviet Emigrants' Transit to Israel

PM2506114190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy: "Transit Route 'Frozen'"]

[Text] Finland has toughened its stand on the planned transit flights of planes carrying Soviet Jewish emigrants across its territory (IZVESTIYA Nos. 96 and 147). The Nordic country's leadership would like official assurances from Israel that the migrants will not be settled on the occupied Arab territories.

In this connection Z. al-Wazir, PLO representative in Finland, has urged Finland to call off the transit plans entirely—particularly after the publication of the new Israeli extreme right-wing government's political program.

Thus a question which seemed to have been sorted out by social, philanthropic, and religious organizations (the preparation of transport and camps for the departing emigrants) is harder to resolve at the political level. The transit question, as the press writes, has been "frozen," at least until the end of Finnish Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio's visit to Israel, Jordan, and Syria at the end of June.

The newspaper UUSI SUOMI carried a report that in certain circumstances Finland's transit services may not be needed at all.

In connection with the postponement of flights, A. Na'im, Israel's ambassador to Finland, sent a so-called "oral note" to the republic's Foreign Ministry. The point of his statement is that the conditions put forward by Finland for transit (including the demand that the emigrants have Finnish currency) are "worse than Soviet conditions." They were a surprise for those USSR citizens who intended to leave from Leningrad.

In the ambassador's words, Israel has no intention of settling Soviet Jews on the occupied territories. "On the other hand, as a democratic country it cannot make laws which apply to only some of its citizens," A. Naim stated, meaning a situation in which only Israelis can live where they want while others (Soviets) will be prohibited from doing so. At the moment it is clear that the first group of emigrants is not likely to leave Finnish territory for Israel even a month after the promised date. The Finns have again demonstrated their leisurely and thorough way of making important political decisions.

Moscow Views Buildup of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal

LD2406135690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Station commentary by international affairs journalist Igor Penchenko]

[Text] According to foreign news agency reports, Israel is continuing to build up its nuclear and missile potential.

Here is a Mayak commentary. International Affairs Journalist Igor Penchenko is at the microphone.

[Penchenko] Israel is not counted as a member of the nuclear club, but neither has it acceded to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Tel Aviv is thereby deliberately maintaining ambiguity in respect of its nuclear status; but, as they say, the truth will out.

Israel began long ago to develop its nuclear potential—about 20 years ago. Whereas this was for a time done secretly, it is now no longer a secret. It is well known that the main work in the sphere of nuclear energy is conducted at Dimona in the Negev desert. A reactor has been built there which is able to produce some 20-40 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually, which is sufficient to equip five to eight nuclear warheads. The reactor at Dimona operates on natural uranium. The main supplier of this material to Israel is the Republic of South Africa [RSA]. A deal has been concluded between Pretoria and Tel Aviv which provides, for instance, for the following reciprocal favors: the RSA provides Israel with a range to test its missiles and supplies it with uranium. In return, Israel provides its partner with certain nuclear secrets and familiarizes it with the technology for making atomic bombs. In addition to the RSA, Israel also receives natural uranium from Argentina, Belgium, and France.

As for equipment for enriching uranium and obtaining plutonium, Israel has acquired some from Britain and France. Finally, Western partners are supplying Tel Aviv with all the necessary information on designs and the results of nuclear explosive tests.

What then are the results of these many years of work? According to a claim in the West German DIE ZEIT magazine, Israel's potential amounts to 100 warheads. The eminent Israeli atomic scientist (?Perlmutter), who now resides in the United States, specifies a different figure—about 200 units. In any event this is a frighteningly strong potential. None of Israel's neighbors and no Arab country possesses a single unit of such weapons. Israel is therefore the first in this troubled region to possess the means of mass destruction. Moreover, it also possesses the means to deliver its nuclear weapons—namely, the multi-stage Jericho class missiles which it has created with the assistance of Western specialists. They have a range of up to 1,500 km. Only two Arab states—Saudi Arabia and Iraq—possess ballistic missiles, but they do not have nuclear warheads.

Israel's steadfast striving to build up its nuclear and missile potential is fraught with the danger of intensifying the Israeli-Arab military confrontation. The complicity in this of a number of Western countries is helping to destabilize the situation in the Near East and beyond the region too.

Latvia, Israel Sign Trade Protocol of Intention

LD2206201990 Moscow TASS in English 1928 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Riga June 22 TASS—A protocol of intention was signed here today between the Latvian Ministry of Economy and the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade.

The protocol determines main directions of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation. The sides are planning to conduct joint research, organise joint ventures and exchange scientific information, licenses and samples of products and materials.

Commenting on the document, Professor Herman Branover from the Ben Gurion University in Beersheva described it as important and opening up wide prospects.

Only in Latvia and Israel there exist specialised research centres studying melted metals magnetohydrodynamics. They are like "two halves of an apple", Branover said. United efforts will promote the development of new technologies in metallurgy, power engineering and semiconductor physics, the professor believes.

East Europe

Shevardnadze at 'Checkpoint Charlie' Closing

LD2206125190 Moscow TASS in English 1231GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Voronenkov and Vyacheslal Katyatev]

[Text] Berlin June 22 TASS—Checkpoint Charlie in the American sector of Berlin was closed in a ceremony today before the opening of the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the two German states, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France in accordance with the "two-plus-four" formula.

The ceremony was attended by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his counterpart from the German Democratic Repubic Markus Meckel. Honorary chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany Willy Brandt was among the guests.

Speaking at the ceremony, Shevardnadze emphasized that this event is a specific sign of a turn for the better in the international arena, of the gradual ending of confrontation and of new developments in German affairs.

Another of the emotional, and at times dramatic, pages in Berlin's post-war history has been turned. Within the frameowrk of the "two-plus-four: negotiations, decisions are being made out to open the way to German unity on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of alil participants in the negotiations, for the consolidation of stability and security in Europe.

Shevarnadze told the people of Berlin that at the meeting of the Six, to begin shortly, the Soviet side intends to submit a draft document aimed at a final settlement with Germany in terms of international law. He said the draft document includes provisons bearing on Berlin's near future.

"We want to suggest to our partners that the occupation regime be ended when a single German parliament and government has been formed and that all troops of the four powers leave the Greater Berlin within six months. Other features of Berlin's present special status would simultaneously be eliminated and western sectors of Berlin would restore ties with their natural environs," the minister said.

"We support a completely full life in Berlin and support bringing it into the process of creating a new German state," Shevardnadze said.

"On the 49th Anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War I would like to express confidence that all of us can jointly draw the line under the past and start advancing towards new horizons of mutual understanding and cooperation," Shevardnadze said.

"I wish Berliners peace, tranquility and well-being. I wish Berlin to become one of the centers of a new system of stability and security in Europe, a bridge between the East and West of Europe," Shevardnadze said.

To the strains of an American military orchestra, a crane started operating to dismantle the main structure of Checkpoint Charlie.

Two-Plus-Four Talks in Berlin Continue

Shevardnadze Addresses Forum

PM2506125190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report, including "text" of speech by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze on 22 June at the "Two-Plus-Four" talks in Berlin: "Meeting of Six States' Ministers"]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Chairman!

Esteemed colleagues!

The Soviet delegation today is submitting for your examination a draft document entitled, "Basic Principles for a Final Settlement With Germany in International Law."

It is 49 years to the day since fascist troops staged a treacherous attack on our country. The memory of the Great Patriotic War will always stay with us. The scars will remain in the hearts and souls of our people who bore innumerable sacrifices for the sake of restoring peace in our country and, together with it, in the other countries of Europe and not only in Europe.

Europe today was born out of the bloody confrontation of dozens of states and peoples. It [confrontation] should never be repeated. That is the testament of Yalta and Potsdam. Many years have passed since then. We have all drawn conclusions from the past even if we lacked the wisdom, strength of will, and breadth of vision to prevent the four-year hot war from being replaced by the decades-long cold war. However, since then there have been no wars in Europe. There has been steady movement toward a new Europe which has led us all to the present qualitatively new horizon.

The previous order of things, which was based upon agreements of the war and postwar period, on the rights and responsibilities of the four powers, on bloc confrontation and military equilibrium, is becoming more and more removed from the realities of present Europe. In its place came the Final Act, adopted at Helsinki, the new system of treaties and agreements which threw up bridges between the East and West and the north and south of Europe; across the borders of military and political alliances; and across national, philosophical, cultural, and other dividing lines. Movement in this direction is gathering speed and strength.

The time has also come to place all matters connected with Germany's place and role in the new Europe and the world on a new, stable foundation in international law. The two German states, the GDR and FRG, have commenced the unification process in accordance with the will of their citizens. This process must become not a loss but a gain for all Germans and all the other peoples of our continent. Our common task now is to regulate the external aspects of German unification, and in such a way that the decisions adopted by us within the "two-plus-four" mechanism and subsequently presented to the all-European summit meeting guarantee peace, stability, and prosperity in central Europe more reliably and far-sightedly than previous decisions and accords on German matters, not less so.

I think that, in present conditions, the process of German unification can and should become the stimulus and the new united German state itself the driving force for profound qualitative changes in a Europe organized according to the principles of joint security, trust, and good-neighborliness.

It is fair to say something else as well, however. A united Germany will not fit the landscape of a new Europe if everything in Europe remains as it was before. In that case, German unity would simply amount to a boost of power on the side of one of the two groups which opposes the other. This would disturb a balance that has developed and become established in past decades and would signal an exacerbation of the contradictions and a move toward conflict. This means that Europe must change.

At the Political Consultative Committee conference the top leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states declared that this organization must undergo profound changes if it wants to play a constructive part in the further

development and improvement of European cooperation and security structures. Our alliance made a start on a far-reaching transformation of its activity in all fields, including the military sphere.

We proposed to the NATO states that they should start moving in the same direction and we can note with satisfaction that we heard a positive response from Turnberry.

As we begin this movement, we must realize that it is not only the direction which is important but, even more so, the dynamism and scale of the changes. From this point of view we are awaiting with great attention the decisions of NATO's London session. Much will depend on this.

In any event, I can assure all those present that we are ready for radical, far-reaching steps. The very character of relations between both alliances and their member states must be changed, their present structures and functions must be restructured having subordinated this whole radical transformation to the task of the transition from confrontation to cooperation and to interaction on a broad range of questions.

In Copenhagen we constituted a working mechanism which is supposed to deal with this matter and present us with appropriate recommendations. In this connection, I propose that our representatives in the preparatory group should operate actively and in mutual agreement so that we can have, in time for the meeting of ministers of the CSCE participant states in New York in September, an agreed timetable for the institutionalization of that part of the pan-European process which relates to regular meetings of heads of state, and government and foreign ministers, and the organization of centers for preventing and settling conflicts, exchanging military and technical information, coordinating verification activity in Europe, and also setting up a small but effective secretariat.

Today we are, I hope, emerging from the shadow of former difficult and often joyless years, emerging cautiously with backward glances. This is understandable. However, if we want to start to live in a new way we need not only to be able to look ahead but also to give one another a solid credit of trust.

No one can have any doubt today that Germany will become an important component of a united Europe which will make a major contribution to building the common European home and economic, ecological, legal, and humanitarian spaces common to the whole of Europe. It is all the more important not to drag out the formulation of solutions to determine the external conditions of its unification and to map out clear guide guidelines and a procedure for implementing what we will all agree on. There are no divergences of opinion between us on the most important issue. Since this is so, I am sure that we will find acceptable solutions on the details.

Now to the content of the document we are putting forward.

It is complex and in package form. In our view, this is the most productive and expedient approach. In the time that has passed since the talks started we have been able to reach the conclusion that the two German states' representatives would prefer not to raise the matter of their unification in the context of concluding a formal peace settlement, a peace treaty, requiring the convocation of a conference of all the states which took part in the anti-Hitler coalition.

I am not going to dwell on an analysis of the arguments which are being given in this connection. It is the essence of the matter, not the form in which it is resolved, that is important. In any case, the solution must consist of working out a document that is equivalent in content to a peace settlement, of indisputable force and consequence in international law and which covers the whole range of issues requiring a settlement. The idea of scattering these issues across various international forums and taking them beyond the competence of those states which bear direct responsibility for working out a final settlement and are possessed of the appropriate exclusive rights is, we think, unrealistic and does not correspond to the real state of affairs.

It stands to reason that it is not, nor must it be, a matter of discrimination of some kind against Germany and its people. The past must be disposed of; the remaining restrictions on German sovereignty lifted; the new status of a new, now united, Germany defined; and reliable prerequisites established for it to cooperate constructively with all—and above all the European—states, supported for the last time by the quadripartite rights and responsibility in cooperation with the two German states which have become recognized as equal members of the international community. We must create the basis for a new structure in the center of Europe. Today we are pointing the way to the new millenium.

This is a great task. Not everything can be achieved overnight. A certain transitional period will be needed before everything falls into its new place. This is natural and this course of events lies at the basis of the conception of our document. It clearly outlines the final aim and the stages and time-scale for achieving it. Both the German states and the "Four" must be quite clear and convinced that the entire package of interrelated solutions will be implemented in a reasonable and fairly short period of time, including the revocation of the four powers' rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole and the elimination of the features of an occupying regime in Berlin.

We favor such an accord being achieved even prior to the all-European summit in late autumn this year. The sooner it is achieved, the quicker its implementation in all parts can be commenced. The sooner it is achieved, the quicker the fact that external political issues have not been resolved will stop weighing down the process of

German unification and impeding the implementation of essential state and legal measures on an all-German scale.

A few words on the basic principles of the final international legal settlement.

The question of the future Germany's borders occupies first place here. A consensus has practically been reached among us here. I think that such a solution will also create a reliable basis for a settlement between Germany and Poland on the question of their future border along the Oder and Neisse in accordance with the Zgorzelec and Warsaw Treaties. At our next meeting in Paris, which representatives from the Republic of Poland will participate in, we will be able to dot all the "i's."

Also extremely important, it seems to us, is the accord that the [illegible] Germany will draw up from its policies to ensure [illegible] peace will emanate from its territory and that [illegible] itary action is launched against anyone, with the exception of cases of the exercise of the legal right to self-defense. For their part the four powers could conduct themselves in the same way as regards a united Germany. The obligations must be mutual. The isolation of Germany would not be expedient. The logic of our document lies in the creation of reliable peace structures by the joint efforts of the four powers and Germany.

This aim is to be achieved by complex steps and measures aimed at reducing military confrontation on German territory which over the years of the cold war has become a unique concentration of the most modern Armed Forces and armaments. It is both unreasonable and impermissible to maintain this position. The material basis for the outbreak of military conflicts, for the maintenance of mutual distrust and the sense of threat, should disappear. Therefore, the document on the final international legal settlement proposes measures to restrict the number of personnel in the German Armed Forces to a definite, specifically stated, upper limit and to alter their structure to ensure that they are incapable of conducting offensive operations. These reductions and structural alterations can be carried out over a period of three years from the moment that a united Germany is created, using the mechanisms of the Vienna talks or, if the aforesaid period is not adhered to for some reason, then independent of these talks on the basis of an accord reached within the framework of the "six."

Of course a united Germany should not produce, possess, receive, or station on its territory—just like the absolute majority of states of the world—nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Correspondingly, the four powers which have their troops on GDR and FRG territory should also, during the transition period, on the basis of mutuality reduce their troops at first by 50 percent and later reduce them to the level of symbolic contingents or else totally withdraw from Germany. This corresponds with the accord which already exists on the level of Soviet and U.S. troops.

We also believe that, after the creation of a united German government and parliament, the occupation regime of the western sectors of Berlin should end. The troops of all four powers could leave the area of greater Berlin over a period of six months.

An important aspect which would determine the military-political and other status of Germany would be for it to confirm for a transitional period of five years the validity of all international treaties and agreements which were previously concluded by the GDR and the FRG. This would mean that the actual position which existed at the moment of the unification and which is connected with the GDR's responsibilities to the Warsaw Pact and FRG's to NATO would be preserved but the responsibilities and spheres of operation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO would, just as before, not extend into territories outside the zone of their operation.

During the stipulated period from the moment of the creation of the united German government and parliament, we propose holding talks between Germany and states which are party to previously concluded treaties on clarifying, changing, or ending existing obligations and replacing them with new ones on the basis of mutual agreement. This concerns the material-financial and other conditions for the stationing of the troops of the four powers in Germany.

In compiling our document, esteemed colleagues, we have endeavored to make the contents aim ahead of the creation of optimum conditions for constructing a new and peaceful order in Europe. For this reason we propose also noting that in parallel and synchronized with the process of German unification and the implmentation of the accord on basic principles, the GDR and FRG, together with the four powers and the other states taking part in the CSCE, will actively promote the further deepening and development of the Helsinki process as a major factor of stability in Europe.

We hope that the document we have put forward will meet with interest, support, and understanding from our colleagues. It has been submitted on the basis of a sincere desire to accelerate the work and make it as specific as possible and to keep pace with the development of events in Europe as a whole and in German affairs.

It is understandable that time will be needed to study these proposals, to work out an attitude toward them, and to propose one's own version and different approaches, perhaps, to this or that issue. Here, it stands to reason, work needs to be done by our experts.

We are faced with a task on a truly historic scale. It must be tackled with the utmost depth and care and with the involvement of the best forces of all the sides. I therefore call for an appropriate mechanism for talks to be immediately set up which would come into operation in the next few days and would submit to our meeting in Paris in July at the very least the basic skeleton of a final document. We must approach the Moscow meeting of

ministers at the beginning of the second ten days of September with an accord on all the basic issues. Otherwise it would be difficult to hope for a successful examination of the results of work by the "Six" within the framework of the European summit in November or for smooth and consistent development of the unification processes.

I propose that today we formalize our decision to set up a permanently operating mechanism for talks at working level and that we announce its adoption.

In conclusion, I should like to express the gratitude of the Soviet delegation to the hosts of our meeting. It is taking place in good conditions. This is down to the GDR Government and Minister Meckel in person.

Thank you for your attention.

[Begin PRAVDA summary] The foreign ministers involved in the Berlin round of the "two-plus-four" talks had a meeting with GDR Prime Minister L. de Maiziere.

During his stay in Berlin USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze had conversations with the GDR and British foreign ministers and the U.S. secretary of state.

During E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with GDR Foreign Minister M. Meckel, the sides stressed the need to intensify the work of the "two-plus-four" mechanism, synchronizing it with the European process and the creation of all-European security structures.

Noting the significance of the changes initiated in the Warsaw Pact by the recent Moscow declaration, the ministers voiced the hope that the NATO side would make a suitable response to enable relations between the two alliances to be put on a new footing. This would also facilitate the resolution of certain difficult questions linked with the external aspects of German unity.

E.A. Shevardnadze's conversation with D. Hurd, British secretary for foreign and commonwealth affairs, covered some specific questions of the essence and functioning of the "two-plus-four" mechanism. They pointed out the importance of transforming the Warsaw Pact and NATO and the nature of relations between the two alliances.

They confirmed the Soviet and British sides' high opinion of the results of British Prime Minister M. Thatcher's recent visit to the USSR and her talks with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker ended late in the evening. [end PRAVDA summary]

Draft Document Submitted

LD2206195390 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Osinskiy]

[Text] The second "two-plus-four" meeting of foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, East and West Germany was held in Berlin. It was intended to regulate foreign aspects of German unification.

The Soviet delegation submitted a draft document, "the main principles of the final international and legal settlement with Germany," for the consideration of the "Six".

Supporting the document, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted that the former state of affairs based on agreements signed during and after the World War II, on the rights and responsibility of the four countries and on blocs' opposition and military balance, is moving further away from the realities of today's Europe.

It was replaced by the Final Act adopted in Helsinki and a new system of treaties and agreements which bridged East and West, North and South, which penetrated borders between military and political blocs, national, ideological, cultural and other borders.

The Soviet proposals are based on an all-round, package approach to the settlement of foreign aspects of German unification and embrace all these issues. An agreement on the final international and legal settlement with Germany can be worked out by the end of the year and submitted to the Paris conference of heads of state and government of countries participating in the all-European process.

The sides exchanged views on the draft and other issues on the agenda. An agreement was reached to instensify experts' work and make it systematic.

The next six foreign ministers meeting will be held in Paris on July 17. The meeting will also be attended by the Polish foreign minister as it plans to discuss the border issue.

The foreign ministers were received by East German Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere.

Shevardnadze had talks with the East German and British foreign ministers. Late in the evening, he is expected to meet the U.S. secretary of state.

News Conference Held

LD2206230190 Moscow TASS in English 2242 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Voronenkov and Igor Osinskiy]

[Text] Berlin June 23 TASS—A final news conference of foreign ministers of the two German states and the four winner states was held after the second "two-plus-four" meeting ended on Friday.

The news conference was chaired by East German Foreign Minister Markus Meckel.

"Characterising the meeting, I would like to note all parties' businesslike and constructive share in the international and legal settlement of German unification," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said.

Before the end of the talks on canceling the rights and responsibility of the four states, we are to go along a difficult road. But the success will come. The Soviet delegation has submitted a draft agreement containing specific proposals to settle argued issues, Shevarndadze said.

It is only a draft and it does not claim to be the final truth. Changes and different variants are possible. The document should regulate all the aspects of the problem, the Soviet minister said.

French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas said he was satisfied with the work of the "Six" and he hoped that the work will be finished by the end of the year. He noted the need to proceed with German unification process and the restoration of full sovereignty of a united Germany simultaneously.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker noted that there are controversies in positions of participants. Western states believe it would be a big mistake to postpone full sovereignty of a united Germany and tear it off the process of German unification. He said he hoped a stable balance of interests will be achieved.

Supporting his U.S. colleague, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said the reached agreement to intensify work was a good sign.

The atmosphere of the meeting leaves hope that constructive work will continue. The talks on foreign aspects of German unification could be finished by Autumn, said West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The Soviet Minister's proposal to stop the occupation regime in West Berlin and withdraw the four countries' troops from greater Berlin within six months after a united Germany's government and parliament are founded, were met by correspondents with great interest.

Participants in the news conference answered questions from Eastern and Western correspondents.

Mixed Reaction to Berlin Proposals Noted

PM2306162090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[Report by special correspondent M. Yusin: "Mixed Reaction to Soviet Proposals: On the Results of the Berlin Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the 'Six'"]

[Text] Berlin—"I am leaving Berlin in a good mood. Judging by today's session, in the end we will find compromises." "I do not think that before the Berlin meeting began anyone was expecting it to result in a breakthrough. And it did not happen. The time has not yet come for a breakthrough." These two statements, so dissimilar, were made at a news conference on the completion of talks between the foreign ministers of six states in the GDR capital. And they come from two of the participants in the meeting. The first—E.A. Shevardnadze, and the second—British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd.

For all their apparent contradictions, these assessments, taken together, characterize quite accurately the results of the Berlin talks. On the one hand, there was indeed no breakthrough, no agreements were concluded, and differences remain. But at the same time there was a great step forward in terms of clarifying the sides' positions and bringing them closer together. And in view of this fact the Soviet minister's satisfaction is understandable.

The main event of the day, in the general opinion, was the Soviet program statement on the German settlement which Shevardnadze presented to his colleagues. The greater part of the talks was devoted to a discussion of the Soviet proposals. I do not think there is any need to go over the main aspects of this document again—especially since you can read its full text in today's issue of IZVESTIYA.

What was the reaction of the other participants in the meeting to the Soviet proposal? Judging by the final news conference and certain details of the talks which have become known to the press, the USSR's initiative met with serious objections—primarily from the United States, Britain, and the FRG. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and his East German colleague M. Meckel reacted more calmly to Shevardnadze's statement—in any event, during the news conference they refrained from any critical remarks.

But James Baker listed bluntly, without any diplomatic vagueness, the shortcomings he sees in the Soviet position. In his opinion, by stipulating the timing of the transitional period and the duration of the presence of foreign troops on German territory, Moscow is trying to undermine Germany's sovereignty and to discredit it, "which is very dangerous, since it could sow the seeds of instability in Europe." The U.S. approach, according to the secretary of state, is to abolish as quickly as possible the rights and duties of the four victorious powers with regard to Germany, thereby lifting the last restrictions on that country's acquiring true sovereignty. A similar viewpoint was upheld by D. Hurd: "In no circumstances must Germany be made the only state in Europe with limited sovereignty."

But does the Soviet Union object to this way of looking at the matter? Here is a quotation from the statement made public by Shevardnadze: "Of course, it is not and should not be a question of any discrimination against Germany and its people. The book of the past should be closed, the restrictions that still remain on Germany's sovereignty should be removed...." That looks like a total unity of positions, with no grounds for arguments. But in

all probability the Western partners were not convinced by the declaration of Moscow's commitment to German sovereignty.

At the news conference the U.S. secretary of state was asked how he regards the Soviet Union's proposal—which prompted a wide reaction—to withdraw the troops of all the four powers from Berlin over a six-month period. It became clear that Baker has serious objections here too. He stated that if the troops are withdrawn from Berlin alone, and not from the whole of GDR territory, then "380,000 Soviet soldiers will be concentrated around the German capital," and naturally the United States cannot welcome such a possibility: "Questions of the presence of anyone's troops on its territory should be resolved only by the government of a united, sovereign Germany."

All in all, at the "first reading" the Soviet initiative came under serious criticism. But we should not make a tragedy out of this. In the end no one seriously expected the document to meet with universal approval immediately. It fulfilled a different task—it enlivened and stimulated the debate, which will make it possible in future to reach a consensus more easily by using different options, including the Soviet version, as a jumping-off point.

Now I would like to touch on some other aspects of German unity that were touched on in Berlin. First, the question of borders. The sides reached complete unanimity in this sphere. The resolutions on the recognition of Poland's western borders adopted last Thursday by the parliaments of the FRG and the GDR in effect removed the problem, as the participants in the meeting noted with satisfaction. It was officially announced that at the next stage of the talks of the "Six," which will be in Paris in mid-July, Polish Foreign Minister K. Skubiszewski will take part in the talks. At this meeting a document will be signed to close the sensitive question of borders.

Another important aspect relates to the actual mechanism of "two-plus-four." The ministers reached an agreement that the talks of the "Six" should end by November 1990—so that the "two-plus-four" have time to submit concrete recommendations on achieving German unity in time for the beginning of the summit meeting within the CSCE framework in Paris.

And finally, another proposal was made at the Berlin meeting, which came, it can be assumed, as a complete surprise to the majority of the participants in the talks. GDR Foreign Minister M. Meckel announced an initiative which amounts to this: The GDR proposes that after pan-German elections the government of a sovereign Germany make a pledge to renounce the acquisition and position of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons on its territory, and also to reduce the strength of the army to 300,000 men. In Meckel's opinion this decision of Germanys should be taken into account during the discussion of problems relating to disarmament at the Vienna talks.

At the news conference none of the other five ministers made any comment on his colleague's initiative. But in the lobbies it prompted animated discussion. Everyone was worried primarily about this question: In putting forward this proposal, was the GDR acting autonomously, or was its proposal coordinated and agreed with the FRG? The second assumption is supported by the fact that recently virtually no important foreign policy decision has been taken in East Berlin without consultations with Bonn. If the same thing happened this time, it means that what we are looking at is basically a trial balloon launched by West German Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher. As yet this is only a guess—the next few weeks will reveal how accurate it is.

Be that as it may, from the Soviet Union's viewpoint the proposal put forward by Meckel contains a number of positive features—first and foremost the renunciation by a united Germany of having nuclear weapons on its territory. The GDR foreign minister's proposal to limit the strength of the German army to not more than 300,000 also merits attention.

Lithuania's Prunskiene Arrives in Poland

LD2106195290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, arrived today in Warsaw on an unannounced visit. Speaking to journalists at Warsaw Airport, she pointed out that the time has come for direct Lithuanian-Polish negotiations. The leader of the Lithuanian Government stressed that the Soviet Union should not exert control over the Lithuanian-Polish border. During her visit Prunskiene intends to discuss this problem with Polish officials.

Prunskiene also stated that she would like to discuss direct Polish-Lithuanian economic relations.

Kazimiera Prunskiene intends to meet Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leader of the Polish goverment; Foreign Minister Skibiszewski; and Senate Chairman Stelmachowski.

Relations, Border Discussed

LD2106211190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] I came to Warsaw from Athens, Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene said on 21 June at Okecie airport as she started her visit to Poland. We would like to maintain good-neighborly relations with Poland, and I believe that [words indistinct] problems. At present, it is most important to consolidate our political and economic contacts. The border between us should become the border of Poland and Lithuania, and only after that the Soviet Union's border without militia and army control.

Kazimiera Prunskiene was received by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Following their conversation the Lithuanian prime minister told journalists: It was a very cordial and meaningful conversation. The situation in Lithuania, relations between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, their progress and prospects, and also relations between Lithuania and Poland were assessed. We examined the positions of the two countries, how they could influence our ocmmon relations and the situation in East Europe. Each of us has his own problems, there are many of them, and by cooperating we will be able to solve them. The integrity of our borders is very important, and we discussed it. We have no territorial claims, either. A good start was made for further cooperation and other [word indistinct], the establishment of diplomatic relations. Of course, today this is still not possible.

Kazimiera Prunskiene also talked with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

Polish Talks Assessed

LD2106233290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted on Prunskiene's visit to Greece and her talks in Warsaw] In the afternoon Kazimiera Prunskiene was received by the Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. After the talks the Lithuanian premier told journalists that the meeting had been very cordial and informative. She said the inviolability of borders had been a very important subject of their talk. We have no territorial claims either, said Kazimiera Prunskiene. She also pointed out that a good start had been made for further cooperation, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, although in a certain sense this is not yet possible, as she put it.

Today Kazimiera Prunskiene also had a talk with the Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and met chairman of the Senate.

Polish Sejm Delegation Holds Talks in Moscow

PM2206143590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Think About the Future"]

[Text] The formation of a new relationship between the Soviet Union and Poland, free of ideological priorities, is often hampered by the difficult burden of the past: "Blank spots" in history and economic imbalances. However, the two countries' peoples, closely bound together by their common destiny, cannot live by memory alone. They must think about the future and about long-term interests in foreign policy. A conversation held in Moscow 19 June between I.D. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, and a Polish parliamentary delegation led by Marshal of the Sejm M. Kozakiewicz was imbued with these ideas.

Despite all the difficult situations in Soviet-Polish relations known to both sides, a durable basis for the development of bilateral ties has been created, the interlocutors said. The Soviet Union is very interested in the statement by the Polish foreign minister on the priority nature of Poland's relations with the Soviet Union, I.D. Laptev stressed.

Concerning the problem of German unification, the chairman of the chamber assured his Polish colleagues that the Soviet Union's stand on the inviolability of Poland's western borders was and remains invariable.

The Polish parliamentarians also had conversations with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs.

S. Ciosek, Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union, took part in the conversations.

The Polish Sejm deputies laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Development of Ties Noted

LD2206142890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 22 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A delegation of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland has been in our country on an official visit. Our correspondent, Andrey Sturua met Mikolay Kozakiewicz, marshal of the Sejm. [video shows correspondent interviewing Kozakiewicz]

[Begin recording] [Kozakiewicz] This has been the first official Sejm visit here, and we decided with the leadership of both chambers of your Supreme Soviet that we will create bilateral groups, Polish-Soviet and Soviet-Polish, in both parliaments, which will work permanently. We drew closer toward solving the problem of the Polish minority in the Soviet Union. In all the conversations, of which we have had many, we have made much progress with permission for Poles living in the Russian Federation and other republics to set up associations and various organizations.

We are closely following what is happening in the Soviet Union. No doubt, you are also closely following what is happening in our country. As we leave, we are sure that you are now in a similar situation to that in Poland, in which it is necessary to tackle big issues. There are, of course, differences too. Matters are proceeding differently in your country. We also exchanged experiences of what took place in our country for six months after the introduction of market mechanisms. The difference is that, in your country, people have money, but have nothing to buy. After six months, we have a situation in which the shops are full. There are things, but people can't buy them for lack of money. It must be said that neither situation is normal.

[Sturua] Soviet-Polish relations are now entering a new phase in their development. How do you see these relations in the future?

[Kozakiewicz] The Soviet Union is always our number one economic partner. So we must now allow any situation that causes these mutual relations to deteriorate. New problems are undoubtedly arising here, because cooperation has to be organized on different principles.

[Sturua] Thank you very much. [end recording]

Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Continues

LD2306155190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 23 Jun 90

[TASS special correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Budapest 23 Jun (TASS)—"By the time that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary ends—by 30 June 1991—1,352 military trainloads are due to have left the territory of this country. To date 265 trainloads have already been withdrawn." This information has been given by Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces. He was speaking at a meeting of the military council of the Group devoted to a discussion of the progress of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. A group of USSR people's deputies—members of the USSR Supreme Soviet's committee on defense and state security affairs led by Valeriy Ochirov, deputy chairman of the committee—took part in the work of the military council.

According to data up to 23 June, Matvey Burlakov noted, over 20,000 Soviet servicemen have been withdrawn from Hungary. Some 353 out of a total of 860 tanks have been withdrawn. In all, 50,000 servicemen are to be withdrawn with their families. At the same time, the commander noted that 11,000 of the families of servicemen returning from Hungary do not have housing accomodations in the homeland.

In the first stage, the withdrawal of 70 percent of all military units, including 65 percent of the Air Force, from the territory of the Hungarian Republic is planned. In the second stage, which will last until the end of February 1991, the number of withdrawn military units will reach 90 percent, which includes the whole Air Force. By agreement between the two countries, the remaining 10 percent of personnel will leave Hungary before 1 July 1991.

It was noted at the military council that the Soviet side is leaving accomodations, service premises, barracks, and diverse property and equipment valued at more than R1,500 million in Hungary. Regrettably, the Hungarian partners are in no hurry to provide compensation for the installations being left behind. "Should they refuse to compensate the USSR for the costs it has incurred," Valeriy Ochirov said in conversation with the TASS correspondent, "we shall approach the Soviet government with the issue of the need to take effective measures to solve this matter on a fair and mutually-acceptable basis."

Hungary Delays Payment for Soviet Facilities

LD2406092290 Moscow TASS in English 0853 GMT 24 Jun 90

[By TASS special correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Budapest June 24 TASS—By the time of the completion of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary—June 30, 1991—1,352 trainloads of troops and equipment will leave the country, Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the South Group of troops, told a meeting of the group's Military Council.

The meeting was attended by members of the Soviet Parliamentary Committee for Defence and State Security, led by Committee Deputy Chairman Valeriy Ochirov.

Burlakov said more than 20,000 Soviet troops of 50,000 and 353 tanks of 860 had left Hungary by June 23.

He noted, however, that 11,000 families of troops, returning from Hungary, have no homes in the Soviet Union.

During the first stage of the withdrawal, which will last until the end of this year, 70 per cent of all combat units, including 65 per cent of military aircraft, will be withdrawn.

During the second stage—until March 1991—90 per cent of combat units, including all aircraft, will be withdrawn.

The remaining 10 per cent of troops will leave Hungary before July 1, 1991.

It was said at the Military Council meeting that the Soviet side was leaving housing, barracks and other property and equipment, worth more than 1.5 billion roubles, in Hungary. But, speakers said, Hungary was in no hurry to reimburse the Soviet Union for the cost of the facilities.

"If Hungary refuses to reimburse the Soviet Union for its expenses, we will ask the Soviet government to take effective measures to achieve a just and mutually acceptable solution of this problem," Ochirov told TASS.

West Europe

Finland Brings Charges Against Soviet Hijacker

LD2206001490 Moscow Tass in English 1712 GMT 21 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Voytto Leskinen]

[text] Helsinki June 21 TASS— The Helsinki court today decided to arrest the Soviet citizen who hijacked the Tu-134 passenger aircraft with 54 people on board on June 19. The aircraft was making a scheduled flight between Riga and Murmansk.

According to the Finnish telegraph bureau, 20-year-old Oleg Kozlov is charged with passenger aircraft hijack. The Finnish legislation envisages up to 12 years of imprisonment for such a crime.

Kozlov's defender M. Fredman said his defendant planned the hijack for a long time, but he either can't or does not want to explain his reason for leaving the Soviet Union in such a way.

The Finnish HELSINGIN SANOMAT newspaper writes in an editorial that the return of criminals to the country from which they fled was the most effective method to fight hijackers. "It should be clear that a hijacker should by no means be granted political asylum," the newspaper writes.

Second Soviet Passenger Airliner Hijacked

Forced To Land in Helsinki

LD2406110590 Moscow TASS in English 1059 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 24 TASS—A Soviet passenger plane was forced to land in Helsinki in the morning today afer a hijacker threatened he would explode a bomb in his briefcase.

The Turpolev 134 of Estonia was on an internal flight from Tallinn, Estonia's capital, to Lvov, the Ukraine.

The chief of a shift of the Central Air Traffic Control Service of the Soviet Ministry of Civil Aviation, G. Leonchuk, said that five minutes after take-off one of the passengers, M. Varfolomeyev, said he had a bomb in his briefcase and demanded that the crew divert the plane to Stockholm.

After talks with Co-Pilot Sharymov, who explained that the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Stockholm, the hijacker agreed that the plane would land in Helsinki.

Plane Commander, I. Belyavtsev complied with the hijacker's demand to save the life of the 72 passengers and six crew members. The plane landed at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport at 9.13 a.m.

All necessary measures are being taken to return the plane to the Soviet Union.

Hijacked Plane Leaves for Home

LD2406172690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1713 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] Helsinki June 24 (TASS)—The Soviet Tu-134 airliner with passengers on board that was hijacked this morning to Finland by a criminal when on a flight from Tallinn to Lvov, left Helsinki for home today.

The criminal has been detained by the Finnish police. Investigations are under way to charge him with hijacking a passenger plane.

Hijacker Requests Finnish Asylum

LD2406155990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 24 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Voytto Leskinen]

[Text] Helsinki, 24 Jun (TASS)—A TU-134 plane from the Estonian Civil Aviation Directorate which was flying from Tallinn to Lvov was seized by a terrorist this morning, who forced the crew to alter their course and land at Helsinki-Vantaa International Airport. The hijacker threatened to blow up the plane with a device he claimed was in a briefcase.

According to a report from the representatives of Finnish police who headed the group investigating the incident, the hijacker gave himself up to the Finnish authorities shortly after the plane landed and immediatly asked for political asylum in Finland.

At a news conference held there this afternoon, an official report was made to be published in the press which says that the hijacker is a Soviet citizen, born in 1969, who has however refused to answer some questions without a lawyer.

The hijacker has been detained by the police and is accused of hijacking a plane.

No explosive devices of any kind were found on board the plane, in the luggage and hand baggage of the passengers, or in the criminal's briefcase during the checks that were carried out.

"The representatives of the Finnish authorities," the report stresses, "believe that such actions, which undermine the safety of air flights, are extremely serious crimes that should be carefully investigated."

Air Force Chief Yefimov To Visit Finland

PM2306173590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "To Visit Finland"]

[Text] By agreement Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, commander in chief of the Air Force and USSR deputy minister of defense, will pay an official visit to the Finnish Republic 25-28 June this year at the invitation of Major General P. Jokinen, commander of the Air Force of the Finnish Defense Forces.

Coverage of Dutch Defense Minister's Visit

Meets With Navy Commander

LD2106154490 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 21 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Chumakov]

[Text] Leningrad June 21 TASS—Dutch Defence Minister Relus Ter Beek, visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of his Soviet counterpart Dmitriy Yazov, arrived in Leningrad on Thursday.

Ter Beek and officials accompanying him, including First Deputy Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Ivan Kapitanets and Dutch Ambassador to the Soviet Union Petrus Buvalda, visited the monument to heroic defenders of the city on Victory Square. Ter Beek laid flowers at the base of the monument.

The minister visited the Leningrad Military District headquarters and met First Deputy District Commander Lieutenant-General Valeriy Mironov. They discussed issues of mutual interest.

"I hope our meeting will promote further contacts between servicemen of the two countries," the general said.

"I am glad to be the first Dutch defence minister to visit the Soviet Union," Ter Beek said. "We should start a new round of relations between the two countries' servicemen and revive ties established by Peter the Great."

"Practical steps in this direction have been made—a Dutch naval ships unit is currently visiting Leningrad. I believe it is an important confidence building step." he said.

The minister laid a wreath in the Piskarevskopy memorial cemetery.

Later, he visited Dutch naval ships, on a friendly visit in Leningrad.

Chiefs of General Staff Meet

PM2206155190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Touring the Country"]

[Text] Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, met General P.I. Graaf, chief of the Netherlands Armed Forces General Staff, who is in our country within the framework of Netherlands Defense Minister R. Ter Beek's visit. During the ensuing conversation they discussed a range of questions of mutual interest. They expressed confidence that the development of contacts between the USSR and Netherlands Armed Forces would promote the further deepening of trust and strengthening of stability on the European continent.

On the same day Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, commander in chief of the USSR Navy, had a meeting with Vice Admiral H. van Foreist, commander in chief of the Netherlands Navy.

Netherlands Defense Minister R. Ter Beek, who is on an official visit to the Soviet Union, set off on a tour of the country 21 June.

The guest and the persons accompanying him were seen off at the airport by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Army Gen. M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Netherlands and Soviet flags flew at the airport, an honor guard formed on the airfield, and the countries' national anthems were played.

R. Ter Beek arrived in Leningrad the same day.

'Constructive' Visit Concludes

LD2306021790 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Chumakov]

[Text] Leningrad June 22 TASS—Visiting Dutch Defense Minister Relus Ter Beek today completed his official visit to the USSR. The minister stayed in the Soviet Union at the invitation of Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov.

This morning, the guest visited the Cruiser Avrora and toured the museum that deals with the heroic history of the legendary vessel. Then he went to the Baltic shipyards.

Relus Ter Beek described the results of his visit to the USSR as positive on the whole.

"We held constructive talks of mutual interst," he said. "Changes in the Soviet Union have made possible the establishment of closer contacts in various fields, including in the military field. This can only be welcomed."

On the same day the Dutch defence minister and the delegation left for Amsterdam. At Pulkovo Airport the guest was seen off by Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Dutch Ambassador to the USSR Petrus Buwalda, and Lieutenant General Valeriy Mironov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Leningrad Military District.

Political & Social

Shishlin Says Gorbachev Not To Resign

PM2206114690

[Editorial Report] London ITV Television Network in English at 1800 GMT on 20 June carries an interview with Nikolai Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee adviser, during a David Smith video report on Gorbachev and the current political changes in the Soviet Union. The following exchanges take place.

[Snow] Does the president have any intention of stepping down as head of the party?

[Shishlin] No, not now. Although I know that many people here in Moscow are talking about his intention to leave the party position and so on and so forth. I don't think so.

[Snow] Isn't it a dangerous game to play, though—suggesting that you might resign when in fact you don't intend to do so?

[Shishlin] Each people has the right to have their own, its own, his own emotions, so maybe that's not wise enough; but President Gorbachev intended only to express his opinion that it's necessary to have certain respect for the post of the Soviet president.

[Snow] So what does this new party mean for the mother Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

[Shishlin] Everything depends on concrete decisions of this party conference or this party congress. It can be a conservative force. I can imagine it. Then that will do some harm to the policy of perestroyka.

[Snow] If the president comes up for election in 10 or 12 days' time at the party congress, do you believe he's going to win?

[Shishlin] I think he will win. I think he will win.

[Snow] There's no opposition?

[Shishlin] No, I'm quite sure that he will have opposition, and one can see there's opposition on the Russian Party Congress so we must not close our eyes on realities.

Retired Official Notes Unchanged Role of KGB

AU2206125990 Vienna Domestic Service in German 0500 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Interview with retired Major General Aleks Kalugin, who, "under diplomatic guise, worked for the Soviet intelligence in the United States years ago and was later one of the leaders of Moscow's Counterintelligence Administration and deputy head of Leningrad KGB in the eighties," by Moscow correspondent of GDR radio Christian Nef in Moscow; date not given; Kalugin statements in Russian with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[Text] [Nef] Considerable public attention has recently focused on the KGB, the Committee for State Security, since the start of perestroyka. The Security Committee has tried to introduce glasnost and to condemn the old suppression practices. Has the KGB really changed?

[Kalugin] No, there have been no essential changes, neither concerning the methods nor its character. The KGB still is a gigantic organization which interferes in practically all spheres of life, and which is larger than all Western secret services together. However, I am not in a position to mention specific figures at this point. Outwardly, the KGB naturally presents itself as somewhat reform-minded, uses terms coined during perestroyka, and condemns the repression of the thirties and forties. However, psychological terror still prevails. In may cases, political opponents continue to be persecuted or are publicly discredited. The strike movement is being infiltrated. The fate of thousands of people continues to depend on KGB decisions, which means that their careers and their private lives may be affected by KGB manipulation.

Official figures quoted by the state security system in connection with Stalin's victims are not correct in my view. The balance sheet is much worse than publicly admitted. There were probably about 7 million deaths and 19 million camp inmates. In addition, one should not forget that the KGB has not said a single word about the repression carried out in the sixties and seventies when Andropov headed the Security Committee and a fight was waged against dissidents. Thus, many things still lie in obscurity.

[Nef] There are fierce political struggles between various wings within the party in your country. This has again become apparent at the conference of the Russian party conference. Where does the KGB stand in this struggle, and is it true that the sources of the public defamation of reform-minded politicians, such as Yeltsin, for example, are to found in the KGB, as well?

[Kalugin] The KGB is pursuing a very conservative policy. In cases where is should intervene, such as in the case of ethnic conflicts or during anti-Semitic riots, for example, its role is undefinable. Of course, there is a great deal of insecurity among the secret service. The old patterns of thinking no longer exist, and the old hostile image has been eliminated. However, the most recent documents of the KGB exclusively deplores the spread of anitsocialist forces in the country and the loss of the party's leading role. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the KGB defames the leading reform-minded forces. For me the KGB is merely some kind of instrument. It has always been a tool of the party leadership.

However, let me come back to the present. The situation in the country seems to have become increasingly dramatic. The conservative communists join forces on the one hand and conservative anticommunists on the other. If these people win a majority at the party congress, Gorbachev might become completely isolated.

[Nef] There used to be close cooperation between the GDR Ministry for State Security and the KGB. Many staffers of the GDR ministry worked here in Moscow. What main aspects did this cooperation include?

[Kalugin] There was not only close cooperation. One must put it differently. The GDR state security service was closer to the KGB than any other foreign security service. This applies particularly to the intelligence activities of Markus Wolf. His activities were the most important basis for Soviet intelligence activities, particularly in Europe. We covered the whole world, from Papua New Guinea to Canada.

The GDR's intelligence activities were very efficient, and Wolf was respected everywhere as one of the most talented specialists. I often met with him in Berlin, Moscow, Prague, and Havana. The KGB would be well-advised to take over part of this net of agents. Our cooperation mainly involved the exchange of political and scientific-technological information, espionage activities, joint training of cadres, and joint actions. Let me repeat this once more: The KGB must open itself up. It must no longer be the instrument of a political party.

Zaykov Considers Leaving Politburo

PM2406150290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report on interview with CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Lev Zaykov by unidentified INTERFAX correspondent: "Lev Zaykov on the 28th CPSU Congress"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] Politburo member Lev Zaykov told an INTERFAX correspondent in an interview that there must be wide cadre changes at the 28th CPSU Congress. In his opinion, "it would be useful to replace nearly 90 percent of the party Central Committee." "If I am nominated to the new Central Committee," L. Zaykov went on, "I will withdraw, and will not be a member of the Politburo, or even of the Central Committee. I believe that the Central Committee should become considerably younger. With our experience, we will be able to find work in industry and in other party posts."

Ryzhkov Orders Transfer of Monuments' Ownership

LD2306134990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, chairman of the Leningrad city Soviet of People's Deputies, declared in an interview with an INTERFAX correspondent that he has received instruction from Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the head of the Soviet Government, concerning the transfer of a number of architectural monuments built before the October Revolution, including the Smolnyy building, to the ownership of the Leningrad CPSU oblast party committee.

The head of the government justified this decision by saying that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and other revolutionary activists visited these buildings, and their memory had to be preserved and perpetuated.

Anatoliy Sobchak noted that the instruction was unconstitutional, and he intended to challenge it in the USSR Constitutional Oversight committee.

Yakovlev Views Party Role, Previews Congress

PM2306190090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed interview with A.N. Yakovlev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, under the rubric "Speaking Before the 28th CPSU Congress"; date, place of interview not stated: "Finding the Strength and Courage for Real Renewal"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Esteemed Aleksandr Nikolayevich! You are head of the CPSU Central Committee International Policy Commission. Imagine for a moment that you are now giving the communists an account of the work done. What would you single out in your report? Are you pleased with the work of the commission and the CPSU Central Committee International Department? And also: Did the USSR Foreign Ministry international affairs specialists "get in the way"?

[Yakovlev] I do not think I should take it upon myself to assess the work of the commission and the International Department—that is the prerogative of the Central Committee, its Politburo, and the party congress. But an account of our work is another matter.

It seems to me that the foreign policy avenue of the activity of the party and its leadership is fairly well known and has produced weighty results and won recognition and support in our country and throughout the world. In essence it was Soviet initiatives that marked the start of a fundamentally different, peaceful period in mankind's life. The building of a new type of civilization—without wars or weapons—is beginning. The main thing now is to maintain this trend. To say nothing of the fact that the disarmament process that has begun promises to give the people considerable material benefits.

The International Policy Commission has contributed to this activity and the groundwork for it—both as regards the ideological, theoretical, and conceptual groundwork, and, naturally, in the practical implementation of the new course.

The present International Department differs radically from its past form. It has been cut down drastically and the so-called visiting [vyyezdnaya] commission within it has been abolished. Within the framework of the new division of responsibility and the changed functions, it was necessary to establish appropriate contacts with the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions, and state

foreign policy departments. I think we have succeeded in the main. Close and fruitful cooperation exists with the USSR Foreign Ministry.

There are, of course, differences in the approaches to certain questions, and that is only natural. But the petty bureaucratic "tug-of-war," which only damaged the cause, has disappeared.

What has the CPSU Central Committee International Policy Commission done? Those questions that are really of the greatest long-term significance, significance of principle, were singled out for discussion actually at sessions of the commission—such as the future of the party's international activity in the light of the initiatives put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches at the United Nations and in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk; the concept of development of Soviet-Chinese interstate and interparty relations under conditions of normalization; ideological, political, and military aspects of the outbreak of World War II; the prospects for Soviet-American relations after the 1990 summit meeting; the changes in East European countries and Soviet interests; and others. Many questions and documents were discussed on a working basis, and CPSU Central Committee decisions were adopted on them.

The chief result of all this work is a better understanding of the essence of the complex problems we are encountering in foreign policy. And not only problems of content, but also the resultant, applied problems that invariably arise in practice.

[PRAVDA] You are chairman of the Politburo Commission for the Further Study of Materials Relating to the Repressions of the Thirties, Forties, and Fifties.

[Yakovlev] Yes, it is a grave responsibility—both politically and morally. The events of those years, however anyone may try to whitewash them, are mixed with human blood, endurance, fear, and destruction of human relations, and the corruption of man himself. Repentance vis-a-vis the millions who died is essential. And if the commission is able to make even a small part of this repentance, this in itself will be an act of conscience.

Naturally, the commission's tasks were not confined to the rehabilitation of innocent victims of the repressions. It sought to uncover the very mechanism of repression and define the degree of responsibility of Stalin and his entourage. This approach enabled us to overcome the inconsistency and reticence of the fifties and to a considerable extent to reveal the essence of this social cataclysm, although scholars will be studying all this for many more years.

To put it briefly, the commission established that the trials of the second half of the thirties were all, without exception, falsified and built on evidence obtained by criminal methods, torture and blackmail of the accused and members of their families. Apart from the four public trials, in Moscow alone there were more than 60 trials which were kept carefully concealed from the public until recent times. In general the tragedy that afflicted the people at that time is striking in terms of its scale, its cruelty, and the unusual cynicism of the organizers, as well as those directly involved. On the basis of the study of these materials, the problem of the study of the political trials and mass repressions of the twenties and early thirties, including those involving the engineering, technical, and scientific intelligentsia, and in particular the peasantry in the period of collectivization, has been placed on a practical footing.

Hundreds of thousands of people have been cleared of slanderous charges. Extrajudicial verdicts have been annulled. And today, when we speak of democracy and glasnost and the renewal of the party, behind these questions and concrete recommendations, apart from anything else, there looms the invisible presence of the dearly bought understanding that in essence this is where it all began: with the stifling of intraparty democracy and the breaking of the two-way links that are normal and natural for a healthy society in its political, economic, and social structure. When whatever the circumstances, it is simply necessary to follow morality and common sense.

[PRAVDA] How do you personally see the renewed CPSU, its role and place in society's life, its leadership organs, and its international relations?

[Yakovlev] Further left, oriented toward the renewal of society, internally free, emancipated, democratic, open to people and to life, and passionately committed to everything new, leading, and promising. I see it as a party of people who are businesslike and intellectually rigorous, people of conscience, people of civic and professional competence. And—people of real, energetic action.

The origins of the crisis the party is now experiencing lie, in my view, in the fact that the party, having taken on power functions that are generally alien to its role as a sociopolitical organization, failed to hand them over in good time to their proper places: to the people, the soviets, the state. On the contrary, it became ever more deeply involved in these functions. It succumbed to the temptations of direct and basically uncontrolled power. And at the same time it became stagnant and lost its dynamism. The fact that party practice in effect protected the immutability of the established order of things was itself a bad thing, condemning the party sooner or later to the loss of its true nature, to degeneration.

The administrative edict system, the stagnant economy, self-assured antidemocratism, bureaucracy, corruption. Party organs that in effect took the place of all other organs, without bearing any economic or legal responsibility for their instructions and directives. A generation of people grew up, party members, who sincerely regarded all this as the norm! Some of them cynically, some in error, some with indignation—but they all took it for the norm. And now this can be seen in the debates

over the revolutionary changes. Distortions of the natural democratism of life—that is always a fertile soil for crime. We know that in a number of places high-ranking party degenerates became intertwined with economic crime and with that area of law enforcement that had effectively become enforcement of lawlessness.

But it is not really a question of the most flagrant individual examples. Something far more dangerous, in my view, was and still is the corrosion of petty and medium-level misdemeanors that we have grown accustomed to, everyday irresponsibility and lawlessness, and common mismanagement, a corrosion that has eaten deep into our structures. Corrupting the intelligence, ruining the soul, and equally fostering apathy and willful detachment in some and aggression and disregard for the law in others.

And we do not only need to rid ourselves of this corrosion—that goes without saying. We also need to establish in all party structures and in all the party's internal life and political activity norms, rules, and principles that make it as difficult as possible for a similar corrosion to appear in future. There is no need for any new discoveries—they are the rules and principles of democracy.

The party now needs the broadest international ties, the broadest, most constructive dialogue with all the forces and movements of today, and especially democratic and progressive forces.

[PRAVDA] Could the need arise, in your view, for coordination of actions in resolving pressing problems among sovereign and equal communist and social democratic parties? What could we borrow from Western social democracy that would be of value to us today?

[Yakovlev] This need not only could arise, it has long since arisen. And it has long since prompted consultations, contacts, and meetings. I personally see nothing odd, still less unnatural, in coordinating various actions on both a bilateral and a multilateral interparty basis, if and when the need arises.

What is holding back this coordination? First and foremost the irrational mutual rejection, mutual denial, and mutual hostility and suspicion which for many decades poisoned the workers' and socialist movement. And which can still be felt to this day. There is no alternative here but to overcome this psychological legacy of the past consistently and purposefully, to thrust it away from us on both sides. I do believe it is more psychological than political.

Take irreconcilability, uncompromisingness. This is necessary when it is a question of refusing to be reconciled to evil. But we know from history that the socialist movement showed a degree of "excess," which was carried over into relationships within our own movement. And how cruelly we suffered as a result! If you look back now at the literature of the late 19th century and the first third of the 20th century: The best minds of the day saw and understood all this! Among them socialist minds—R. Luxemburg, N. Berdyayev, and not only them... We did not heed their doubts and warnings, we underestimated them, and from the time when the elevation of Stalin began we rejected them entirely from our intellectual field of vision.

Borrowing from Western social democracy? It is never any use borrowing mechanically from anyone else. But there is great interest and undoubted benefit for us, especially in the new conditions of perestroyka, in the study of, for instance, the parliamentary experience of social democratic parties. Experience accumulated by them in the practice of state administration, especially at local level. Relations with other parties, trade unions, and social organizations; work in the mass media. The experience of the Socialist International. In general we should, I would say, open ourselves up to social democracy again.

[PRAVDA] How do you perceive the relationship between foreign and domestic factors in the policy of the Soviet state at the present stage of perestroyka?

[Yakovlev] In other words, will the foreign factor help us, will it to some extent smooth over the difficulties of the transition? No, it will not seriously help us or smooth things over.

In this case I am not talking so much about politics as about economics, properly speaking. Politics has already had its say. A weighty and previous say. The new political thinking enabled us ourselves, first and foremost, to cast off the "besieged fortress" mentality. It enabled us to achieve historic accords with the West and secured the understanding and support of the world public for perestroyka. What is really the most difficult thing is beginning: the economy. And here no one will resolve our problems for us. They could avoid hindering us. They could try to help us—for which we give them twofold thanks. But the size of our country and the scale of the problems are such that in the end only we have it in our power to resolve them.

What we will certainly come up against is the need to win a foreign market. And here miscalculations and errors are possible. And what we should do is not to have hysterics about it in public, but really to apply our brains and hands to reduce the cost of learning to a minimum, and, most important, take advantage of this experience in the transition to a market economy at home.

[PRAVDA] Since April 1985 there have been many meetings between our political and state leadership and leaders of East European countries who have since ended up in the category of "has-beens." Were they given any kind of warnings on our side that difficulties were in store for them?

[Yakovlev] Did I personally foresee this? You know, I do not want to look like a wiseacre or a fool. And therefore I will answer thus: It is not yet time to write my memoirs.

It was clear that certain leaders risked political unpleasantnesses. But no, I did not imagine that all this would take on such a form and such a pace.

There were, of course, frank discussions, on numerous occasions. I personally, for instance, had occasion to hold such talks more than once. So there were warnings from our side. Tactful, restrained, but clear.

When we spoke about every people's freedom of choice, about the fact that we do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of other parties and countries or impose our own ideas and approaches, these words were spoken honestly and seriously, even if at first some people perceived them differently. And there is also the bitter experience of past attempts at interference and its lessons. After all, we already realized that August 1968 held back development, set it back by two decades, not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in our own country, since it strengthened for years the positions of the most conservative forces in our own party and country.

All the same, I believe that the socialist choice, the socialist idea in those countries will still have its say. Socialism has given the peoples much. And when the emotional accretions are removed, when the most flagrant absurdities have been rectified—the socialist shoots in the peoples' way of life will once again begin to burst through. Time will sort out the authentic, the valuable, and the promising from all the rest.

[PRAVDA] Is there not a contradiction in the fact that the USSR's foreign policy achievements in the years of perestroyka markedly outweigh the results of the socioeconomic and political reforms within the country?

[Yakovlev] No, there is no contradiction here. The aim of perestroyka is to make the Soviet people's life in every way better, more worthy, and healthier. Is this not promoted by the ending of the cold war, normalization, the lessening of the danger of war, the conversion of resources and capacities to civilian purposes? Is the widening of our international ties and contacts and the opportunity to make wide use of international experience at odds with such a life and its formation and development?

True, inside the country perestroyka is proving complex and is producing results more slowly. In part because it takes time to resolve the many problems we have accumulated. In part because perestroyka impinges on many entrenched interests and comes up against growing and increasingly conscious resistance. That is an inescapable fact. But I personally do not share the view that perestroyka can show fewer results at home. It is simply that there is less objectivity here, because it affects everyone more closely.

But ultimately foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. And if perestroyka had changed nothing within the country, there would be no results in the foreign arena.

[PRAVDA] How do you see the world in the first decade of the 21st century? What will prevail: rivalry or partnership? What role will ideology play in international relations? Do you foresee a trend toward convergence between the two social systems, or is such a trend already detectable?

[Yakovlev] I do not want to speculate. In the modern world 15 years is a very long time. Especially now that the planet is being affected by long-term and fundamentally new processes whose course and effects will not be fully apparent even tomorrow.

I would like to see much more partnership and cooperation in the world of the early 21st century. And we are working to that end. Evidently rivalry cannot be avoided entirely, and indeed that is hardly necessary. But it must take on civilized, even constructive forms, otherwise we simply will not survive.

I think all this is within the bounds of the realistic, the attainable.

Now for convergence. I admit that my views have changed considerably in this respect since the sixties. I think the convergence process is an objective one; it has been in progress for a long time, and will increase. Neither this fact itself, nor its practical and political significance should be underestimated. But it would also be a mistake to overestimate it and interpret it unjustifiably widely.

The convergence process mainly affects questions of the "technology" of social life. This means the organization and functioning of a modern market. It means the technology and technique of democracy. It means the support of information science in general in every sphere of the activity of man and society: freedom of access to knowledge and information. It means the regulation of social life for social, ecological, disarmament, law enforcement, and other purposes. In all these spheres the laws of the functioning of large social and economic systems dictate much that will be in common, and as society and its civic organization develop and as knowledge and technologies are accumulated, by all appearances this common ground will grow. Here convergence is obvious, is predetermined by life itself, and is in general, in my view, positive in nature. Furthermore the trend toward internationalization of the economy, science, technology, information science, and communications that is so characteristic of our time quite clearly can develop only on some kind of material basis that is common to all or the majority of countries.

But the more strongly and profoundly the convergence processes develop, the greater the significance of the choice: how, to what end, for what purpose these opportunities are used. For the benefit of man or to his detriment; whether the choice made is tinged with social, group, or national egotism or whether it seeks as far as possible optimally to reflect and take into account the

different interests and aspirations. All this is self-evident. But the main thing, in my view, is that convergence creates a basis for the growth of the world's social, political, and spiritual diversity.

True, sentiments in favor of the standardization of world culture and its reduction to some kind of common denominator can also flourish in this soil. I personally am convinced that any trends toward standardization, if they prevailed, would be a tragedy for the peoples, and perhaps even for mankind.

One example has been with us for a long time—mass culture. This is where the convergence of technical means, methods, and tools has advanced furthest. Standardization of forms and methods, even content. Internationalization of distribution. The vivid, colorful, attractive nature of the packaging—that is undeniable. But the sum total is that the spiritual potential of culture is damaged. Because spirituality is always individual, unique, inimitable. I am convinced that the full might of technical means must be channeled into finding, reproducing, and disseminating what is really spiritual, valuable, and eternal.

[PRAVDA] The readers are convinced that you are among the active participants in the turnaround in foreign policy. Nonetheless, they observe, you often try, so to speak, to stay in the shadows. Why?

[Yakovlev] In part, of course, it is my character that is "to blame": I really hate strutting around in the foreground. All the same, I think that only people who have a very simplistic view of the process by which policy is made and implemented could think that policy is "made" by any one person, or by two or three people. Policy is always a collective creation, it cannot be otherwise. And more than ever in the conditions of perestroyka and democracy.

As for me personally and my position, I have always spoken openly about it. About the need for freedom of the individual and freedom of creativity. About economic emancipation and the transition to a market economy. About democracy as an essential condition of a healthy, viable, prosperous society. About the urgent need to eradicate deadening dogmatism in theory and practice. About opposition to nationalism and chauvinism of every hue and the defense of true culture, the moral ecology of society. All this is in my speeches, articles, and interviews and in my recently published book.

But in general, I believe that here too we must depart from the Stalinist legacy and do away with it mercilessly. I believe that everyone should be personally responsible for his actions, that the public should know state and political leaders "face to face."

The model of absolute, monolithic uniformity, which does not exist in real life and cannot exist even among those who most closely share the same views—this model was instilled by Stalin and after him, but not for the sake of unity. Today we know well that very often real unity did not exist.

The "value" of this model lay elsewhere. Safely to shut away from the public any views, opinions, or nuances differing even in trivial respects from the highest views. Tightly to close the lid isolating the jinni of glasnost from society. To deprive everyone of even the opportunity to submit their view for discussion by the masses, to the judgment of conscience.

And in parallel another ritual that was extremely useful to the regime of unlimited personal power was set up—the ritual of criticism and repentance. When the masses are well informed and really know everything, as Lenin put it, and are capable of forming conscious opinions about everything, then this ritual cannot exist. Then debate, polemics, disputes are possible, but not courts whose purpose is to make a man submissive, bend and break him, subjugate his will, and tear from his soul the very desire for an opinion of his own. To make him repent publicly and undergo a kind of psychological inquisition. And not only to secure victory over him, but thereby to give comfort to those who seek culprits, thereby concealing either their own sins, or their own inability and reluctance really to set about tackling the problems. This has eaten into our blood, our consciousness, to such an extent that sometimes we do not notice the covert casuistry.

[PRAVDA] What matters are you concerned with on the Presidential Council? How do you personally see its work?

[Yakovlev] The Presidential Council is still only a staff of advisers to the USSR president as yet. Evidently as the political reform develops its functions and powers will change.

I think we should start up the mechanisms of presidential power at full capacity more quickly.

[PRAVDA] Your plans for the future? How do you see the future after the congress?

[Yakovlev] Yes, the congress has a very great deal to resolve. There has probably not been within our memory a congress that was at once so significant, so dramatic in terms of the atmosphere in the country, so crucial, and at the same time so unpredictable.

The problem today is not to turn against each other, but to get on with the job. There has been enough arguing about abstractions and concepts, and enough looking for people to blame. We all need a revolution in our thinking. It is necessary to begin to think in practical, concrete, systematic terms. It is time really to start working in a new way. Otherwise the question of the party's inability to respond to the challenge of the times could be raised. And no one will stop to ask whether we have split, regrouped, or consolidated. The people need

results, not endless shows—who criticized whom and how, who said so-and-so first, who objected to something but was not listened to.

In essence the congress will not decide the future of perestroyka, that will continue, but the future of the party itself. A party that, in the last year, has been swept by a wave of retrogression, of several varieties at that: from bad to worse. Of course, everyone has the right to his position. But we have plenty of reasons for asserting that unless the party finds the strength and courage for real renewal in the spirit of perestroyka, the new difficulties could prove insuperable, and life will pass us by.

Yeltsin's National Role Examined

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[Yevegniy Ambartsumov article: "The Yeltsin Phenomenon"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin has been elected chairman of the highest body of power of the Russian Federation, the home of 150 million people, half of the Soviet Union's total population. He was elected under daily increasing popular pressure and in spite of bitter resistance from the apparat. In my opinion, anti-Yeltsin efforts on the eve of the last round of voting tipped the unstable balance of opinion in favour of Yeltsin. We do not like to be pressured and often act contrary to how we are told.

Yeltsin was a pleasant contrast to his rivals. His first rival was Aleksandr Vlasov, the outgoing premier of Russia, who, despite his calm and self-confident appearance, is associated by the people with the all-Russian crisis, even though the system, not the man, should be blamed. His second rival was Ivan Polozkov, the Krasnodar Territory party boss and an outspoken opponent of cooperatives. Leaflets in support of Polozkov were circulated among the deputies. Allegedly, these leaflets had been inspired by Pamyat or circles close to it. Polozkov refused to distance himself from Pamyat. Well-known Stalinist Nina Andreyeva called Polozkov a possible leader of the Communist Party of Bolshevik Leninists.

Betting on such unpopular and unattractive candidates, and vacillating between the two into the bargain, the CPSU leadership failed to counter Yeltsin with an authoritative rival, thus undermining its influence among the deputies. A more reasonable approach wouldf have been not to oppose Yeltsin's election, but to use it to calm social tensions in the country caused by bare shelves at the shops, and to shift part of the problems connected with the transition to market economy onto the new leadership of Russia. Yeltsin's victory gave some moral satisfaction to the people who were quite unanimous in their support of him. Only the congress was divided over Yeltsin because its composition does not reflect prevailing public opinion. Many "nomenklatura" candidates had themselves elected in the constituencies with no alternative or only pseudo-alternative candidates.

The West seems to have been astonished by Yeltsin's victory. Having staked much on Gorbachev, primarily for his services in improving the international situation, the West did not trust Gorbachev's opponent, his Russocentrist formulas and populist image, exaggerated artificially by Soviet political analysts.

After the purgatory of political campaigning and other trials, Yeltsin emerged as a more mature and responsible politician. He is neither revengeful nor destructive. He chairs the congress sessions in a calm, balanced manner, patiently and democratically. He does not foist his opinion on speakers or the audience, retreats when his proposals are voted down, seeks a different variant in cooperating with deputies and gives no special preference to the bloc, Democratic Russia, which had nominated him for office. Yeltsin makes tactical retreats in order to win strategic victories and agrees to have some of his deputies elected from the other camp. His main wish seems to be to achieve a consensus, without which the congress will not be able to move an inch towards the solution of Russia's problems.

The problem is, however, that the other wing pushes its own candidates into high offices, violating the consensus agreed to by the conciliatory committee on Yeltsin's initiative. It votes down candidates nominated by Yeltsin and there are reasons to believe that similar tactics will be resorted to during the formation of the Supreme Soviet and the governemnt of the republic.

At the same time, having failed to derail Yeltsin's victory, "nomenklatura" deputies began seeking all kinds of concessions, after Yeltsin declared his preparedness for a broad coalition. While doing this, they easily betrayed their principles and old bosses in order to retain their power and positions. One such ambitious deputy who had tried to convince Yeltsin to withdraw his candidacy, after Yeltsin's election, began offering him cooperation. "I know you are a good volleyball player, and I would like to play on your team," he said.

Such miserable attempts and the towering figure of Yeltsin make one remember the story about Gulliver tied up by Lilliputians. The conservatives want to tie Yeltsin's hands, make people dissatisfied with their former idol, accuse him of inefficiency, which they manufactured themselves and remove him from the political arena.

In order to achieve this end, the other camp is successfully disguising itself by abandoning its outdated ideological approaches and resorting to the vocabulary of the progressive-populist camp. When you read the speeches they make today, it is often difficult to tell whose speeches they are. They key to the answer is in the intonation and in how the speaker voted in the past.

The Yeltsin programme is well known, but I would like to speak on some debatable, or to be more precise, debated items of the programme.

The programme is accused of being "anti-socialist" or, in any case, that Yeltsin does not use the word 'socialism," though other deputies, however, are ready to reproach Yeltsin for his chairing the congress under a towering statue of Lenin. In my opinion, Yeltsin's answer to these accusations sounded almost convincing. Names and labels do not matter; the main thing is well-being of the people. Besides that, Gorbachev himself was the first to start destroying this ideological fetish when he spoke ironically of the "mourners of socialism."

Yeltsin's main disagreement with Gorbachev is in the interpretation of Russian sovereignty. The former believes the sovereignty and laws of Russia must prevail over Union laws. The latter, quite naturally, sticks to the opposite view. This difference can, though, be resolved. I believe, despite all the antagonism of the two positions. On the one hand, it is evident that sooner or later a new Union treaty will have to elaborated with a certain degree of acceptance of the principle of that Union republics must delegate some of their prerogatives to the Union. The central authorities will not be able to avoid the necessary changes in this respect. On the other hand, Yeltsin himself suggests that the Union leadership should retain a number of key functions, including those on matters of defence. Today, however, these matters are the main content of the foreign political functions as has been demonstrated by the Gorbachev-Bush negotiations. Consequently, much of the foreign political function should also continue to rest with the centre. Some anti-centre extremes in the Yeltsin programme can easily be removed as a result of compromises proposed by Yeltsin himself.

Yeltsin did raise the question of Russia's own direct foreign political and foreign economic ties with Union republics and foreign countries. But Yeltsin himself admitted that Russia would have to coordinate its efforts with the existing Union mechanism. Besides, even before the advent of perestroika, the government of the Russian Federation developed direct ties with East European governments in which the new Russian leadership is especially interested.

Obviously, Yeltsin's intention to work out direct agreements, including commercial agreements between the Russian Federation and the Baltic republics must have caused the largest amount of irritation. However, the economic blockade will have to be lifted one day. We will, willingly or otherwise, commence a dialogue with these republics and eventually recognize their sovereignty and independence. If today Yeltsin is urging the vacillating central authorities closer to this recognition, perhaps Yeltsin is doing the right thing? Perhaps Yeltsin is becoming the desired factor of unrealized acceleration, the policy of which was declared in the early months of perestroika? Very briefly put, if Yeltsin did not exist, Gorbachev would have had to invent him?

This is exactly what Gorbachev had done. It was Gorbachev who had sponsored Yeltsin's career. I do not know the concrete reasons, but I believe that the architect of perestroika was attracted to Yeltsin by the latter's populism, who was later criticized and has grown civilized and democratic by now.

I believe now that passions have calmed down, the two most popular and influential leaders of this country should meet in private and discuss their relationship and their common interests. Such a consideration is hindered by the inertia of and dependence on party and quasi-party structures. On his part, Yeltsin declared he quitted membership in Democratic Russia and believed the presidential office could not be combined with any other leading post, especially in a political party. President Gorbachev still shows no intention of abandoning his leadership of the CPSU, although such a move could give him a freer hand.

Besides, Gorbachev should distance himself from the government policy as wisely did all presidents of France starting with de Gualle, the more so as the Ryzhkov Cabinet, which presented the highly unpopular programme of economic recovery at people's expense already rejected by the three largest republics, seems to be living out its last days.

In these conditions, the formation of the government of national accord composed of most authoritative experts appears to be the only constructive way out of the current situation. The formation of such a government could become the result of a compromise, a Yeltsin-Gorbachev rapprochement which would help ease social tensions, calm down emotions and begin easing the nation out of crisis.

Yakovlev Interviewed on Career, Politics

WA1206190090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Abbreviated version of interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and of the USSR Presidential Council, by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents Aleksandr Afanasyev and Andrey Kabannikov: "Politics Are Interesting in a Time of Transition"]

[Text] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, can you imagine a situation in which you would apply for retirement?

[Yakovlev] Yes, I can. I would do that if I could see clearly and distinctly that perestroyka had come to a dead end, that everything had turned backward, to the past... But I believe in our country's new destiny.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is there anyone who could do your job better than you do?

[Yakovlev] Probably.

I.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You devoted one of your books to your parents—Nikolay Alekseyevich and Agafya Mikhaylovna. Who were they?

[Yakovlev] They could not have been simpler people. My father completed the fourth grade of parochial school. I still have a copy of the Gospels—a gift to him from his teacher. My mother was completely illiterate. She spent only three months in school. My father spent his whole life working and serving in the military. In the Civil War—from beginning to end, from 1917 through 1921. And from 1941 through 1946 he was in the Army.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How did your family live during the thirties?

[Yakovlev] Chance saved my father in 1937. Our rayon military commissariat was headed by Novikov. As it turned out, he was the commander of the platoon in which my father served during the Civil War. He was an amazing person. He was the only one of the rayon leadership we know. And then one day he came and knocked on the window with his whip handle. My father was not at home and Novikov said to mama: "Tell him that he must come to the conference which—be sure to get this right—will last at least three days. I will come later." Mama did not understand a thing. When she went to tell my father he questioned her several times—especially about the last sentence—"I will come later." My father put a few things in a bag and went to the neighboring rayon, to my mother's sister, Aunt Raya, "to the conference." He told Mama where he could be found. Mama was a silent person, a peasant.

During that night there was a knock at the door and they asked where my father was. Mama said: "He went to a conference." "Which conference?" "I do not know, he did not tell me." They left. They came again the next night... Three days later Novikov appeared—this is what friendship on the front means. No, not everything was inhuman even then, there were some human qualities left... So Novikov came and told Mama that it was time for her husband to return, the conference was over! Mama sent me off... And after that nothing ever happened.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why?

[Yakovlev] Well, everything was probably pretty simple. As we now understand, there was a plan "for enemies"—in terms of numbers and time periods. During these nights they apparently took others and fulfilled their plan.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] This seems impossible today...

[Yakovlev] Yes, I think this fails to make sense with the normal perception. I must say that my father accepted Soviet power 100 percent. For him—a young chap who knew peasant life and poverty, everything that had started in the rural areas initially seemed very promising... If we look into olden times, our rural life, according to the stories, began with two families. According to legend, at one time one landowner lost two serfs to another at cards and sent them to live here. One of them mowed well, he was a mower. The Kosarevs descended from him. The second was called Yakov. I remember well my grandfather and grandmother on my father's side; their names were Aleksey Potapovich and Mariya Aleksandrovna. They say that his father, Potap Aleksandrovich, was a stern person and had some kind of special authority. He did not drink or smoke. This is the way they remained in the memory of the villagers—the Potapovs. Whose descendants? Potapovs. Incidentally, in the first grade my teacher registered me under the name of Potapov.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is your parents' home still standing?

[Yakovlev] The house in which I was born, in the village of Korolevo, about 15 kilometers from Yaroslavl, is no longer there; it burned down. As of last year there were only three houses left standing in the village. I do not know what may have happened to them this year. After two fires we moved to another village—Oparino. It is probably a kilometer or so from my village. You know that the villages in the Central Russian oblasts are quite close to one another. Wherever there was a little bit of land there was a village... Our house in Oparino is still there. I have visited there a couple of times. Then we moved to a worker settlement. And this house which my parents have lived in since 1939 is still standing. We gather there with our families every year. I have three sisters. One of them lives in Rostov in Yaroslav Oblast, another—in Uglich, and the third—in Yaroslav. Yekaterina, Lyudmila, and Tamara. Now we all get together with our grandchildren. They are all simple people.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Here is a photograph from your family album: A boy with a book. We can see that this boy is you as a child... But what is the book?

[Yakovlev] I do not know how or why this happened but I began to read very early. I was told later that when I was five years old my grandfather showed me the letters and how to form them. The most incomprehensible thing to me is that when I was in the second grade the village women asked me to read the Gospels. How much did I understand at that time? Absolutely nothing. But still I read. And another thing—do not laugh—I read newspapers. We did not write anything and, naturally, there was nothing in our newspapers. But when my father went to the city he would bring back a newspaper. Since those days, from among the magazines and books that were in the library of the village soviet, for some reason two books have remained in my childhood memory. One was "The Kolchak Movement." I spent a long time looking for it later but I never did find it. (Did I have the author wrong or was the book confiscated later?) But in the picture is "Quiet Flows the Don." This is the first photograph of me in my life. I was about seven or eight

years old and I was holding that book. I do not think I understood much of what I read but I read persistently. But it was different when I read "Quiet Flows the Don"... I somehow lost out on part of my childhood because I did not spend much time with other children—although, of course, I did to some extent. I was more and more drawn to reading. Mama would get very upset with me. And my eyes were not very good, I had scrofula in childhood. Everyone was expecting me to die and they did not register my birth for two years, but I survived... Mama later told me in her simple way that she had gone to church, lit a candle, and asked God to take me. But then one day a field physician was passing through the village. He did everything; he treated lambs, he treated horses. And when he saw me he gave me some kind of ointment; it was black and brown. And since that time I have been all right... But still something has always been wrong with my eyes. And Mama was categorically against any kind of education. She had a strong opinion that if I went any further with my learning I would either become a fool or be left blind. Well, my father had different ideas.

He always encouraged education... When I returned from the front on two crutches Mama looked at me and gasped. She dropped the bucket she was holding. And in tears she said: "What am I going to do with you?" I somehow felt that I myself was to blame. One of my sisters was three years old, another—four, and the third—11. And we had one cow. Something happened to the cow—she died. Later, when I was making plans to go back to school anyway, Mama would have none of it: To the slop plant—this is what they called our distillery. It was called a slop plant because that was where they sold slop for cows and supplied all the surrounding villages. They offered me the job of head of the personnel department. At the plant they gave the workers vouchers for 100 buckets of slop free of charge each month. Mama had to write a letter to complain to my father—he was in the army at that time. He wrote back: If he wants to study, do not stand in his way.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, according the to statistics, only three out of 100 of your contemporaries returned from the war...

[Yakovlev] I was drafted into the Army before I was 18, in August of 1941. And very quickly they began to train us to be platoon commanders. Then it turned out that a very large number of them were killed during the first months. And when I was 18 years and two months old I became a lieutenant. I ended up in the Baltic Fleet, in the marines, in the sixth brigade.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The ones who were called the "black devils"?

[Yakovlev] Yes. It is difficult to say whether I was lucky or not. It is known that the marines were used in the hot spots. The Germans did not take prisoners. Nor did we... Sometimes comrades who were very interested in prisoners tried to persuade us to keep some of them, right down to the point of promising us a mess tin full of vodka for each one we kept—each living one. But even this rarely worked...

But still I consider myself lucky in some way. The marines have their own traditions. Here is one of them: Never leave your comrade on the battlefield—even though he may be dead or wounded. Never! And when I was seriously wounded near German territory, five people dragged me back. Four of them were killed. And the fifth could see that things were bad and he jumped up and stopped dragging me along the ground and the swamp and simply stood up and took me in his arms and ran. I stayed alive and was all right.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Was that your last battle?

[Yakovlev] Yes, I did not have to engage in much combat. And they thought that I was born with a silver spoon in my mouth. During that time the members of the platoon changed completely about five times. Very many people died... The year before last I was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner—for that same battle, my last.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, you grew up and were educated under Stalin. What were you like then?

[Yakovlev] I always had a certain sense of oppression and fear but also faith and the conviction that this is the way it must be. Today it is easy to imagine myself as a prophet or a dissident. There were probably such people as well, but among those who were older.

I do not think that there is any need to assure anybody about my attitudes today toward Stalin's repressions or Stalin himself as a person. But at that time I really did believe! And—psychologically—for me it is the memory of boundless faith that today generates the feeling of having been deceived.

Were there any flaws? There were. The first thing that struck me like thunder was when my father told me about the pact with Hitler in 1939. We were in the garden doing something. He said to me: Son, there will always be war. I said: What do you mean? For those times it was unheard of to speak so freely!... But even in my childish mind a real flaw appeared when after the war I saw how we treated our prisoners. Prisoners began to return from Germany, and we put them in camps. There was no way I could reconcile myself to this. I was terribly ashamed—for I knew how they ended up prisoners. I spoke openly about my feelings. I do not know why they did not arrest me. Apparently I was not around anybody who would report it.

So everything proceeded abnormally right up until 1956. At that congress I attended the presentation of a report as an apparatus worker. I remember how we came down

from the balcony and could not look one another in the face. Either from a feeling of surprise or from a sense of shame or shock...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Can you be considered a "man of the sixties"?

[Yakovlev] To a certain extent. You understand I was never much interested in the material side of the matter. But at the same time I am always chastising myself for being a romantic. So I have a desire to believe in and embellish the future. And suddenly with bitterness you understand that you have been deceived. So who are you? After all, at that time I wrote lead articles about Stalin... Of course, 1956 played its own role. Of course, a great deal comes from our character. All my life I have felt sorry for those who are wronged. And sometimes I would speak up for people not at all out of ideological considerations but because I saw that they were being treated unfairly.

II.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did you strive to become a party worker or did this happen by accident as it did for many people?

[Yakovlev] In general there are no accidents. When I was in school I was elected chairman of the student committee, and in the military academy—to the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] bureau. When I went to the institute I became deputy secretary of the Komsomol committee. I was elected student representative to the party committee. Without trying at all. And then there was an incident which was quite paradoxical. I left the Army as a disabled serviceman and I still am one. First I got rid of one crutch and then the other, and I switched to a cane. And suddenly I was called to the oblast military commissariat: Will you be in charge of the military faculty in your institute?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Head of the faculty?

[Yakovlev] Yes, the faculty was called "Military and Physical Training." Well I still had some idea of military training but knew nothing whatsoever about physical training. And I was attending lectures as a student and was in charge of a faculty at the same time. Now all this seems ridiculous.

Once they called me in to the oblast party committee: Would I not like to take the examinations for the Higher Party School? Well, in those days this, you know... And I went to Moscow.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You worked on the newspaper editorial staff for several years. How did you end up there?

[Yakovlev] Yes, we were hearing the case of the oblast newspaper in the bureau. Of course we noted serious shortcomings and so forth and so on. And we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to reinforce the newspaper with personnel. The editor suddenly asked that I be appointed a member of the editorial board. For the propaganda department. But I worked in the press sector and twice published articles in the newspaper after business trips.

Actually, I was taken into the newspaper. And I worked there for three years. I consider this time the best in my life.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why?

[Yakovlev] There are two periods that I single out for myself. My years as a journalist and as a director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. They were the best in terms of human relations and they were the most filled with human life and interest.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] And did you make any mistakes when working on the newspaper?

[Yakovlev] Of course. Once I wrote an essay on a woman who was the chairman of a kolkhoz [collective farm]. Someone said that she had a daughter. I should have verified that... But I did not. Later, after the article was published, I received a letter: "Shame on you, you should have known that my daughter died two years ago." I was very disturbed by this letter. I have reproached myself ever since: Verify what you are writing about tenfold.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Were the journalists unfair to you?

[Yakovlev] There was a case when I was working in the obkom [oblast party committee] in charge of the department of schools and VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. A PRAVDA correspondent came to me one summer: "How are things going with the repair, with the wood, and with the chalk?" I was young and inexperienced and truthfully told her that there was no wood, the schools had not been repaired, and the chalk had not been delivered. Then by September all this had been taken care of. Time passed and suddenly in December a lead article which mentioned me appeared in PRAVDA. They said I was not concerned about the firewood and so forth. I was very indignant.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Well, those are past offenses. What about today?

[Yakovlev] Well, when they do not agree with my position I consider that normal. I do not agree with the position of certain critics either. So an element of equal rights is in evidence here. But when people lie, misrepresent, and manipulate—this offends my human sensibilities and I am shocked by the immorality. True, I have experienced a certain evolution in this sense recently. Previously when I would see such an article I would read it immediately; the bias would knock me off balance. Now I am generally not interested in reading such things.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Have you changed your attitude toward your opponents?

[Yakovlev] One time at a meeting I was asked how I feel about my most inveterate critics, their prejudice, and their desire to hit you harder. Without putting on any airs I responded: I pity them and wish them no ill. In fact it is pathetic when in life something occurs that nourishes malice and intolerance. I never respond to lies or inaccurate quotes. This is my ethical principle

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We could understand this restraint from a person in your position 10 years ago. Then every word that was uttered, whether intentionally or not, could put the immense power mechanism into action. But now? Perhaps now we have more of a need for Central Committee Secretary Yakovlev to openly state his own political position and for the desire of citizen Yakovlev to defend his honor and dignity—through legal means, of course.

[Yakovlev] Well, how does one respond if it is lies? Here, for example, is a passage about me: At the plenum he calmly looked at the Moscow Gorkom [city party committee] as it "verbally slaughtered Yeltsin." And I wasn't even at the plenum; how do you respond to that? Or, for instance, one of the authors accused me of Russophobia. As if I had indicated that somewhere. Horrible nonsense. This a punishable offense. But imagine me going to court and saying: "I am not a Russophobe! No, members of the court, I am not a nationalist, not a chauvinist, not an anti-Semite," and so forth. That is beneath any kind of dignity!

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You are one of the active proponents of glasnost. Does it not seem that glasnost has suddenly turned around and is being used against you?

[Yakovlev] It was clear that the changeover to glasnost after many years and decades of silence and hypocrisy would not be simple. But there was also the assurance that the possibility of expressing the truth and one's opinion directly, honestly, and openly would open up a new world to people and would elevate human beings. Life has again proved to be more complex.

III.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Tell us, please, about your party penalties.

[Yakovlev] I received a reprimand for the fact that I did not display persistence in potato procurements. True, they did not enter it on my card. But I was to learn that later. I had to appear before the KPK [Party Control Commission] three times. The first time was when I was secretary of the obkom party organization. There was a meeting at which the instructor of the administrative department, Kashin, accused the first secretary of Trotskyism...in the area of animal husbandry. And if we were to print now what he said at that time everyone would laugh themselves silly. But then... Kashin wrote to the Central Committee: I unmasked him but the criticism was suppressed. And we—the first secretary, the secretary for agriculture, and I—were called into the KPK. And everything would have gone the way Kashin intended and would have turned out badly for us if Kashin himself had not come to our aid. Success makes one giddy. Having received a victory, Kashin declared: "Matvey Fedorovich, I think you should deal more harshly with such people!" Shkiryatov could not stand it when anyone like Kashin tried to tell him anything. "Ah, but what about you, my dear?" And to the first secretary: "How do you work with personnel over there?"

The second time a KPK inspector called me on the carpet. His question: Why was I not purging the institute of cosmopolitans? A complaint had been received. Apparently it was necessary to find a whipping boy. There was a campaign in progress and they needed a "personal case." And here was a letter. And I had to go to Shkiryatov. He said: "No way, you are unprincipled and will not be able to do this work. I do not know about the party but as for working—no. You may go." I left. And suddenly: "Wait, wait, why are you limping?" I told him I had fought at the front. "So you were at the front? Where?" I escaped all the consequences.

But time passed and I had to go to the KPK again. Another letter. This time I was accused of being too zealous and persecuting innocent people. There was no proof. And again I had to go to Shkiryatov. I listened to him and said: "Yes, you have already called me in regarding the same issue but then I was on the other side of the fence!" "What?!" He pushed a button and requested the file. I watched him move his head back and forth. "Wait a minute," he said, "both letters are signed by the same person!"

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Has there been anything in your party work which you find it awkward to recall?

[Yakovlev] Probably, in any case I have not always displayed real courage. I was inhibited. Sometimes you are surprised: We have fought on the front lines! And later suddenly we have found ourselves in circumstances that required action...

Well the apparatus is a kind of rigid force. Like any other political institution it has its own rules. You can like it or not but there is no point in beating your head against the wall. But a knife cuts both ways. The apparatus gradually develops a unique kind of character in a person, a style of behavior. It is another matter how much personal honor and decency are left.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] People know about your participation in the big scandal of those times concerning the article by Arkadiy Sakhnin in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA devoted to the escapades of the famous whaler Solyanik.

[Yakovlev] It is true that I wrote a note in support of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The article also included a not altogether clear episode. But, according to data of the KPK, there were even more terrible facts. The question was discussed in the secretariat. Even Brezhnev

came, which happened very rarely at that time. He told us and the editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Voronov, not to "sing along" with this person. Solyanik was fired but everyone felt sorry for him. The dispute was heated, everyone spoke out against the article except for, it seems, one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. But Suslov—and he led the secretariat—turned the discussion upside down in a very unique way: "The comrades are right, they are right... Solyanik must not be allowed to stay with the flotilla." Although nobody had said that he should be fired!... But many people who were looking for the truth also paid for this affair... Fomin, the first secretary of the raykom [rayon party committee] where Solyanik was registered (Odessa), who took a principled position in this matter, was not readmitted to the party until about 25 years after these events...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Perhaps the most notorious "newspaper" affair of those days was the story surrounding Lake Baykal. What was your position at that time?

[Yakovlev] We were instructed to figure out the articles in PRAVDA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The thrust was: It is time to put an end to this outrage. They had in mind attempts to protect the lake. The departments reported that the newspapers were essentially correct. And this, of course, caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. In the secretariat I personally was accused of "political striptease." Incidentally, I did not know at the time what a striptease was. And did they really know? When I got home I started looking for the word in dictionaries but could not find it. It was not until later that my friends told me... And in general the matter ended in failure for the protectors of Lake Baykal.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] At the beginning of the seventies you were relieved of your duties in the CPSU Central Committee. Many think that the reason for this was a certain article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in 1972 after which various reproaches were hurled at you.

[Yakovlev] No, the matter was more complicated. There is no doubt that the article played the role of catalyst. They discussed me at a meeting of the secretariat, accusing me of not asking anyone. Although I signed the article as a doctor of sciences without indicating my position.

The essence lies elsewhere. Here is an example: There was a festive meeting devoted to the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. I was on the editorial commission. And, as is the custom, greetings and reports were coming from everywhere to Brezhnev personally. They were reporting on their successes. And suddenly one of the reports—I still have it as a souvenir—said: "The workers of Sakhalin Oblast, unanimously approving and undividedly supporting the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, express feelings of boundless thankfulness and profound gratitude to the party Central Committee and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee as well as the brilliant perpetuator of the cause of the great Lenin, the wise leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the outstanding figure in the international communist and labor movement, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, for his gigantic multifaceted activity to implement the majestic program of the new stage of communist construction developed by the 14th CPSU Congress..." and so forth.

That was the way we spoke up until 1953. This disturbed me, to put it mildly. I went to the deputy chief of the general department and then to the chief—Chernenko. And he told me reluctantly: "Whatever you like. Look for yourself." I should have listened to the undertone of the advice. But I had no idea. Only later was I to understand that this report had been discussed in advance—as a foreshadowing of things to come.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But by this time you were a fairly experienced apparatus worker. It is difficult to imagine that having passed through so many stages you would not know the rules...

[Yakovlev] I certainly do not wish to depict myself as some kind of hero. This is far from being true. But the memory of the recent past—where do you escape it? Moreover, it seemed to me that if there was a general secretary, regardless of what sort of person he was, it was necessary to protect him from blows as much as possible and not allow him to get into a ridiculous, politically vulnerable situation.

At the 24th congress one of the speakers, the first secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Committee, said approximately this: The credit for the fact that our troops went into Czechoslovakia belongs to Comrade Brezhnev! Applause. I perceived this "laudatory" statement as directed against Brezhnev. Could this really be left in the record?... After that case the head of the science department of the Central Committee at the time began to look over the editorial commission. Then it was revealed that this statement too had been coordinated ahead of time!... Some time later Brezhnev's assistant telephoned me. And among other things he said: "Well, let us see how you complain about the general secretary's work now." I should have kept my mouth shut but I said: "I will do everything that corresponds to the decisions of the Central Committee."

Some by design, others cynically, and still others out of zeal and an inadequate sense of humor fashioned a new monument during his lifetime. He liked this. And any interference, even simple actions dictated by common sense, even silence in places where there should have been a verbal toast, was perceived as sedition... I was to understand all this later. In Canada.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did you encounter something unexpected?

[Yakovlev] Not completely. When I myself raised the question of leaving the Central Committee apparatus I was immediately offered the position of rector of one of the Moscow pedagogical institutes. I refused and asked for teaching work. Now I was the one to be refused... It became clear that I had to leave. Then I asked about diplomatic work in one of the English-speaking countries. For example, in Canada. The decision was made that same day.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] It seems that once when recalling your diplomatic service you used these two words together: "curiosity" and "melancholy"...

[Yakovlev] Yes, I had a certain feeling of indignation. I had a fervent desire to return home, although with a clear head I consider it more emotional than rational. You understand that approximately every four years a repetition of the cycle of embassy work begins over again. And much of what is repeated is routine. I received an order: Go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And read it word for word and let no doubts show in your face.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But judging from the work written at that time, the ambassador also had safety valves...

[Yakovlev] I regret that I wrote little. Although it is good that at least I wrote something. There was the essay on the Dukhobors [Russian Christian sect], whom I visited as a guest. There was the article in NOVYY MIR under a pseudonym. I wrote the work "Dynamism and Conservatism, Their Adherents." All this was before perestroyka. I published a brochure signed with my mother's name—Agashin. It was about the Canadian counterintelligence. Do not be surprised, I was angry with them. Every half year they drove somebody out of the embassy. Most frequently it was quite unceremonious, purely for political purposes. I still have notes from that time and I should rework them.

And in general only now do I understand that I could have behaved more rationally. I should have written not telegrams but books. Anyway, 10 years is an immense term.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Term is the right word.

[Yakovlev] Yes, I arrived in Canada on 21 July and returned on the 19th exactly 10 years later.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So was the time you were working in Canada the most difficult for you?

[Yakovlev] I had a very difficult year when my father and mother died. That was 1981-1982, with a six-month separation in between them. Our family is close and every year we gathered together at the home of our father and mother. We slept on the floor. Well, as the older brother I was given a bed... In general, I took my parents' death very hard. I flew back to bury them. First my father and then my mother. She did not want to leave home and would not travel either to Canada or to our Moscow apartment. This is what she said: Your father is dead and there is no reason for me to live...

This was a bad period. The atmosphere in the country was heavy. It was boring there. Thoughts crept in: What am I doing here? I receive a military pension of R70 and I could get some kind of honorarium—I should go and write. There are moments when you are just sick and tired...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] There is a widespread rumor that it was in Canada that you first met Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev... Is this true?

[Yakovlev] That is a delicate question and therefore I will be brief. I knew him before. I recall that we supported one another's initiatives in the department. This was when he was organizing student brigades under contract. Through the chain of command he was reproached for this. But we in the department liked the idea. Incidentally, as far as I recall, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA supported him as well... So the story does not begin in Canada. I was impressed at that time by his candor and the clarity of his positions. The main thing was that we could not go on living like that. And this was two years before perestroyka...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Thank you, that is very important for a better understanding of the situation... But as you travel this difficult path what do you feel is your identity—a politician, scholar, diplomat, journalist, or apparatus worker?

[Yakovlev] All my life I have been attracted to that which I had least time to work on—writing. As for politics, it is really interesting only in times of transition.

IV.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How does your work day usually take shape?

[Yakovlev] Alas, I come to work at nine o'clock in the morning. I leave at 10 or 11 at night. I cannot say that I have any particular style. I always have the feeling that you do not control time but that it controls you.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] It is understandable when instructors experience that feeling. They have pressure from above. But a secretary of the Central Committee...

[Yakovlev] No, what do you mean! When I worked as chief of the radio and television sector and in the Central Committee apparatus I was my own boss and I could plan my time, which was rarely intruded upon. This is no longer true. For instance, in the morning there is a pile of papers higher than my head. Three-fourths of them have nothing to do with me. But it is thought that they should be read and initialed. Then there are the telephone calls. Our deputies are very active. And so on until lunch, and what can you do? Then there are various meetings and conferences. For example, today there is a secretariat

meeting at three o'clock. At seven I have a meeting with V. Yaruzalskiy. And all this is necessary... Here are papers, there are papers, and I cannot find a place for myself in their midst. Well why, say, does a Western businessman or politician have everything scheduled—he has the entire year written down in his notebook. And I cannot even schedule tomorrow...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] A member of the Politburo has numerous sources of information but do they have any direct connection to the outside world? Do you have this problem?

[Yakovlev] It exists. You see I receive plenty of official and unofficial information. I would prefer to receive less, although to a certain degree it is necessary, but only to a certain degree. You know sometimes you get the feeling that when you speak directly to people you get altogether different information from that in the papers. And your conclusions are different. And your attitudes are different.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How well informed are you about how youth are living? How do you find out about this except for newspapers?

[Yakovlev] I have very little opportunity. I obtain information from my children's friends and sometimes I especially invite them. Or else they will come of their own accord and I will sit and talk with them.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In your office there are several dozen of the latest issues of magazines. Do you read foreign periodicals?

[Yakovlev] I look through the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, and, less frequently, the ECONOMIST.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you think you have conflicts with your subordinates at work?

[Yakovlev] You know, it happens that there have been no work conflicts with people who have worked right around me. Neither in the institute nor in the embassy nor in the Central Committee. Although there was one case... I know I have never raised my voice to anyone. I try to avoid making [negative] remarks. If you do not make these remarks you force a person to take responsibility and follow his conscience. If a person has not performed a purely work- related assignment very well I prefer to do it myself. I know: This is bad and it is a violation of all the rules. But I hate various kinds of confrontations.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What merits and flaws do you see in the current party apparatus?

[Yakovlev] If we are to speak about the apparatus we cannot avoid them. It is important to know what you are basing your remarks on and whom you are serving. I am being banal but if a businesslike person comes to me, one who has an interest in life and is sensitive to the new, then everything is all right. But what bothers me? The inability of a few people (or maybe more than just a few) to talk with people and consider their ideas in discussions. The lack of a sense of humor is very harmful. A lust for power is especially dangerous. It corrupts people, and not just stupid people. Being drunk with power makes people power alcoholics.

At the same time one cannot say that the whole apparatus is conservative or, conversely, democratic. We have not gotten over the inclination to divide people up: ours and not ours. There is no such thing as ours and not ours. They are all ours.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Consolidation right up to the point of forsaking principles?

[Yakovlev] Here we are speaking not about a loss of principles but about national harmony in the name of the ideals of freedom of man and the society. This is what I wonder: Is it necessary now to bring differences of opinion to the point of a split, to the delight of conservative forces? I think not.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We must admit that in this case you have not convinced us. This thesis has been repeated for a long time. There is no doubt that we must have certain special conditions for discussions in the Politburo and the Central Committee. But in today's stormy situation it is perhaps even more important for one position or another to receive mass support. And compromise, although theoretically it may be reasonable, in practice does not receive this kind of support. And it seems to us that the time has come when everyone must either take a stand or lose this support—and it still exists as of today.

[Yakovlev] I think we might be getting personal here. I will answer this way: Say I have published a book. Let everyone take it as he wishes. For one reason or another I could speak and write either more pointedly, or precisely, or gently. But in principle this is my position.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Your example is more from the academic or scholarly sphere. But what about the political side?

[Yakovlev] You know what I thought about? The most important quality now is the ability "not to fall along the roadside." If we started out together we should push forward together. Yes, we can argue, yes, we can persuade, but looking one another in the eye, honestly, without politicking. Consistency and loyalty in friendly relations—this is ultimately the issue of the new ethics and new political morality.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Tell us, please, in your time there have been many discussions in which everyone has had to adjust somewhat--have you personally had to change your views since 1980?

[Yakovlev] You know, in principle, no, I have not had to.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Well, that is quite normal...

[Yakovlev] Perhaps one correction should be made. "I do not change"—to say this about oneself would be too self-confident. Everyone changes and becomes different. Certain different approaches appear—worse or better. One has a more profound knowledge of life and more experience. But in the main, strategically—no.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you have any rules of communication with subordinates? And have they ever been able to change your mind?

[Yakovlev] Of course. Very frequently.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In what, specifically?

[Yakovlev] No, in the main, if you are speaking about political strategy, it is difficult to change my mind. But in approaches and interpretations of some concrete case, in tactics—then yes. For example, when I go to speak I usually discuss ideas, tone, and attitude with people close to me. Here I am submissive. I have among my friends people who are professional skeptics. They cast doubt on everything. There are also unrestrained radicals and moderate conservatives.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So this is a matter of principle.

[Yakovlev] Yes. When I fight for tolerance of the positions of people who think differently I have in mind any views. For God's sake! Except, of course, for those that engender hostility and violence...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How are your articles and speeches prepared?

[Yakovlev] For the most part I like to write them myself. I write quickly and preparation takes more time. I like very much to rework things. Sometimes four or five times. I like to look for words. Sometimes I dictate to a stenographer. But I cannot get used to a dictaphone. Sometimes after dictating I ask a knowledgeable person to look over the text. The third path is discussion. When an idea arises I gather a number of people around me and we begin to discuss and dispute. Certain speeches arise from that.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Have you ever had occasion to admit your mistakes in public?

[Yakovlev] Well, yes, quite recently. To the question—somewhere, I do not recall, I was asked what I would write differently in an article against anti-historicism from 1972 which certain Canadians are discussing even now, out of the time context—all over the place... Incidentally, let them have at it! I answered that I would write differently about convergence now. At that time I was proceeding not from the sources but from commentaries, and they were quite biased. What did I know at that time, for example, about Marcuse? Nothing! His works had not been published. But a good deal was being said. When I received the work of Marcuse himself, of course, my viewpoint changed.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] A fair amount of time has passed since the episode with the publication of Nina Andreyeva's article and the response in PRAVDA. Perhaps now, taking advantage of, as it were, the time that has passed, you could tell us something about this?

[Yakovlev] Some day I definitely will. This was an interesting case.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you want to save this for your memoirs? Although, in general, it is a pity...

[Yakovlev] I recall that I was in Mongolia. And suddenly an aide came up to me, opened a newspaper, and showed me the article. I did not have any time, I had to rush somewhere. But I read it and threw my hands up...

V.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, will you be able to find a reasonable combination of your basic work and your family affairs? What does your family think about this?

[Yakovlev] Alas, there is no reasonable combination. My job is wild right now. And my family, of course, is dissatisfied.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In general, how are your days off as a member of the Politburo?

[Yakovlev] Sometimes I do not get a single one. Last year there were about four months when I did not have a single free Sunday.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Please tell us about your home life.

[Yakovlev] I have a wife, two children, and a mother-in-law. And also four grandchildren.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you manage to get to see your grandchildren?

[Yakovlev] It is easiest with them. One of them said once: "Grandpa, you are my best friend." Then he thought a while, squinted his eyes, and added: "And even comrade..." He is eight years old.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The position of a member of the Politburo almost inevitably presupposes a certain amount of isolation from the outside world even in your private life. How do you handle this. How do you feel, for example, about your personal guard?

[Yakovlev] At first I was bothered by this. But they say it is necessary. And, indeed, as your face becomes known it is better to have someone with you when, for instance, you walk down the street... There are unrestrained people. It would seem that I personally do not need to be protected, but there are various situations.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will it not turn out that soon the party will have to pay for the services of the Committee for State Security?

[Yakovlev] This question will probably arise. But, following the practice of foreign countries, the parliament makes a decision to protect the leading political figures and party leaders. And there, you know, it looks much more impressive... I do not know how things will proceed beyond that.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Could you tell us about your purely human weaknesses, passions, and shortcomings.

[Yakovlev] In my family I am frequently reproached for being too easy-going. They say I spoil the children too much and let them get away with too much. I am impulsive. I am too trusting.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you have any friends? From which milieu?

[Yakovlev] I have various friends. From school, from the front—in the Sixth Brigade, student friends, and those with whom I worked subsequently. I have been lucky with friends. I have friends from before Canada and they have remained friends, they have not betrayed me and have not been scared away. At that time I even opted for a certain amount of alienation myself—I would go on vacation and try not to spend too much time with my friends, so as not to cast a shadow on them or something. But they recognized me and would come home and talk about everything that had been happening. I am a sensitive person and I can feel a person's real attitude, perhaps too much.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] If you ever do end up with any free time, what do you prefer to do with it?

[Yakovlev] Chess. Once Anatoliy Karpov offered me a match out of courtesy, although I would inevitably lose. I agreed and now I brag about it.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But they say that at one time you helped Kasparov who was making a challenge for the chess crown.

[Yakovlev] Yes, but that was not about personalities but about fairness.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you manage to keep track of the literary news?

[Yakovlev] With difficulty. But what do you consider news? Because of the nature of my work, as it were, I have had to read all the works which today address our literature from the past. I read several journals.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Education, circumstances, milieu, and communication inevitably equalize people to a certain degree. But you have nonetheless retained your soft Yaroslav accent...

[Yakovlev] That is why among my close friends I have earned the nickname "Khorosho" [All Right]. (Precisely like that, with the stress on the vowels—"Khorosho").

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How do you feel about music?

[Yakovlev] I try to attend concerts and sometimes I listen to classical music. But in general my tastes here perhaps coincide with the tastes of many people of my generation. I love a good, melodic song with lyrics that touch the soul.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] And rock?

[Yakovlev] That is not my kind of music. But if a person likes it, I do not experience any discomfort. And in general I am against trying to translate singing and music into the political plane. Incidentally, one time 20 years ago, I had a conflict with a central newspaper about that. At that time I spoke out against a devastating article about Vysotskiy. (I do not think that at that time I had heard him myself.) I was bothered by the very principle: Why should a party newspaper judge who sings well and who is irritating?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is your family proud of your position?

[Yakovlev] No. I think it causes them much more inconvenience than joy.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In one of your articles published at the very beginning of perestroyka you, apparently without much reflection, exclaimed: "We are all captives of our time..." Do you still think the same thing?

[Yakovlev] Yes, here my opinion has not changed.

Economic

Abalkin Comments on Switch to Market Economy

LD2206140490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] The Soviet parliament failed to adopt this month a government program for the nation's transition to market relations. It instructed the government to work out concrete measures for the transition already this year, with due account for the numerous remarks made by the MPs. A Radio Moscow reporter, Sergey Vorbyev, spoke to a Soviet deputy premier, Academician Leonid Abalkin. What is the state of the government program now?

It is being worked out. The parliament has paved the way for practical actions. It has given us a number of instructions of principle. We have to submit the program by 1 September. This won't be a work of literature, it will be a concrete program with different directions, deadlines and stages of realizing it. Besides that, we have been given our opportunity before laws are adopted beginning

on 1 July to put into effect a number of provisional decrees, which will determine action on laws already passed about property, land leasing, and other things. The prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, has signed a decree on introducing temporary provisions about setting up shareholder societies and other associations and about the issue of securities.

The correspondent asked would prices be raised in the USSR of foodstuffs and other essentials and he was told that prices would go up. And then he said was that a willful [as heard] decision and he was told that they would go up anyway. They have to raise, there is the objective logic of market development and the vast imbalance between demand and supply [words indistinct] the growth of prices. Those growths can proceed in various forms, for example on the black market.

Another question put to Abalkin was: When do you plan to raise the prices? Abalkin answered that our program is a sufficiently well thought out complex document, which provides for price changes as of 1 January next year. At the same time, the new system of taxation will be introduced on the same day. Now, if the program fails for some reason what would you do in such a case and what is the nation supposed to do? Leonid Abalkin said that personally he didn't see any special problems. He would return to research work, which he loves and would be doing with great enthusiasm.

Leonid Abalkin was asked about the destiny of the nation. He said that he was convinced that we had elected one of the most optimal versions of development, which makes it possible to advance to market relations. The program has been weighed from every angle and it would make it possible to convert to these relations without great losses to society. He thought that in another version of the development the losses to society would be much greater.

Abalkin Answers Questions on Soviet Economy

LD2406170890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1405 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Studio interview with Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, with Valeriy Kyosa and Igor Zorin in Moscow on 23 June—live; phoned questions from program listeners both live and recorded; Kyosa, Zorin not individually identified]

[Excerpts] [Kyosa or Zorin] We are beginning a live broadcast: One hour with Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, academician. I will remind you he is deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, leader of a government commission on economic reform and delegate of the Constituent Congress of the Russian Communist Party and 28th CPSU Congress. Commentators Valeriy Kyosa and Igor Zorin are conducting the program. In the course of almost one hour Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin will answer any questions from both radio listeners and journalists. In the course of two hours we have recorded numerous questions by listeners. Some questions will be reproduced from tape recordings, others we will ask ourselves.

In all, more than 60 people managed to call us in the studio in the course of two hours. Moreover, those calling intercity have been constantly butting into the conversation and asking why it was not possible to get through to us. Such was the great interest of our meeting. Thus, Leonid Ivanovich, we welcome you to our Mayak radio studio. [passage omitted]

[Kyosa or Zorin] Well, for a start, a tape-recorded question from a radio listener. It was the very first. Will the producer please switch this tape on.

[Spiridonov] Spiridonov, Vladimir Anatoliyevich, economist from Moscow. Your economic policy is built on regulated market relations, while socialism as a system of organization is based on regulated production relations. This is a fundemantal difference. If this is so, then in your policy you must refrain in the naming of your policy from the word socialism, in order not to dupe the people. What do you say to this?

[Zorin or Kyosa] What do you say to this, Leonid Ivanovich?

[Abalkin] In athe course of many years, possibly even a decade, I have been teaching students political economics and have been constantly explaining, among other questions, that the market is a system of production relations. So, therefore, to set off the regulated market as a special sphere of economic relations which embraces all means of the national economy, the producers and the consumers, the allocation of resources, prices, incomes, and cash flow, is, in my opinion elementary. Besides this, I want to say there is contemporary thinking, and there is the thinking of yesterday and sometimes even the day before yesterday. Yes, yesterday's concepts correspond to a concept, rejected by life and history, of the incompatibility of socialism and the market.

We have lived through this and have stepped over this threshhold of prophesy and dogmatism. Today, all historical experience and the whole history of civilization has shown that socialism does not only reject old forms, the old economic structure, but also inherits all the best of what has been created in the economy and in democratic institutions and in spiritual, moral values, inherits this historic past. The market has been forming for centuries. It has gone through the crucible of natural selection and demonstrated its vital strength. To take a step forward in the ongoing development of society, everything must be taken from the past, including market structures and mechanisms, enriching them with our social values, that which is connected with our country's socialist choice. [passage omitted]

[Sokolov] Do you not think that it would be useful to introduce a ration card system in the country?

[Kyosa] I would like to add to this another question which is asked by vary many listeners and which relates to the need to carry out monetary reform and regressive monetary reform in this country. How would you answer these two questions?

[Abalkin] In other words, the question is whether monetary reform is necessary, am I right?

[Kyosa] Yes.

[Abalkin] Let us start with the first question, as the two questions differ in content and will require separate answers. Indeed we were placed under rather complex conditions as regards the transfer to the market. In an attempt to be realistic we took into account a very low degree of trust toward the measures which are being taken in the economic field by the country's leadership, and the people's constant apprehensions that things are held secret from them or are being done behind their backs, that things are being concealed from them and the truth is not told in full. And we opted to take a bold and an honest step: We announced our intentions openly in advance. We spoke about possible losses and difficulties. We were even reproached for drawing too dark a picture and that we should have added some rosy colours. [passage omitted]

We have announced this programme in full realization that it can lead to a destabilization in the market. [passage omitted]

We understood that it can lead to a wave of panic demand and so on. It seems that the elements of regulated and normative distribution are needed. But so are opportunities for this. Today they are totally in the hands of the local organs of power—both republican and local, since the entire structure of the trade and public catering sector, just as the development of a whole range of spheres, including the development of the agro-industrial complex, have long been fully handed over by the union to the local organs of power. [passage omitted]

I have been elected as a delegate to the congress by the Krasnoyarsk Kray party organization. Naturally I met with the delegation and I met with the delegates today, too. I talked to leaders of the kray. They said that after the government program had been announced, just as everywhere else, panic demand began. Groats, pasta and other products were bought up. The kray, however, is rich and its reserves are reliable. There were appeals to introduce immediately ration cards and a rationing system. [passage omitted]

[Kyosa] So, they did not introduce ration cards in the end, did they?

[Abalkin] No, they did not. And the situation stabilized after this fit of agitation. And admittedly, the supply of these food products is quite steady in the country. Nevertheless, I admit that there may be different situations in various regions, and I do not rule out the measure of ration cards.

As to monetary reform, we have considered many times the option of monetary reform and its consequences. We asked the experts to give us their view. [passage omitted]

Deposits are distributed very widely among the population. There is very precise information about savings, broken down into social groups and age groups, and size of deposits. We know that the greater part of cash income earned through corruption and speculation does not appear in savings books. It is not kept in the form of hard cash. This can be avoided in a great variety of ways. The results of all assessments have shown that this does not affect prices but it could greatly worsen the situation on the market. [passage omitted]

If we go over to the market, there will be the following consequences. The management structure of ministries and other administrative bodies, if I may put it that way, will be sharply reduced, reduced to a minimum. As regards the management structure of economic institutions—banks, financial bodies, tax inspectorate, and so on—it will increase correspondingly. Already about 300 commercial banks have been set up in the country, during a short space of time. This is a wide network. Frequently they attract good specialists away from the state banks, because they can offer more favorable working conditions.

[Zorin] But clearly there are still not enough purely commercial banks on a nationawide basis.

[Abalkin] Probably not enough. But the number will probably increase because there will be regional banks, industrial banks, cooperative banks, banks specializing in certain areas, for example the stimulation of science and technology, investment banks. Legislation is being prepared. We have to admit it in early fall. I think this will be in September. The draft law on banks and the banking system will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet. We plan to submit a separate law on the USSR State Bank. As far as specialized banks are concerned—ones which, at the moment, are run by the state—clearly they will be turned into banks of the joint-stock type. [passage omitted]

There are two alternative options for settling this question. Either it can continue to be under government control or it can be handed over to the Supreme Soviet. Experience varies abroad. The Bank of England, for instance, is under the control of the government. Admittedly, this is an exception. Most of the central banks are independent. We shall be proposing both options to the Supreme Soviet. That is what we plan to do, at any rate.

The one thing we must ensure is that we take our agreement to its logical conclusion. If we remove the bank from control by the government, both the Supreme Soviet and the population of the country lose the opportunity to demand that the government be held responsible for the amount of money circulating in the country. If we hand over the bank, the State Bank, which has a monopoly on the issue of money, which regulates the amount of cash in circulation, it will continue to decide

these questions. The government's opportunities to make ill-thought-out moves, so to speak, will be reduced, but it will no longer be responsible for the amount of money in circulation.

[Zorin] And it will no longer be possible to accuse the government of issuing too much money.

[Abalkin] Not at all. That will be finished. Criticism will have to be redirected—to the Supreme Soviet itself, if that's what you want, or to the independent bank itself, if that's what you want. But the government will not bear the responsibility. [passage omitted]

In line with the government's proposals, salary and wage rates in the new conditions will provide a minimum guaranteed wage level. An employee of a given speciality, with corresponding qualifications, at any enterprise, be it leasehold, cooperative, state-owned, joint-stock, or any other, cannot receive less than the salary or wage level—provided, of course, that he fulfils his obligations and works the number of hours he is supposed to. This system takes on the function of social security, with account taken of the professional skill, experience, and talents of an employee. This must be observed strictly and unconditionally. [passage omitted]

The beginning of this work—the program of a transfer to the market—goes back several months into the past. [passage omitted]

We chose what is called a radically moderate variant, which combines the decisiveness of steps, and courage in implementing them with weighing things over and a careful approach to their implementation—you see, the price one pays for possible mistakes is too high. We considered diverse variants and paces of movement while preparing proposals for the Supreme Soviet.

As for variants which are alternative to that of the government, we have been considering alternatives within the framework of the government's program.

[Kyosa or Zorin] So, your institute, your former institute, was not the only one working at it. Or do you no longer need it?

[Abalkin] I am the head of this institute at present, and we have been recruiting a very wide range of scientists, experts, have received and analyzed reports. [passage omitted]

[Kyosa or Zorin] Well, what about the people paying out of their own pocket?

[Abalkin] Well, when it comes to that, there have been lots of versions. To date, however, there has been no alternative version to our own, to that of having some kind of integrated program even though we are now, after the Supreme Soviet, implementing its and creating a special commission under the government to analyze alternative versions, involving eminent scientists, practical workers and representatives of contemporary structures like the Union of Cooperatives Worker, the Union of Lease-Holders or the recently founded Union of Managers of State Enterprises headed by Sergey [name indistinct] Tretlyakov. We are including them all in the commission for assessing possible alternative versions. Naturally, it must not be done at people's expense. No one is planning to do this. There is nothing like that in the government program. And all attempts to make capital out of this topic (?have been taken) from the authors of that version. I'll start with each element. All financial savings—and incidentally it is for this reason that we are rejecting money reform—all financial savings, like the population's savings from its labor, must be protected in the most decisive way. A population which has lent the state its money in whatever form, as contributions to savings banks or by acquiring an insurance policy or certificate, this is all money people have given the government and the latter must be able to dispose of it in the economy but must be honest in its credit obligations. These must be fully defended. [passage omitted]

[Abaklin] We have proposals that have been worked out by the specialist at the banks we have just spoken about. We should like to publish these proposals so that readers, our citizens, could express what they think about the possible versions because there are various ways of providing this protection, ways that would consolidate these investments and that, while protecting the investments would not permit them to come onto the market immediately leading to a still greater lack of balance. I think that in the summer months, July and August, we will publish these proposals. [passage omitted]

[Kyosa or Zorin] Radio listener Frolov from Pervouralsk even poses the following question: Is the government aware that its program of transition to the market means handing over the people's property into the hands of the big boys of the shadow economy and that part of the party and state apparatus affiliated to it? Even this sort of question was asked. So, what shall we do with the shadow economy? How shall we withdraw money from it?

[Abalkin] The question is, what does one count as the shadow economy? According to international practice in this matter, the shadow economy is a form of activity related to obtaining income, which is not controlled by any payment of taxation. [passage omitted]

There are various ways of dealing with it. First of all, the first method is to legalize certain forms of activity. I cited the example of people using their own vehicles for public transport: this is legalized, becomes part of the usual pattern, it is good for people and convenient, and revenue goes into the local budget.

The second method is to deprive people of the opportunity of deriving profit by means of the shadow economy. If your market is unbalanced, if there are queues and mass shortages of goods, there will be speculation and

one can only combat it with the aid of the law enforcement bodies. An economist cannot combat it. You can impose taxes, but they only work when they are implemented.

The methods here must be first and foremost methods relating to a general improvement: We must create a situation where the market is saturated, where there is everything in the stores, and then the activity of the shadow economy loses its source of nourishment. Second, it must be combatted with the help of the law enforcement bodies, applying the necessary and legal measures with all severity. For many forms, this regulation consists in applying the taxation system. [passage omitted]

I think we shall arrive at a normally functioning market, using only economic methods; but in order to reach that stage, we need a period of transition, a period in which we'll also be applying certain administrative restrictions. [passage omitted]

We in fact presume that the enterprises of the defense complex, or more precisely that section which is connected with the manufacture of arms and special technology, cannot be removed from state property, and will be regulated through the state orders system, as is obvious that, say, a MiG-29 or a modern tank will never enter the free market or be bought by anyone other than the state, the Ministry of Defense itself. Certain technical demands emerge here, and this is understandable. At the same time, a mechanism should be found—and we are developing one—that would protect them from the possible consequences of the market. For example, metal or raw material or equipment which they buy from civilian industries go up in price. This could automatically lead to increases in the price of technology and to increases in budget spending to this end. This, of course, is because it is paid for out of the budget. For this reason, special measures are being drawn up there to protect them from these fluctuations of the market. Work on this is being finished.

As far as turnover tax is concerned, we said in the old, December program that our future goal was to abandon turnover tax and to go over to value-added tax, a tax which is in use throughout the world. Its application will spread. This is a very flexible and efficient way of regulation. We have decided not to break up the old system for the time being, for a transitional period. Turnover tax is being paid. If cooperative enterprises are operating along these same principles—if for example they receive raw materials and other components, which are subject to turnover tax, for the manufacture of goods—they have to pay it.

[Zorin] Please take another question.

[Kisenchuk] Kisenchuk, candidate of economics, from Simferopol. Why not set up a Committee for State Economic Security, which would in practice control the economic situation in the country?

[Zorin] He is suggesting a Committee for State Economic Security.

[Abalkin] I'll answer that. Can you imagine the government taking such a proposal to the Supreme Soviet? After all, the creation of a new committee would require its approval. They would tell us that this would inflate the civil service still further. Joking apart, there is a problem. Such a function has to be carried out by government bodies. Therefore, it deserves attention. In fact, we have been thinking about this question. This question is a very broad one, because economic security entails the protection of our external market from unjustified exports, exports of things which should not be exported, and the protection of certain commercial and technical secrets.

Our international contacts have developed greatly. It is no longer the state alone that is involved in foreign trade, but 14,000 enterprises, which are now operating independently. This creates the problem of a brain drain away from the state. And here we are not only talking about sportsmen—ice hockey players or footballers, for example. We are also talking about talented technical specialists who represent the future of the nation, the cream, the pride of the nation, without whom it will, in general, be difficult for us to live. How do we prevent this? This is also a security question, a question of economic security.

[Kyosa] We have already begun losing them.

[Abalkin] At the moment we are merely aware that a threat is looming. But, with the adoption of all the laws on visas and contracts, this could become a real danger. So, as we evolve our strategy, we have to consider this. This is a very broad problem. This is not just the mafia of speculation, so to speak. It is a broader question. I wanted to demonstrate that there is a certain range of problems which we are aware of. Problems exist. A function of this sort has to be exercised. But we hardly need a special committee for this purpose.

[Kyosa or Zorin] Leonid Ivanovich, here we have been answering listeners' questions—receiving them, rather—and actually most of them have been on the economy. Well, that is not surprising since it is economic issues that are now our primary preoccupation. But all the same, you are, after all, not only an economist and not only the deputy of the head of state: You are also a delegate to the forthcoming 28th congress and a delegate to the founding congress of the Russian Communist Party. Incidentally, you have come to our studio straight from the session. Perhaps one is justified in asking you of your impressions of the founding congress of the Russian Federation Communist Party.

[Abalkin] Well, indeed, we have been talking about real time and listenres must feel that indeed this is not some program—I did indeed go away, as the program was planned a week ago, without waiting for the work to finish—and now, when I leave here, I will have to go back. The congress is not yet over and it is too soon to

sum up the final results. But if I am perfectly frank, I would say it is one step forward and two steps back. I understand that that is a very serious statement. The step forward is the creation of the RSFSR Communist Party.

[Kyosa of Zorin] But on what principles?

[Abalkin] Wait, I will first tell you about the step forward. The very fact that the party has been constituted, that this very large, complex republic has the same party status that every medium-sized or small republic has had for a very long time, is in my view certainly a step forward, giving the possibility of perusing a definite political line, program. The very fact that the party has, been set up provides that possibility. That, in my view, is a substantial achievement, in everyone's awareness and in the possibilities it opens. But what bothers me—there is a great deal—is that we have not been able so far, and this has been felt here too, we have not been able to keep the passions and emotion of street politics and the absence of common sense in many cases, out of the work of Russia's highest party forum. In fact, most of the speeches skirted around the real socioeconomic problems facing the republic. The discussion was of intraparty issues, important and necessary ones, such as how to elect delegates, how to form various bodies. Important matters, I understand that. Russia's population of many millions was expecting something more than that the 2,500 communists who have assembled would be engaged in solving their own internal issues. The people expected a response to the pain, alarm, and destiny of Russia. They were waiting to see what solution this party would propose as a way out of the crisis. The opportunity to do this existed. A report was delivered. A modified platform for the 28th congress was put forward. There was discussion and debate. It has emerged that there is a plenty to discuss here. This was somehow pushed into the background and purely internal, intraparty problems swamped what the people expected from the congress.

This is on the one hand. On the other hand, many attitudes also put one on one's guard—these, too, frequently stem from an emotional perception of reality, without taking the seriousness of the problems into account. The voice of Russian science was not heard at the congress. Not a single major cultural figure from the republic spoke at the congress: and in this area a great many things need to be said. [passage omitted] This puts one on one's guard and is a matter for concur, especially in connection with the process of the forming of the party bodies, the highest party bodies of the Republican Communist Party and in connection with the process of elaboration of its theoretical and ideological programs.

For the moment, the present composition of the congress elects, today, two thirds of the composition of the Central Committee—and there are practically no people professionally capable of taking on this kind of work. This cannot but alarm one.

[Kyosa or Zorin] And, naturally, what about your attitude to the First Congress of Russia's People's Deputies which ended yesterday. In particular, what about your attitude toward the demarcation of functions between Russia and the Center, adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia?

[Abalkin] These are childhood illnesses. These are childhood illnesses. Despite everything we must not forget that Russia, historically and today, ought to be a consolidating center of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—it should not set itself off against others; its attitude toward the USSR Constitution and to laws adopted at this level should be one of respect.

Any confrontation here is harmful to perestroyka and to people. People will suffer from that. It will give rise to counter action. Today, when we were listening to the latest news of the day before this broadcast, the association among the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhastan represents a reaction to what Russia is doing, the latest confrontation and it is not something that benefits the people.

[Kyosa or Zorin] We have just over a minute left. Exactly a minute. The cult of personality, voluntarism and stagnation, can these replace perestroyka in foreseeable future?

[Abalkin] Perestroyka is not a campaign—it is a strategy. It is a matter for decades. Perestroyka is not reckoned to span a quinquennium even; nor even 10 years—it will end when we have established a renewed society, a highly effective society, geared towards the requirements of Man, a society of which each of its members can feel proud.

[Kyosa or Zorin] And it is on this note that we shall end the live broadcast "One Hour With Academician Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin." He replied to the questions put to him by radio listeners and journalists. The broadcast was presented by commentators Valeriy Kyosa and Igor Zorin. All the best to you.

State Support Urged During Market Switch

PM2006144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Yu.V. Yaremenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by R. Lynev under the "Facing Up to the Market" rubric; place, date of interview unspecified: "About Macrolevels and Microthinking, or a Conversation with a 'Radical Conservative'"—first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] The government concept of transition to the market is the subject of tumultuous discussion. It seems at times as if, under the onslaught of criticism, neither the concept nor the government itself would be able to maintain the planned course even through the summer. On the other hand, criticism could make it possible to more accurately check the economic recovery course. IZVESTIYA's latest interlocutor, appearing under the

"Facing Up to the Market" rubric, is Yu.V. Yaremenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[Lynev] Numerous arguments about the schedule and pace of the intended transition have developed in connection with the government program for transition to the market. More decisive steps, based on a time scale of 500 days for example, are being suggested in place of the gradual steps proposed by the government. What would you say about such a pace?

[Yaremenko] I don't wish to appear evasive but, bearing in mind that we are taking our time over the introduction of many market elements, I disagree with those who think that market relations can be introduced overnight, as the result of an intensive drive, and then everything will automatically run smoothly. I fear that, with such an approach, everything will end up as yet another imitation of strongarm measures, as has repeatedly happened in the past.

[Lynev] Your remarks contain three tenets which call for clarification. First—you are in favor of a gradual approach. Second—you simultaneously believe that we are slow in our movement toward the market. Third—this approach by itself will not solve all the problems. There are signs of both a conservative and a radical approach. How can you follow a straight line between the two?

[Yaremenko] Following a straight line means reducing everything to some sort of a simplistic solution, replacing one set of stereotypes by another.

[Lynev] Fine, since we are on the subject of pace, let us dwell on it.

[Yaremenko] There have been numerous arguments on this topic. None other than Harvard University Professor D. Sachs, famous international authority on the extrication of economic systems from crises, played the part of our consultant and critic. He has previously been consulted by several governments in Latin American countries, as well as on Poland's "Balcerowicz Plan." Thus he estimates that our economy could be boosted within three years provided the international community invests an annual amount of $30 billion in it.

[Lynev] $90 billion for us? Why should the international community get us out of our own mess?

[Yaremenko] For the sake of general stability. Several scientists believe that it would be more advantageous and reliable to back it up in this way, rather than investing the same billions in arms. It is, after all, clear that we are not the only ones to blame for the mess—as you put it—which developed over so many years and is associated with the unheard-of arms race, that we were drawn into it against our will. This is a common problem—it is simply a matter of it being a heavier burden for us than for anyone else—and therefore it must be solved jointly. This is in no way a question of us going cap in hand.

[Lynev] Be that as it may. But the concept of reform proposed by the government—as far as I understand it—does not bank on such generous external backing. And it is scheduled to take more than three years. How did D. Sachs appraise it from the viewpoint of accumulated international experience?

[Yaremenko] He was restrained initially. He said that our leadership lacks imagination. But later on he realized: The standard package of measures, tested by international practice, cannot help us get out of our present situation, which is unlike the situation in any other country.

[Lynev] Not even like Poland's?

[Yaremenko] Not even like Poland's. Market prerequisites were created there, as in several other East European countries, earlier. There was a powerful private sector in agriculture. We, on the other hand—and D. Sachs admitted this—are both structurally and institutionally unprepared for a swift transition to the market.

[Lynev] What is meant by institutionally?

[Yaremenko] It means that we have not created institutions capable of providing a backup for the market, of creating the appropriate economic environment for it. What are they? A securities market. A taxation service, which is virtually nonexistent in our country. Just as the very idea of tax returns is nonexistent. Indexation could have been introduced today, if not yesterday. This is what I meant when I said that we are taking our time over reform. It will be difficult to launch all this overnight and make it work.

[Lynev] So, what is your view about structural preparations for the market?

[Yaremenko] Let me begin by saying that our economy may not have been efficient compared with a market economy, but it was nonetheless an integral system. It had its own production, social, and management structures, it had its own meaningful functions. All its links were closely interwoven. Nobody can deny this. Having built it up over the decades, we of course achieved some gains and suffered certain losses. Ultimately, the loss proved unacceptable.

What was the main factor in the entire system? The unbearable noneconomic pressure exerted upon it by the defense complex. Moreover, this complex actually contained the technological nucleus of the entire system. It also contained—to the detriment of the remaining economy—extraordinary "state of the art" material and technical supplies.

Just think of it: All the rest of the economy— all of it!—existed on the remainder principle. Conventional machine building, for example—we are talking about a

different and much lower technological standard than in the defense industry. Technological standards were even lower and supplies even worse in sectors meant to meet man's needs—the light and food industries. Consequently the "senior" economic sister—if this description could be applied to the defense industry—developed a most powerful submarine fleet in a very short time, while the two "junior" ones have been racking their brains for ages about ways to build a motor vehicles plant in Yelabuga.

[Lynev] It cannot be denied that we are unwilling to forgo the remainder principle. But it is difficult to figure out from what you have said which way you tend to lean—toward accusation or justification of the administrative edict system.

[Yaremenko] This is neither an accusation nor a justification, it is an attempt to explain its structure, the causes as it were of the resources imbalance and inequality inherent in it.

[Lynev] Nonetheless, attempts have been made over the last five years to somehow boost the economy's laggard sectors, be it machine building or agriculture. It is a different matter that these attempts cannot be described as successful.

[Yaremenko] But why did the emphasis on machine building fail to produce results? After all, sizeable amounts were allocated. A superministry was created—the Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine Building. A similar supercentralization occurred in the agro-industrial complex, the chemical industry and timber complex, the light industry....

[Lynev] And is the "senior sister" still sidelined?

[Yaremenko] Yes! All that happened was that the capital investments pumped into the economy were funded by paper money and not backed by material resources. This provoked inflation. The conclusion was: It is necessary to delegate powers to departments which failed to cope with their tasks, to the direct producers. They were delegated, the Law on the Enterprise was adopted. The enterprises ended up with money in their accounts, money to pay higher wages. But, once again, none of this money was backed by material resources. This was nothing but maneuvering around the previous and restricted resources space. This is why there was no turnabout toward the consumer sector.

[Lynev] But what about the cooperatives?

[Yaremenko] They can be the topic of a separate and lengthy conversation. But to pursue our line of discussion: It is obvious that they have, of course, proved unable to correct the structural imbalance. Why? Like any other commercial structure, cooperatives as rule lean toward big money. This is a law of economics. And who has big money? The big boys. It is no accident that the entire computer market, with the cooperatives involved in it, is geared to meeting the needs of powerful departments, primarily the defense departments. And the result is that even a new form like the cooperatives serves largely the same old priorities. The economy's flywheel is spinning not so much forward as backward. The number of cooperatives is growing, but this does not in any way hinder recession.

And yet we are told: Everything will quickly take shape through a free market, through a system of balanced prices, through privatization.

[Lynev] Why not look at the economic recovery concept proposed by the government, which includes a price reform, as some sort of draft project for the entire reform?

[Yaremenko] The way I see it, the purpose of the price reform proposed by the government is more modest: To balance the budget before switching to the market. To take out some sort of insurance. I think that here we have more timidity than farsightedness. I can understand the reasons for raising food prices. But higher prices for nonfood goods will undermine the incentives for active labor among the bulk of workers. As for the budget deficit, I would not make a drama of it at all. This is because our deficit as such is not the cause but the effect of other imbalances and shortages which I mentioned earlier.

[Lynev] So, what is happening? We have an economist speaking under the "Facing Up to the Market" rubric and persistently warning against the market.

[Yaremenko] Not warning against it, just suggesting that we do face up to the market, not closing our eyes to it but clearly aware of all possible consequences. Specifically the fact that the market will not remedy the shortages which are genetically inherent in our system but will aggravate and exacerbate them—which will lead to the bankruptcy not just of individual enterprises incapable of existing for a single day without state help, but of entire sectors. This could turn out to be a collapse of the entire economy, which still has a very low level of adaptability. How can this happen—how can we tell the sectors which have for decades been trampled in the dirt: There is your market, keep afloat as best as you can. Never mind the social consequences for millions of people living on the borderline of poverty.

[Lynev] This sounds like something Iuda Golovlev [reference to literary character, created by Saltykov-Shchedrin, a hypocrite concealing his cruelty by pious talk] might have said to his terminally ill brother: Pick up your bed and walk. So, what should we do about the reform? We have to start somewhere.

[Yaremenko] I suggest starting with something that neither the government nor its radical critics mention or, when mentioning it, they do so by the way: By freeing the economy from the excessive noneconomic pressure. By replacing our, if you like, national priorities. So far,

perestroyka has been geared only to the technological periphery of the economy. But the technological nucleus still remains unaffected.

[Lynev] This calls for a certain amplification. L.I. Abalkin says: Despite the overall decline of production, there is a growth of consumer goods output. And the highest growth—up to 15 percent in the manufacture of television sets and tape recorders—has been secured by the defense sector. These, let us assume, are just the first steps in fulfilling the conversion program adopted by the government, and surely they move in the direction you have mentioned?

[Yaremenko] The defense industry produced civilian output even prior to conversion. But all this was done, as the saying goes, on the quiet. By way of a tax in kind, an additional workload. This output—L. Abalkin is right—is rising now. First, however, it still remains just a sideline to the "senior sister's" basic program. Second, it represents a narrower range of goods which are not fundamentally new but, as a rule, obsolete models: This output is resource-wasteful both in production and in consumption.

In other words, the military are operating according to the old canons. They themselves determine what and how much they will manufacture. They are hardly concerned about the national economy as a whole. Consequently, vast resources are being wasted supposedly for the sake of maintaining a mobilization potential—duplicating mobile targets like tanks and other similar equipment. And how does the "senior sister" with its colossal potential intend to technologically boost its juniors? Is it prepared to release a series of its enterprises to the market, letting them become fully fledged subjects of this new market—with access to markets abroad, with a powerful organizational and commercial infrastructure? The market is suffering from shortages of cars, bicycles, spare parts for them and other machinery, video tape recorders, video cassettes—you name it and there is a shortage of it!—and yet not a single defense industry firm has turned any of these articles into its main product. To a large extent, the conversion program is out of kilter with fundamental national interests. Our most advanced and most privileged sector has not been properly studied as a promising market space. And it still remains the ultimate in exclusion zones for our economic science.

[Lynev] Let us sum up: Christ drove the moneychangers out of the temple, but we now have the exactly opposite thesis—if the state were to be allowed into the market, it should be just a tax collector. A watchdog—this is also advocated. But you are in favor of its market presence in a different and more active role.

[Yaremenko] Yes. Especially, and I repeat this, at the initial stages, the stages of shaping the market. I perceive one way into the future market via major but nonmonopolistic corporations with extensive ties abroad and with modern and powerful research and development facilities. A prototype of such corporations can be provided by our aviation design bureaus and enterprises of the watch and clock industry. This part of the market economy requires time to get established. The other part of the market, based on simple technologies and manual labor (agriculture, the services sphere, trade, and municipal services, where we need powerful cooperatives instead of our decrepit housing operation offices), should have switched to a commercial basis a long time ago.

But we must realize: There must be material support by the state for both major corporations while they are getting on their feet and for small farms separating from kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], as well as for the kolkhozes and sovkhozes themselves. Without such support, the path to the market will not be direct and short but, on the contrary, it will be longer and harder.

Nefteyugansk Oil Reservoir Fire Extinguished

LD2206173490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 22 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by corespondent Zhuzhgin]

[Text] In Tyumen Oblast, 25km from the town of Nefteyugansk, a major Siberian oil center, oil has been burning for the second day. Our correspondent reports:

[Zhuzhgin] The emergency occurred on the night of 20-21 June. A 20,000 [ton] oil reservoir in the goods yard [tovarnyy park] of the Karkateyevyy line production control room initially caught fire from a bolt of lightning and then exploded. Despite the measures taken, by morning three more blew up in succession and the fire raged over three hectares of the yard, in close proximity to dozens of similar ones.

To be fair, we must say that there was also a threat to the settlement, which luckily has passed. Credit must be given to the firemen. Immediately the alarm was raised and special subunits from Nefteyugansk, Surgut, Gagala, Nizhnevartovsk, and Tyumen were mustered. Considerable special forces and all possible kinds of fire-fighting equipment have been assembled at the scene of the accident. By yesterday evening it had proved possible to localize the fire. There is no threat of it spreading to the remaining tanks. Today the oil pumping station has been started up, although the fires are continuing. The former volume of oil is being transported to Omsk.

Here one could put a full stop. However, the question remains: are other goods yards and thousands of similar reservoirs, dispersed across the whole of Tyumen oblast, insured against similar strikes by the weather? It has become clear from conversations with specialists that lightning conductors [zashchita ot molnii]—and it is precisely this which caused the fire and explosion—only guarantee 95 percent safety. The remaining 5 percent

have caused damage which, expressed in financial terms, amounts to many tens of thousands [currency not specified].

In our view, this accident is another alarm bell for all oilers no matter where they work—in Western Siberia, in Tataria, or in Azerbaijan—on the need to take account of those percentages which enable fire to gobble up our riches and, only by a miracle, not to take human lives. [video shows reservoir on fire, uniformed woman speaking into a microphone, firemen standing around, a fire engine, burning ground, control room]

We have just been informed that the fire has been completely extinguished.

Serious Gasoline Shortage Exists in Kuzbass

LD2206141290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] We have discovered that sales of gasoline to vehicles which are at the disposal of hospitals and other medical establishments of Kuzbass were stopped today. Those engaged in emergency service transport—apart, perhaps, from the militia—are finding themselves in a difficult situation. During the past week not even one tonne of 93 grade gasoline was delivered to Kuzbass. During the coming weekend, gas stations will not service private cars. Reports about the shortage of gasoline are coming in literally one after another. It looks as if Mayak, together with other media, will have to ask the State Committee for the Supply of Oil Products or those organizations which deal with the distribution and production of gasoline for explanations.

Paper Shortage Seen as Economic Trap for Glasnost

90US1048A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Article by TRUD special correspondent N. Dorofeyev: "A Trap For Glasnost"]

[Text] **Another commodity has joined the list of those rarely available now. There is no meat, nor fish, nor tea. And now there is also no paper, which means there are no newspapers or magazines. The mailbox often stays as empty as the refrigerator.**

The telephones on the desks of the TRUD editors ring incessantly. Subscribers are trying to find out what is happening to the newspaper: Has it been closed, God forbid? It hasn't? Then why did we stop receiving it several days (or a week, or two weeks) ago? There is only one answer: Sorry, but there is a shortage of paper—we are trying to do everything we can.

The nearly 22 million Soviet people who subscribe to TRUD are concerned about the fate of the newspaper. At this very moment we need 27,000 tons more paper to print the necessary number of copies. In other words, of the planned 300 issues a year we can print only 250. TRUD has been trying to raise the alarm for a long time now, but to no avail. They either do not hear or do not want to hear the newspaper's appeals. Since this January there has been no answer to our request for hard currency allocations to buy paper. We need 2,700 tons of paper to cover, for instance, a two-month shortage, but instead, as some kind of a joke, we get 500 tons—our daily requirement. On top of that, the 500 tons are given from the state reserve—it turns out there is such a reserve—but this amount is immediately "deducted" from our future supplies. The situation is becoming critical....

The paper crisis struck unexpectedly and its blow to glasnost, which was gaining strength in the country, was even stronger as a result. And it all started quite innocently, in the spirit of the times, accompanied by the then seemingly unreachable dream of the market. The end of the newspapers and magazines subscription campaign coincided with the adoption of the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1990. Every periodical was allocated the amount of paper it had required at the time the plan was introduced. It is true that there was a footnote: The periodicals had to acquire some of the paper themselves directly from the paper and pulp enterprises. The state orders for the latter were also decreased by five percent. The organizers of what is known as planned market relations between the paper manufacturers and consumers created a fascinating fairy tale according to which the released part of the output was to be sold on the free market.

The publishers said "Yes, sir!" and directed themselves to the free market. But from there they returned empty-handed. Minister of the Timber Industry V. Melnikov now insists that the market was formed to make it possible for the paper and pulp enterprises to exchange their products for foreign-made spare parts, chemicals, materials, and equipment. The publishers, of course, could not offer any of that. The money known now as "wooden rubles" was of no interest to the paper and pulp industry. According to Comrade Melnikov the released five percent finally had to be sold to foreign and other organizations as part of their barter trade.

Thus was the foundation prepared for the paper crisis. Here is the outcome of it. I am not going to talk about other periodicals, let me just say something about TRUD. Kharkov, Tyumen, Kazan, Moscow, Simferopol, Minsk, Leningrad; the Moscow, Bryansk, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tambov, and Kalinin Oblasts and the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]—this is a far from complete list of locations where over 6 million people fail to receive their subscription copies of TRUD.

This is a dangerous symptom. It is dangerous for two reasons: Primarily, because for millions of people their channel of information has been blocked and it is the very channel they prefer and trust, the one they listen to. One more thing is of no less importance. The current paper situation is eloquent proof of the unstable and unbalanced position of our entire society on the threshold of tough economic reforms. A mere embryo of a market—some pitiful five percent of the state orders

created what essentially is a real disaster. Can this be a prototype of the feudal-like exchange of goods in kind which may come into existence given our current preparedness for the market?

Officials of all ranks who are responsible for the production, planning, and distribution of paper are keeping their Olympian calm. From time to time they give verbose interviews or publish their own speeches, seriously trying to persuade the public that the paper situation cannot be any different at present. They agree that the paper and pulp industry is in a near catastrophic situation; the machines and equipment are outdated, there is a shortage of spares, most of which are foreign made. The many years of a lack of government attention towards the timber industry complex are making themselves felt. For that reason, they say, publishers of any periodicals should base their requirements on the realistic supplies of newsprint and on the current situation in the printing plants. In short, cut your coat according to your cloth until the market sends the entire country along the road of total prosperity.

All this can be described as tactics of "washing one's hands of the whole affair." But here is what is curious about it: Every encounter and every conversation with any of the managers responsible for the distribution, planning, or production of paper begins, without fail, with accusations of...journalists and publishers. The literary tribe seems to have caused the damage by their participation in the fight for environmental improvements. In this way they did not allow some new paper and pulp plants to open and helped to close some old ones.

Besides, the saboteur journalists publish materials that are too interesting and that sharply increases the demand for some of the periodicals.

"Look what is happening," Ivan Semenovich Kharitonov, until recently chief of the department of wholesale trade and balance in the paper and pulp industry under the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gossnab], told me. "The LITERATURNAYA UCHEBA magazine tells me they are going to print the Bible! And this at a time when we do not have enough paper to publish the materials of the coming 28th Congress of the CPSU!"

I will reserve my comments here. Let the readers come up with their own evaluation of this type of accusations. Let them also consider the information provided to TRUD by the USSR Committee of People's Control [KNK]. This information is the result of an examination conducted at six paper and pulp plants of the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry. According to KNK data none of the six plants was using its paper producing capability in full. The Leningrad industrial association "Bumaga," for instance, works to only 81.4 percent of its capacity; the Kamskiy pulp and paper combine uses even less—78.7 percent. The transportation consumers association [LPO] "Novgorodlesprom" works to 86.7 percent of its capacity. All in all, the plants reviewed by the KNK gave the people's economy 590,000 tons of pulp and 100,000 tons of paper less than planned.

And this is not all either. In the opinion of the KNK the USSR Ministry of Timber Industry does not supply its plants with raw materials on a normal basis. As a result of this the Solikamskiy, Balakhninskiy, Kamskiy, Klaypedskiy, and some other combines produced another 51,000 tons of paper less than planned.

And even this is not the entire problem. The economy gets even less paper because of construction delays. Since 1977 the Solikamskiy pulp and paper combine has been unable to start operating its plant, capable of producing 35,000 tons of newsprint. The only reason for this is the inability of the contractor trust to complete the work. Only about half of the Kamskiy pulp and paper combine has the work load. Why? They do not have the timber preparation shop whose construction was also stopped in 1977.

Let me repeat: All this was revealed by the USSR Committee of People's Control at six plants. It is hard to imagine that things are any better at other plants of the paper producing industry. A truly "auspicious" moment was chosen to start organizing the paper market.

The KNK data makes us look at the paper situation from a different angle. The natural question arises: What should the publishers pay for, in fact, on the free paper market? For the paper or for the losses in its production—losses caused by unused capacities, poor supplies, and construction delays? There are losses due to failures to install equipment, including foreign-made machines. The KNK has heard about such cases also. There are losses incurred during loading and unloading procedures or caused by poor packing and spoilage during storage.

On the free market the publishers will also have to pay for losses caused by the impractical use of paper. They waste 20,000 to 25,000 tons of paper on printing all kinds of forms and agency memos for internal and outside use. Many cooperators, by the way, feed at the same source.

They now publish things in small numbers and they do not need a lot of paper. Arkadiy Andreyevich Glovatskiy, in charge of the timber industry section of the USSR KNK, told me about a conversation he had with a certain cooperator who publishes an information bulletin in Kalinin. It turns out that currently a private publisher does not have to go to a paper plant. All he has to do is to find an enterprise or an organization that has paper reserves. Then he pays R700 to R1000 per ton (the existing state price is R350) and receives as much paper as he needs.

One more thing that we all will probably have to pay for on the free paper market: It is our great talent to incur losses when trading with other countries and that on top

of huge domestic losses. Our country is exporting more paper than it is importing but we get for it less than what we pay.

At the end of May TRUD published some figures dealing with the export and import paper sales. Unfortunately, those were the 1988 figures. The newspaper does not have any newer data on the subject. The already mentioned I. Kharitonov, from USSR Gossnab, refused to quote for us the exact amount of paper we need to buy abroad immediately to cover the shortages. It seems that the capitalists cannot wait to get this information to raise their prices.

Do not worry, Ivan Semenovich. The capitalists know all about us anyway and that includes the amount of paper the country needs. No newspaper with any self-respect would remain silent after being cheated even by its own country's merchants or bureaucrats. We can say for the information of those foreign paper business bosses who do not know it yet, as well as for our readers, that TRUD alone is supposed to receive 12,000 tons of the imported paper. However, for reasons unknown, the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations is not paying the bills and the foreign paper remains where it was.

The same Bank for Foreign Economic Relations, by the way, is moving very slowly in financing a rather important contract for new equipment, which was signed by the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry and a Japanese firm. At the same time, the ministry fulfills its plans for hard currency profits, thus contributing over 2 million hard currency rubles to our budget. It is a curious situation: The government takes away all the hard currency that the Ministry of the Timber Industry earns from its export sales but at the same time it has stopped giving any centralized allocations to paper and pulp plants which they need in order to purchase foreign made spare parts, chemicals, and other materials. Instead they have lowered state orders by five percent, as if they did not understand that such a decision would strip the domestic paper supply of another 94,000 or so tons.

A good economic trap was set for glasnost. It is strong and, what is more important, reliable. You cannot go back and there is nowhere to turn either. They calculated exactly that the most popular periodicals will get caught in the trap, the periodicals that carry the burden of a huge circulation—yes, it is a burden nowadays. See what is happening: It seems that we still live under the centralized system of distribution when the corresponding state services should do their duty and purchase the paper for further supplies to the publishers. However, these services while formally existing in practice do not take any action because "a sort of a market" has been already declared. But we do not have it either; all we have is some elements of primitive society barter trade.

The half-plan-half-market system seems to be a convenient device to manipulate the half which serves most to your advantage at a particular moment in time.

As for TRUD, both its editors and publishers will try to do their best to fulfill their duty to their subscribers and their readers to the maximum. And that in spite of the current shortage of 27,000 tons of paper. We are talking to the USSR Council of Ministers about providing us with additional funds. We have invested R3.5 million in the development of the Balakhninskiy paper combine.

But all of these are, of course, half-measures. We need some radical decisions, primarily from the government, about the development of the paper industry which would provide for glasnost. Maybe the state orders have to be revised again (I hope the paper industry people can forgive me for this) and increased so that the industry is given a chance of hard currency cost recovery other than at the expense of the domestic paper consumers. It is time to look at the losses incurred by the paper industry. We need to immediately buy back the paper set aside for free sales if it is still possible; even if it has to be paid for in hard currency. And finally we have to start carrying out the government program for increased paper production. This program does exist and it is time we took it seriously now.

New Store Trades Foreign Goods With Enterprises

PM2206144790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 20 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by S. Sergeyev, G. Kononov, identified by caption]

[Text] [Newscaster] As soon as we hear the term "hard-currency store" we immediately think of foreigners or people who have earned foreign currency abroad as its clients. The attitude of the overwhelming majority of people to these trade outlets is purely negative. Now such a store has opened in Chelyabinsk but, rather than individuals, it serves enterprises which have their own foreign currency accounts. As a result, both the store's founders and workers of major associations and combines are satisfied.

[Correspondent] [video shows various aspects of store and goods on sale, as well as catalogs] This store has been opened by the Chelyabinsk "Forum" joint stock company—or rather its foreign trade department, the Swiss Hupf Company—and the "Molodezhnaya Moda" [Young Fashion] retail trade association. Each of the partners has something to gain, which is as it should be in the business world. The "Forum" foreign trade department receives 2 percent from every transaction for its services as middleman; the retail trade association, having supplied the premises and skilled staff, includes the turnover of the new store in its books; and the foreign company has acquired a new and virtually unlimited market. Unquestionably customers, too, will be satisfied. The store offers excellent footwear, knitwear, dresses and suits, and beautiful fur and leather coats and jackets.

Other categories of goods which include personal computers, video equipment, copying equipment, medical instruments, and cars are marketed with the help of glossy catalogues supplied by foreign firms. So far the store serves exclusively the collectives of enterprises which have foreign currency accounts at the Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity]. Private citizens are not catered for.

[Correspondent] Is it advantageous for enterprises with foreign currency to cooperate with you?

[A.Ya. Vaymer, store director, identified by caption, facing camera] I believe that it is. First, other enterprises which provide similar services take a bigger cut. We retain only 2-3 percent. That first. Second, the enterprises with which we do business do not have their own trade premises, or skilled staff, or warehouse facilities. If they had to acquire all that it would cost them a lot of money.

[Correspondent] The first clients of the hard-currency store are the Kopeysk and Chelyabinsk machine builders. They have concluded contracts for the purchase of footwear, copying machines, video equipment, and other consumer goods.

And so, there is a hard-currency store in Chelyabinsk. Something that seemed unlikely yesterday is a reality today.

Belgium Bell To Help Develop Telephone Network

PM2206143790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by S. Milyanchikov, A. Arbuzov, identified by caption]

[Text] [Announcer] Our correspondent reports on Soviet-Belgian cooperation in the sphere of telephone communications in our country.

[Correspondent] We have gotten so used to the telephone that we don't even notice it any more. As long as the telephone is working, that is. But as soon as something happens—the telephone is out of order, or we move to a new apartment which is not fitted with a telephone—we immediately start cursing our communication workers.

To begin with, a few figures: there is a total of 37 million telephone subscribers in our country. Is this a large or a small number? Let me tell you right away: it is a small number. In the United States there are three times as many. In our country there are 92 subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants in cities, and only 29 subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants in rural areas.

In order to satisfy demand for telephone connections as quickly as possible, a Soviet-Belgian joint venture for the production of automatic telephone exchanges has been established in our country. [video shows wide range of telephone equipment, negotiations, and agreement being signed at USSR Ministry of Communications]

Taking part on the Belgian side is the famous Bell Telephone Company, and on the Soviet side the "Krasnaya Zarya" Association. A contract on the establishment of this joint venture was signed at the USSR Ministry of Communications today.

[V.K. Yevseyev, director of the "Krasnaya Zarya" Association, identified by caption, facing camera] At present there are 16 million would-be subscribers in the Soviet Union on the waiting list for the installation of a telephone. We are producing some 7.5 million sets per year. This problem is getting worse with every passing year. We have now concluded an agreement with a Belgian company for a joint venture which will produce telephone exchanges for 1.5 million subscribers per year. This will make it possible for us to satisfy demand for telephone connections with the help of modern electronic telephone exchanges.

[Correspondent] When will the joint venture produce its first output?

[V.K. Yevseyev] We will produce the first 100,000 sets in 1992.

Scientific

Cosmonauts To Repair 'Soyuz' Coating

PM2206210590 Moscow TRUD in Russian 23 Jun 90 p 2

[Special correspondent V. Golovachev report: "Are the Cosmonauts in Danger?"]

[Text] Mission Control Center—"A Fault in the Soyuz Heat Insulation System Presents a Colossal Danger to the Soviet Space Crew"; "Will A. Solovyev and A. Balandin Be Able To Return to Earth?"—some time ago articles with those headlines appeared in foreign publications when it became known that almost half of the vacuum-shield heat insulation system (EVTI for short) had become detached from the body of the craft and large insulation elements, about 2 meters long, were waving about in space like leaves, fastened on one side only. The mission control center directors announced at that time that there was no danger to the crew even though this unpleasant surprise created extra difficulties for the performance of the flight.

In order to maintain the required temperature within the reentry vehicle (and the temperature can fluctuate within rigid limits from plus 5 degrees C to plus 30), the station has to be rotated regularly, twice a day, throughout the flight first turning one side toward the sun, then the other. In addition, warm air is pumped from the station into the reentry vehicle through a special air duct to prevent the buildup of moisture. The flight is going normally.

But won't the flapping "leaves" hinder the Soyuz landing? The most varied situations were studied in research and experiments on earth and in almost every instance reliable methods (including manual methods) were found to carry out the reentry program in full. However, there is a very small possibility of a development of events in which the "leaves" would become entangled and alter the movement of the reentry vehicle and the living compartment when they undock. In that case a collision between those compartments in space cannot be ruled out. I repeat, the likelihood of that is negligible but when dealing with space it cannot be ignored.

After heated discussions the decision that deputy flight director B.D. Blagov announced to journalists yesterday was finally made: The crew will have to go out in space and secure the EVTI. That will take time. And to carry out the program of work on board the station in the interests of the national economy and science the flight will be extended 10 days.

Thus the cosmonauts will have to return to earth not on 30 July, as planned, but on 9 August. The launch of a new crew to replace A. Solovyev and A. Balandin is now planned for 1 August.

Soyuz will have to redock to complete the repair. How will the "leaves" behave? Specialists are confident that there should be no complications. But in the event of an accident, the crew will break off their maneuvers around the station and returned to earth ahead of schedule. The redocking is set for mid-July.

'Mir' Orbiter Crewmen Continue Experiments

LD2206110690 Moscow TASS in English 1034 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin will go on with their programme of geophysical research today. They will take photos of the Crimea, Caucasus and areas with high seismic activity.

They have completed a 120-hour technological process to grow a monocrystal of zinc oxide. Space smelting, whch began on June 20 with the Krater-b equipment, is continuing.

Over the past few days the Mir crew studied the earth's natural resources and the environment.

They conducted distance sounding of central and southern parts of the Soviet Union and worked on methods to determine the bioproductivity of sea waters.

Experiments in space were conducted hand in hand with tests aboard a research ship in the northwest of the Black Sea.

Solovyov and Balandin also checked the work of the new Glazar-2 ultra-violet telescope, with automatic homing.

The flight is proceeding normally, according to the mission control centre.

'Mir' Cosmonauts' Program Outlined

LD2406214190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Text] The crew of the Mir orbital complex is starting its 20th working week. The cosmonauts will be engaged in experiments in geophysics and in the study of materials in space. According to the program of research of the earth's natural resources and study of the environment, it is planned to take photographs of various areas of the country. Optizon, a new technological apparatus, which is installed in the Kristall module, is beginning to function. The unit is designed for growing silicon monocrystals in conditions of weightlessness. According to the schedule for re-equipping the station with additonal installations, monitoring checks and preparations for forthcoming astro-physical research of the new (Buket) gamma-ray spectrometer, which is also installed in the Kristall module, are planned.

Correction to 'Man, Earth, Universe' Program

PM2206141790

The following corrections pertain to the item headlined "Transcript of 16 Jun 'Man, Earth, Universe' Show," published in the 22 June Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 58-59:

Column one, paragraph two, penultimate sentence, make read: ...although from the "Splav," "Kristall," and "Korund" ["Alloy," "Crystal," and "Corundum"] experiments we realized... (providing Russian names of experiments per conventional usage);

Page two, column one, first partial paragraph, antepenultimate sentence, make read: ...ports and one [Blagov points at wall-hung diagram of "Mir"]—the "Kvant" module... (adding editorial note for clarity)

Military

Moiseyev Interviewed on Military Reform

LD2306172990 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Report on interview with Army General Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; place, date not given—Moiseyev in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet military are often asked if perestroyka is going on in the Armed Forces? This is a serious question, since the Army costs the taxpayer so much. The Soviet Defense Ministry, engaged in drafting a military reform, promises already this year to present

the draft to the Soviet parliament. Our reporter asked the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, to speak about changes in the Army.

[Moiseyev] There's a military reform and a reform of the Armed Forces. The latter is a component of the former. The military reform has now covered all areas of our activity. As for the Army reform, it provides for positive changes in all the armed services, it touches on the system of personnel training and production of combat vehicles and armaments. In view of the conclusion of an accord about reducing the Soviet and American strategic offensive armaments the structure of the stratgegic missile troops, the Navy and the Air Force will change. After the completion of the Vienna talks there are plans to change also the structures in other armed services.

[Announcer] Would the coming reform change the time of service in the Army and the principle of forming the Army?

[Moiseyev] We do provide for some changes. For instance, beginning in January of 1991 sailors and soldiers in the Navy will serve not three, but two years. At first, as an experiment, we propose armed service on contract as well as service not in the troops but in an alternative way without bearing arms.

[Announcer] The next question was what is to be done for army servicemen in the social way?

[Moiseyev] Cash grants will be raised for all servicemen. There will be leaves, better social amenities and living conditions.

[Announcer] How do you regard the future of the Army's political bodies?

[Moiseyev] I think the answer to that question will be supplied by the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party opening early in July.

Yeltsin Speaks to Graduates on Role of Army

LD2306162490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Report by Ivan Akkuratov]

[Excerpts] This morning the graduates of the Moscow Higher General Military Command Red Banner School named for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet fell in ceremoniously on Red Square. The young officers received their diplomas testifying that they had graduated from this well-known military training institution. Yeltsin, RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman, USSR Defense Minister Yazov, and Moscow Soviet Chairman Popov, were present at the ceremony. [passage omitted]

[Akkuratov] After the ceremony Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, RSFSR Suprenme Soviet Chairman, answered journalists' questions.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Boris Nikolayevich, today you awarded officers diplomas to young lieutenants. Tell us please, what hopes do you place in the officer corps?

[Yeltsin] I think reform, nevertheless, lies ahead in the Army. I have spoken with the defense minister, and he also agrees with this, since very serious changes must take place in the Army, in general, in all relations, in the system for training cadres and in the structure, in the plans for the Army. Of course it must be relieved of inappropriate functions. This is the necessary task with reduced personnel; nevertheless it is necessary to leave the country's defense in reliable hands.

There have been incidents when the Army has been used against the peaceful population, and this must be eliminated. This must be eliminated legislatively, the soldiers themselves must be defended by this law. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the internal troops exist for this purpose.

There are people who, because of religious and certain other convictions, cannot serve in the Army. Their forced call-up is not a way out of the situation, that the sovereignty which we have declared, must be defended, so it is said. [as heard] If it is to be defended, then the Russian Federation must have an army, but if we split our Armed Forces into national sections, then we will no longer have an army as such. [end recording]

Armed Forces Delegates to CPSU Congress Meet

PM2206122190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by "our correspondent": "To the Delegates' Council"]

[Text] A conference of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the Russian party conference from the Armed Forces party organizations has been held at the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, warmly congratulated the conference participants on the great confidence they had won. Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, addressed those present.

Topical problems of the party's renewal, the restructuring of party political work in the army and navy, and military reform were discussed in an atmosphere of openness and democracy.

A council of representatives from the Armed Forces delegation was elected.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov answered delegates' numerous questions.

N. Batarchuk, deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee subdepartment, participated in the work of the conference.

Weekly Publishes Makashov Speech at Request

PM2106171190

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 June 1990 First Edition carries on page 2, under the headline "'We Are Not Going To Surrender'" and the rubric "From the Congress Transcript," the text of the speech delivered by Colonel General A. Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, in the debate at the Russian party conference 19 June. The newspaper prefaces the speech with the following introduction:

"The speech at the Russian party conference by Col. Gen. A. Makashov, commander of the Volga-Urals Military District, has evoked considerable comment of various kinds. However, not all our readers were able to listen to the speech during the television relay. So the editorial office has received many requests to publish the full text of the speech so that everyone can form his own impression of it. We are meeting those requests."

Makashov's speech is the only debate speech that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has so far published in full. Other debate speeches have been summarized briefly in TASS accounts of the conference proceedings carried by the paper.

The regular "Feedback Telephone" feature on the front page of the same issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA contains the following comments from readers on Makashov's speech:

"Colonel B. Novikov (Retired), Kishinev:

"'I am calling you to express my support for the speech by Col. Gen. Makashov—the commander of the Volga-Urals Military District. I think that at long last someone has said what we have all been thinking for the last few years. We are Soviet people who are not indifferent to who says what about our Armed Forces.'

"Colonel N. Maklishevskiy (Retired), Moscow:

"'I must confess that Col. Gen. Makashov's speech depressed me. Is there any call to present your opponents as dim-witted people? After all, everything is far more complex than the picture of "evil intent" on the one side and "patriotism and loyalty to ideals" on the other. Arguments at the level of slogans are hopelessly obsolete.'"

Official Says Konmsomolets Disaster Avoidable

LD2406234890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Studio interview with Ye. D. Chernov, deputy Naval Academy chief, former first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet, by unidentified moderator; from the "Vzyglad" ("View") program—live]

[Excerpts] [video shows clip from old "Vremya" item. Caption says "11 April 1989"] ["Vremya" announcer] As has already been reported, a Soviet submarine fitted with an atomic unit sank in the central area of the Norwegian Sea on 7 April. [passage omitted]

[Chernov] Throughout this period, I have been engaged in investigating the causes of the loss of this submarine and the accident which led to this loss as well as being involved in it on my own initiative. I came to the conclusion that far from all the possibilities were brought into play in the battle for the survival of the submarine, that far from all the technical resources designed especially for this were employed, and that far from all the standard systems were used as they should have been according to the logic of the battle for the survival of the vessel and according to our rules for waging this battle. Quite simply, I came to the conclusion that the loss of the submarine could have been prevented, just as her crew could have been saved. The leadership of the Navy did not agree with this quite precisely and responsible formulated concept. I believed that these conclusions, the lessons that were to be learned from them, and the recommendations should have been immediately communicated to the personnel of the Navy's submarine forces.

[Moderator] In order to avert future incidents....

[Chernov] Yes, naturally. The point is that the Komsomolets does not differ crucially from the vessles that are now in service in the Navy. Practically every day these vessls perform missions at sea, and combat training takes place on them on shore. And I believed that the lessons that could be learned from this tragic accident should be immediately learned and communicated to the people who could find themselves in the same situation tomorrow, so that they can be in a better position to fight for the survival of their vessel and win the battle which, to our regret, this crew, the majority of which died tragically, did not win.

[Moderator] The leadership of the USSR Navy should have been presented with specific proposals for the training of the personnel of the Soviet Union's submarine forces.

[Chernov] You are quite right. You are quite right. I have come here today, 22 June 1990. The first point, the results of the analysis, were submitted in early August 1989 to the leadership of the Navy. And since then, this point has just not been taken on board. And having exhausted all the possibilities, in order to finally draw attention to the need for us to address these issues, a general concept needs to be drawn up at long last. We can do without a clash of views within the Navy itself, and particularly in the context of the Navy and Ministry of the Ship-Building Industry. A common view of these things needs to be formulated. The lessons have to be endorsed and the conclusions, recommendations, and

proposals need to be confirmed. That is why, as a final and extreme resort—it is very difficult, very difficult—I am appearing on your program. Only recently I did not think I'd have to resort to such measures and actions, because I received word from the military-industrial commission of the Council of Ministers that they proposed to return to this matter—that is, the Ministry of Defense, or specifically the Navy, and the Ministry of the Ship-Building Industry. The main organization—our design institute—was nominated. And we thought that we would be able, as professionals—without interference from senior chiefs, who also regard themselves as professionals, but to whom it is rather difficult to talk, because conversations with them always end up barking up the same tree—to sit down and calmly examine the whole business. Frankly, after a long period of gloom, it was a red letter day for me. But unfortunately, the whole thing came to nothing.

Diet Told Soviet Far East Fleet Aging

OW0606125890 Tokyo KYODO in English 1111 GMT 6 Jun 90

[Text] Tokyo, June 6 KYODO—Half of the Soviet Union's 240-vessel naval fleet stationed in the Far East is 25 years old or older, Defense Agency officials said in Diet testimony Wednesday.

According to the Defense Agency's analysis, 70 of the Soviet Union's 140 submarines based in the Far East, and 40 of its 100 navy vessels are over 25 years old.

The data is in contrast to an analysis presented in the latest defense white paper issued last fall. In the document the Defense Agency said that the Soviet Union was improving the quality of its Far East forces, though their size was being reduced.

On Tuesday Defense Agency officials acknowledged that the Soviet Union has also reduced the number of naval vessels and military aircraft stationed in the region.

Next year's defense white paper will include the data, the officials told the House of Councillor's Budget Committee.

Vessels in the analysis included submarines, some equipped with cruise and ballistic missiles, destroyers, cruisers and escort ships.

Akira Hiyoshi, head of the agency's Bureau of Defense Policy, said that he did not expect the aging vessels to be retired, unless the Soviet Union decides to reduce its military power.

Baltic Republics

Reportage on Lithuanian Independence Moratorium

Prunskiene Comments

LD2306012490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2345 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Kazis Ustila]

[Text] Vilnius 23 Jun (TASS)—An interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kasimiera Prunskiene, who had just returned from a trip to Greece and Poland, was broadcast late on Friday [22 June] evening on Lithuanian television. Having spoken of the outcome of her trip and of the opportunities that are opening up for economic and political cooperation between Lithuania and those countries, the head of government stressed that "the Lithuanian government's suggestion that the republic's Supreme Council discuss the possibility of declaring a temporary moratorium on the 'Act of restoration of an independent Lithuanian State of 11 March this year' for the duration of the talks with the Soviet Union has been perceived by the politicians and journalists of Greece and Poland alike as a natural and perfectly reasonable action and has been favorably received."

Speaking of the present situation in Lithuania, the chairman of the Council of Ministers stressed that "at the moment, the main thing is to make the correct decision on our relations with the Soviet Union, to discuss the government proposals and also whatever the republic's parliament may suggest on this matter." She said that, since returning from her trip, she had already had a conversation with Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, who, as the government head put it, "basically supports the government's proposals, while at the same time allowing for the possibility of other formulae and additions to this formula."

As is known, the government proposal to discuss the possibility of a moratorium on the Act of Independence has generated a sharp response in Lithuania, with many considering the act "inviolable and not open to debate". On this point, the chairman of the Council of Ministers voiced the hope that it "will be possible to discuss this matter in a calm atmosphere, without any extreme assessments."

"The government does not believe that any single proposal is the sole possibility. This or that formula may be found, but what is important is that it should yield results and lead to talks with the Soviet Union," said Kasimiera Prunskiene.

Justice Minister Views

LD2406033990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1610 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Telephone interview with Professor Pranas Kuris, Lithuanian minister of justice, by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] Does the (?announcement) of a moratorium on state independence have a precedent? I telephoned Professor Pranas Kuris, Lithuanian minister of justice, with this question.

[Begin Kuris recording] I am not aware of any precedent applying the term moratorium to independence implementation. However, the term moratorium is familiar in international law. It came into being, one might say, it had its beginnings in roman law, in the so-called Civil Liability Law and denotes a certain suspension of obligations—a certain postponement of obligation. Also understandably, if it is to denote postponement of obligation, then also correspondingly, it denotes a postponement of a certain right. Moreover, no doubts existed, even within Roman law, that the announcement of a moratorium does not destroy either, the right or the obligation. And here, since residents of Lithuania are currently very interested in the moratorium and if its origins and sometimes, some even explain incorrectly, that it is a term nearly related to the word death, I could state, this explanation is incorrect. Three volumes of "Roman Law" by Ziraras were published in Lithuania, even before the war. Some people could glance through those and also, could examine the Latin-Lithuanian Dictionary, published in Kaunas, by Jokantas back in 1936, where it is clearly indicated, that this word, this term, is derived from the word 'mora.' The word 'mora,' means postponement and nothing more. It means, nothing is destroyed, in the case of a moratorium, but certain things are solely postponed. Also, civil laws of civilized countries are aware of this term, generally speaking, and in Paragraph 88 of the Lithuanian Civil Code, this term of moratorium has also been employed.

As to when it found its way into International Law, I would say, that apparently, following World War II, it has gradually transcended from that Liability or Private Law, to the area of Public Law, and we have already been aware of instances, where this moratorium concept is used in certain international agreements, in a certain [word indistinct] of assumption of obligations or in legal use. [passage omitted]

I regard this proposal to the Supreme Council as a certain search, and further, a search in the sense of terminology for now, in a categorical legal sense, but not as a political fact, and like a certain political path in the solution of the Lithuanian question [word indistinct]. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Reaction to 'Moratorium' Seen

LD2206081890 Moscow TASS in English 0715 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscilla]

[Text] Vilnius June 22 TASS—"Moratorium", hardly a household word in Lithuania, is now on the lips of young and old. People are trying to understand what it stands for, lauding or lambasting the government for its "risky step".

On June 16, the Lithuanian government, without doubting Lithuania's right to independence or reneging on the parliament's March 11 declaration on independence, suggested that lawmakers consider a moratorium on the act for the time of talks with the Soviet Union.

The government believes that the moratorium will help normalise relations with the Soviet Union, establish the Lithuanian state and ease its international recognition.

Although the government explained that the moratorium will not annul the act but only temporarily freeze it without changing Lithuania's independent status, the proposal caused an uproar.

The moratorium is the number one topic with Lithuanian newspapers and radio and tv speakers.

The moratorium is a "trap" against independent Lithuania, Antanas Pernatskas, leader of the League of Free Lithuania, said in a parliamentary newspaper.

The Council of the Sejm of the Sajudis movement also called on parliament not to allow a temporary moratorium on the March 11 act, pointing out that the motives behind the government's decision are not yet clear, that the moratorium is currently unacceptable and that new ways for talks with the Soviet Union should be found.

Even if extreme attacks in the press are left out, calls to "protect the act on Lithuanian independence" and "denounce opponents of independence" prevail in the newspapers.

"It is a pity that the government has come under heavy fire for allegedly wanting to give up independence. This is either due to ignorance or malice," Lithuanian Justice Minister Pranas Kuris complains.

Meanwhile, the republic is losing millions of roubles every day.

Pro-Union Lithuanian Communist Party Meets

LD2306182390 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius June 23 TASS—To firmly uphold the ideological and organisational unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the mandate given to delegates to the CPSU's 28th congress by participants in a plenary session of the pro-Union Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) Central Committee here today.

The main item on the plenum's agenda was "preparations for the 28th congress of the CPSU."

Mikolas Burokiavicius, first secretary of the pro-Union LCP Central Committee, in his remarks at the plenary session pointed to the complexity of the situation that had developed in this Baltic republic on the eve of the national party forum.

This is precisely what disruptive, anti-perestroyka forces speculate upon, Burokiavicius maintained. Such forces, accusing the pro-Union LCP for the past and present state of affairs in society, cultivate an enemy image allegedly represented by the party and are trying to remove the party from the political arena.

This is why Lithuanian communists are now as never before in need of cohesion, a high degree of organisation and responsibility for the further destiny of the party, Burokiavicius emphasised.

Speaking of the republican government's proposal to the Lithuanian parliament about a moratorium on the March 11 act for the period of talks with the USSR, the party chief said there were grounds to consider this as a step towards a dialogue with the centre.

Since dialogue may become a reality, the communists must be vigilant and see to it that no concessions are made to the detriment of the interests of Soviet Lithunia and its citizens, Burokiavicius said.

The plenum also adopted a statement expressing the pro-Union LCP's negative attitude to Lithuanian parliament resolution on the issue of identity cards of the citizen of the Lithuanian republic (in accordance with the resolution, persons who received these identity cards are deprived of the citizenship of the USSR), to the desecration and destruction of monuments to the figures of the communists parties of the country and the republic of Kaunas on June 14, and to the creation of national military formations in Lithuania.

Reportage on Lithuania's Economic Blockade

Correspondent on Results

LD2306053590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2112 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Report from Vilnius by correspondent Kurkletite; from the "Television News Service" program]

[Excerpts] The economic blockade has affected our correspondent's point as well. Our correspondents' cars lie idle—there is no gasoline, and you cannot get very far on a trolley with television equipment, never mind to distant towns and villages.

The economic blockade as affected many newspapers as well. Due to no deliveries of newsprint, newspapers have halved in size, and some are not published at all. As the Lithuanian Statistics Department reports, due to a shortage of fuel, energy, and material resources, almost 39,000 people were unable to work on 20 June in industry, construction, and transport. Losses due to the economic blockade have already surpassed 102 million rubles.

I could list many other sad figures, but there is also, nevertheless, reassuring news. The Ionovskiy nitric fertilizer factory today completely returned to work.

In expectation of the possible talks between the Lithuanian Republic and the USSR, Lithuanian society is heatedly discussing the Lithuanian Government's proposed variant of a temporary moratorium on the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's act of 11 March on the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state. [video shows Kurkletite standing in front of the Lithuanian television building] [passage omitted]

Finance Minister on Results

LD2306025690 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] The economic situation on the 65th day of the blockade can be defined as critical but still controllable. This was said in a governmental communique released today after a long break. Earlier such communiques were announced daily and a number of newspapers and other mass media published them in an obligatory manner. Today's governmental communique says that at present 46,300 people in industry, building, transport and agriculture are out of work or on early annual holiday because of economic blockade. Production in 10 industrial enterprises has been stopped completely while the losses of Lithuanian industry and construction have reached the mark of 335 million rubles

The Lithuanian Minister of Finance, Romualdas Sikorskis, has told Radio Vilnius that the income of the state budget has went down by 100 million rubles due to the blockade. The sum makes up one sixteenth of the total annual revenue. The minister of finance pointed out that the money accumulated by the blockade foundation was kept spared as a reserve. Romualdas Sikorskis said that 22 kopeks from each ruble are deducted for the budget of the Soviet Union. According to the minister, this practice will continue until appropriate treaties with the Soviet Union have been signed and all calculations to this effect have been concluded. The 22 percent deduction for the Soviet budget are entered as the first Soviet Union's debts to be paid back to Lithuania. Romualdas Sikorskis was confident that Moscow owes Lithuania more than Lithuania owes Moscow.

Current Problems Viewed

LD2406211890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian at 0000 GMT on 24 June carries on 11-minute interview conducted by presenter Roma Pakeniene with Lithuanian Finance Minister Romualdas Sikorskis.

The minister notes the existence of "blockade-caused income deficit." He observed that "Lithuania's state budget has suffered more than 100 million rubles in losses," and says this amounted to "approximately one-seventeenth of the entire budget." He explains that because of a shutdown in capital construction and ensuing cessation of supplies to Lithuania, financial manipulations are possible, and these help maintain a certain budgetary balance.

Asked about pension and disability compensation and financial assistance payments, he replies: "We are treating this problem in a normal fashion, so to speak." He observed that problems may arise in this respect, if the blockade drags on.

Commenting on the specter of mass joblessness and a totally empyty budget in Lithuania, Sikorskis states: "Well, I do not think we will come to such a situation, at least, not in the near future. In spite of this, a number of enterprises and organizations will continue to work." He mentioned the possibility of loan financing and points out that each situation development will call for specific measures.

He expresses hope that the blockade will end and a solution with Moscow will be found, somehow. He adds that a few more months under blockade conditions will cause a major setback, which will require much time to overcome. He notes that several agreement variants have been prepared concerning contributions to the union budget. Such contributions currently represent one-fifth of the republic's income. He remarks that eventually, Lithuania will seek to regain the money contributed to the union budget, during the current year, and next year's budget will not feature any such contributions. He observed that this "is being currently tolerated for diplomatic reasons." He adds that, in the event negotiations fail to take place, this can be annulled by the parliament and no more money will be contributed to the union budget.

Asked who is the greater debtor Sikorskis replies: "Moscow owes us more. The list is huge." He details the existence of various funds, noting about 11 billion rubles outstanding involving the finance ministry budgetary funds, and not including various other sums related to deportees and Lithuanian gold bullion. He also recalls Lithuania's "chronically difficult situation" up to the time of Stalin's death.

Sikorskis cites difficulties involved in having to do everything separately from Moscow, such as in instituting new laws and new systems of taxation and finances, in relations with foreign countries, and in questions of currency. "We are doing everything on our own," he concludes.

Lithuania's Fuel Position in Agriculture Updated

LD2306175490 Vilnius International Service in English 2200 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] The Azotas fertilizer plant in Jonava, mid-Lithuania, is gradually expanding production. This was made possible after the flow of natural gas to that enterprise had been renewed following an agreement between the governments of Lithuania and the Soviet Union.

Yesterday Lithuania used 10.5 million cubic meters of natural gas, nearly as much as prior to the blockade.

But there is no centralized supplies of petrol to Lithuania yet. The present resources of petrol in agriculture can guarantee normal work for a week only, while other oil products can last the farmers till mid-July when harvest time begins. Work on the farms is highly complicated due to the shortages of fuel and further aggravated by the railway blockade. It is quite probable that the old horse-driven farming machines may have to be used again.

Landsbergis, Prunskiene Hold Talks 22 Jun

LD2206221490 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Excerpt] I am very pleased that Vytautas Landsbergis supports, in principle, the government proposal, of course, while also visualizing the possibility of other formulas or supplements, stated Lithuaian Premier Kazimieria Prunskiene in her Lithuanian television address late this evening.

According to our correspondent's report, after returning to Vilnius today, Kazimiera Prunskiene met with Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, and spent approximately two and one-half hours in conversation with him. A government meeting will take place tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Latvia's Gorbunov on Baltic Developments

LD2206185190 Prague CTK in English 1728 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Riga June 22 (CTK correspondent)—Moscow, Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn urgently need to start talks on tackling the Baltics problem, but first both sides must make concessions. That from the Baltics should be expected in the days ahead, Latvian parliament Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov told CTK here today.

However, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will not go so far as to comply with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's demand to "freeze" their independence declarations, the Latvian official said.

He agreed that the developments around the Baltic have been somewhat slowed down over the past few days, but said it was a positive shift in the whole situation that the tension accompanying the three republics' effort at resuming their independence has slightly subsided.

Anatoliy Gorbunov told CTK that President Gorbachev had confirmed, though only verbally, the possibility of the Soviet Union's transformation into a union of sovereign states. According to Gorbunov this idea and the declarations of the Baltic republics about their resuming state sovereignty and independence "are not at variance."

On the other hand, it is most disconcerting that all that is now taking place should have happened two years ago at least. As the time passes, the situation is becoming ever more complicated, the Latvian parliament chairman said.

Speaking for his republic, Anatoliy Gorbunov said that a formula under which the Latvian side would "do nothing concerning the Soviet Union's fundamental interests" during the talks could be acceptable to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets

LD2306074190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 15 Jun 90

[Text] The Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium held a regular session yesterday. There was a discussion of the agenda of next week's plenary session, which the Presidium will recommend on 18 June for adoption at the session. It is anticipated that there will be an examination of a draft resolution on the procedure of examination of draft laws and resolutions, a hearing of the government's information on the economic situation and measures to regulate prices.

It is also planned to examine three questions connected with the budget, a draft law on the Committee on Protection of the Environment, a resolution on establishing newspapers of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, as well as to discuss the question of the activities of political parties and other public organizations at state administration and law protection establishments.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium also confirmed the regulations and structure of juridical administration. (Aivars Datavs) was confirmed as its chairman. The presidium also continued its discussion, begun at the plenary session on 13 June, of Anatolijs Gorbunovs' visit to Moscow, and what sort of stance should be taken in the future on relations between the Republic of Latvia and the USSR. An appeal was also adopted to the people of Latvia in connection with June, when the occupation of Latvia began.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Holds Financial Session

LD2206224290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1414 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 22 June (TASS)—Deputies of the Latvian Supreme Soviet have this week devoted their main attention to financial affairs. The law on the republic's budget rights was adopted in its first reading. The main element in it is the principle of the independent setting of the budgets of the republic and local soviets. The allocation of resources for joint "interstate" special program is also allowed for. In order for the law to work, a normative act on taxes is required in addition. Its draft, unlike the first document, is not yet being published for broad discussion.

As has already been reported, the session has suspended the validity on the territory of Latvia of one article of union law on the estate budget of the USSR for 1990. Deputies have decided to keep in the republic the whole of the income tax system and the so-called transport taxes and to increase the share of taxes from trade turnover transferred to meet the republic's needs.

The question of the material maintenance of the deputies is progressing less easily. The deputies have asked that they be given a list of members of staff of the apparatus of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers, in order to compare the salaries of the legislative and the executive. Information on the Presidium's apparatus was prepared, but did not come up for discussion.

The USSR president's proposal to freeze the declaration on the restoration of Latvia's state independence for the period of talks was not included on the agenda and was not examined.

Fuel Supplies in Latvia Restricted From 19 Jun

LD2306045990 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0430 GMT 19 Jun 90

[Text] Attention all heads of ministries, institutions, associations, enterprises, and organizations, as well as owners of private means of transport! The administration of the Degviela [Fuel] Association announces that in connection with the reduction in reserves of 93 brand petrol, starting from 19 June, that is from today, for a period, the sales of this brand of petrol will cease in the Republic of Latvia, except for special transport and means of transport belonging to invalids.

Estonian Party Congress on Union With USSR

LD2306233790 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] We must not allow Estonia to secede from the Soviet Union, it was said at the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress which continued today in Tallinn.

The 20th congress opened, as you remember, in March. At that time the independent Communist Party of Estonia was also created, with Vaino Valjas becoming its chairman and Enn-Arno Sillari its first secretary. On the night after the congress a section of Russian-speaking delegates continued work by setting up the so-called night-party wing of the Communist Party of Estonia. They indeed were to continue the congress today.

The congress came to the conclusion that the Estonian-speaking Communist Party will have no future because after the rebirth the party did not acquire a new content. Likewise, it has few members. Self-managing Estonia has collapsed in Estonia. the economic situation is below the lowest, and with becoming independent one is playing with fragile ethnic feelings. On 15 May on Toompea [seat of government] it was Savisaar's aim to demonstrate to the Estonian Committee that the population in fact stands behind the prime minister.

In the words of Pavel Panfilov, Estonia does not need two communist parties and he sees certain possibilities for the two parties to come closer together. Pavel Panfilov thinks that Estonia should still remain within the composition of the Soviet Union. Pavel Panfilov has for a long time had no meeting or discussion on the subject of the party with Vaino Valjas.

[Reporter] [Begin recording in Russian] Tell me, please, one more thing. Do you have any contact with Vaino Valjas, chairman of the Communist Party of Estonia?

[Panfilov] With him...in the parliament I sit...across another deputy from Vaino Valjas, on the same bench.

[Reporter] I mean along the party lines?

[Panfilov] But along the party lines there are no links whatsoever.

[Reporter] No links at all?

[Panfilov] No, no links at all. [end recording]

Baltic Leaders Comment on Future of Union

90UN2162A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 25, 20 Jun 90 p 2

[Report on interviews with A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet; A. Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet; and V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, by T. Fast, P. Keydoshyus, and R. Kacra; in Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius, respectively; date not specified; under the rubric "Express Interview": "Difficult Steps to Agreement"]

[Text] **The third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet ended with the adoption of an appeal to the higher organs of state power of the union and autonomous republics. Its main thrust: to move beyond what might be the most dramatic point in the history of our state when the temptation to search for a solution to the crisis alone, without taking one another's interests into account, might be a threat to its very existence; we need efforts for joint constructive work.**

Let us recall: The country's president and the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet met before this. And, as V.I. Yeltsin announced at the opening of the first session of the Russian parliament, "we have taken steps to meet one another halfway and have said that we would work only on a joint, businesslike basis because the country cannot survive without Russia, nor can Russia survive without the country."

On 12 June the same kind of meeting was held between M.S. Gorbachev and the three leaders of the Baltic republics, and right after that there was a meeting of the Soviet of the Federation in which they participated. The

country's president advanced a new concept of a union of sovereign socialist states. Various ties among the republics are possible within its framework—federative, confederative, and freer ones than existed previously.

When they returned home from Moscow, the chairmen of the supreme soviets were asked two questions by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondents of their republics in Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn:

1. WHAT IS YOUR EVALUATION OF THE DISCUSSION THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERATION TODAY AND DID IT SATISFY YOU?

2. HOW WILL RELATIONS BETWEEN YOUR REPUBLIC AND THE UNION DEVELOP NOW AFTER THE CHANGES OUTLINED IN MOSCOW?

A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia

1. This meeting of the Soviet of the Federation may be called our first meeting on a concrete subject. It seems to me that the general atmosphere of the discussion between the center and the republics has changed. Elements of a dialog between equals have appeared for the first time.

The main question in the Soviet was how to go on living. All participants in the meeting expressed their attitude toward the reorganization of the Union. The position of the Baltic governments is known from their declarations, and representatives of other republics also spoke in favor of the confederation, and those where the government is not yet completely formed refrained from making final suggestions. And only Kazakhstan spoke in favor of retaining a strong center. Yeltsin's position was interesting. In his opinion, the center is not necessary for agreements to be concluded among the republics. The process should proceed from below. And if, say, the agreement were to consist of six or seven points and three of the points are the same for five of the republics, this would be a basis for the formation of a new union.

2. The idea of creating a union of sovereign states was heard for the first time from the mouth of the USSR president. And not on the basis of a standard agreement, but taking into account the interests and capabilities of each republic. This represents a great deal of progress in the position of the center. It was immediately suggested that a working group be formed to develop this idea. But I declined to become a part of this group since I did not have authorization from the parliament.

Progress is impossible without concluding an agreement concerning the legal status of the transition period, which involved providing for full state sovereignty for Latvia. In our opinion, Latvian independence should lie at the basis of such an agreement. As an initial position—through the sovereignty of the republic Supreme Soviet. All contradictions that arise between the laws of the USSR and Latvia should be resolved through agreements based on equal rights and equal advantage. Gorbachev, having considered this a basis for further negotiations, made his own suggestion: For the time of the negotiations we should freeze the declarations. If the Latvian parliament makes a positive decision, these official negotiations may begin immediately.

A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia

1. I think this is the first time a candid discussion of such a delicate subject has taken place at a meeting of the Soviet of the Federation—changing the nature of the state structure of the USSR. It is very gratifying that it proceeded in such a balanced and proper manner. Only one thing is troublesome: We had to wait a year and a half for such a discussion and there is no way to make up for the time lost.

As you know, the significance of 12 June for the destinies of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia has not been exhausted by the discussion in the Soviet of the Federation. On that same day there was a long-awaited meeting of representatives of the Supreme Soviets of the three republics with the president of the USSR. I should very much like to believe—and it seems to me there is justification for this—that this will mark the beginning of a new stage in our movement toward the acquisition of real state independence—a stage of rejecting force, a stage of political regulation and search for compromises.

2. As concerns the prospects for relations between the USSR and the Estonian Republic, it is difficult to respond right now. Everything should be determined during the course of our negotiations and I have already expressed the hope that they will begin soon. But I can state our position. It is simple: Estonia, like Latvia and Lithuania, never voluntarily became a part of the USSR. The same scenarios of "socialist revolutions" of 1940 was played out by the Stalinist regime under the threat of application of force, which had actually already been applied in our land. And therefore the will expressed by the Estonian people for the restoration of sovereignty is the will for the triumph of justice. The restoration of Estonia's state independence is by no means an act that is hostile to the interests of the peoples of the USSR.

We hope that during the transition period we have proclaimed we shall be able to resolve the problems that exist in our relations with the USSR, including ethnic ones. We wish to create a democratic rule-of-law state in Estonia with the human individual at the center. And no encroachment on human rights and liberties as defined by international law would be permitted in this state, which is also written in the declaration of the Council of Baltic States of 6 June of this year. We wish to be good neighbors and reliable partners in economic development with the Soviet Union and we want our relations to be built on the basis of equal rights, respect, and mutual advantage.

V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania

1. In the Soviet of the Federation we discussed the future of the Soviet Union. Although my participation there might be considered conditional—Lithuania, as we know, is a part of no such federation. To the suggestion that we express our opinion, I recall that I said: Today nobody needs the Soviet Union as it was, with the exception of the octopus in the central departments and, perhaps, the old General Staff.

Finally changes have come from below. And this real perestroyka will soon spread beyond the stagnant sacred inviolability.

Chairmen and presidents spoke and everything amounted to economic and social offenses, to exploitation of the republics by the center (a "union of ministries or republics?"), to an immediate need to restructure this Union ("tomorrow it will be too late even to speak of a confederation"). M. Gorbachev's "union of sovereign states" formula was repeated several times and they discussed the diversity of future ties both among the republics and between the latter and the center. And each would decide for itself what to concede and what to take away from the center... All this looked quite interesting when laws were adopted by illegal procedures which gave all the "rights" of the republics we all know to whom and where. The corresponding distribution of benefits from this was never to occur. How will it be now? Lithuania could give some advice but it would be afraid to intervene in internal affairs.

2. I expressed certain considerations to the USSR president about this and I can now cite at least the basic content: "Whether the Soviet Union decides on a federation, confederation, community, or society of states or combined variants, Lithuania must choose its own path—possible participation as a sovereign subject of international law."

Any other choice would be coerced and thus illegal and short-lived. To achieve this by force (through railroads or petroleum, monopolies, under the thunder of armored personnel carriers, or the threat of the capture of the youth) is an unseemly and irrational thing. At least normal dialog would not spoil relations for the future.

They say that the USSR president is making it incumbent on the Third Congress of People's Deputies to find a solution on Lithuania. It is difficult to believe this because the decision was announced before the adoption of the Law on Withdrawal of Republics from the Union. Consequently, it applies to the corresponding section of the State Archives and nothing more.

When they speak about compromise I raise the question of its limits. That is, the point beyond which compromise becomes capitulation. We have neither the mandate from the voters nor the moral right to capitulate. In addition to these demands of the Kremlin, which were directed essentially not at patriots but at subjects who have misbehaved, for three months we have been seeking, proposing, and outlining calming compromises. And we are just as ready for them as we were before.

"A system of bilateral negotiations will make it possible, in our view, to satisfy the strategic, transit, and economic interests of the USSR in Lithuania, as well as the rights of USSR citizens living here." This is also from a letter to Gorbachev.

Veterans Council on 'Encroachment' in Baltics

LD2306165790 Moscow TASS in English 1622 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—The All-Union Council of the Veterans of War, Labour and the Armed Forces has sent an address to the prime ministers of Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian republics, expressing concern over direct enchroachments on the rights and personal dignity of veterans who reside in these Baltic republics.

Collective letters are coming in from war veterans who reside in the Baltic republics, to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Government, the USSR Defense Ministry, and the All-Union Veterans Council, the address says.

"The authors of letters demand an end to encroachments on privileges granted to them by the law and protection of their honour and dignity from militants' insulting remarks.

"Particular indignation is aroused by the fact that this happens in the year of the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascism and at a time when other union republics have considerably broadened privileges to veterans.

"The Baltic Republics' state agencies' decisions concerning the provision with housing and residential registration—which encroach upon the rights of commissioned and non-commissioned officers who are being transferred to the reserve and servicemen on active military duty—cannot be recognised legitimate either," the message reads.

"Such actions, along with violations of the law of the USSR, instances of desecration of monuments and outrages on the memory of those who liberated the Baltic area from Nazi enslavement, stir up inter-ethnic strife and destabilise the situation still further," the authors of the address emphasise.

"The All-Union Council of the Veterans of War, Labour and the Armed Forces is resolutely protesting against encroachments on the rights and privileges of the veterans and expresses hope that state adminstration bodies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will suspend the lawful acts concerning the position of war veterans in these republics," the message says.

Baltic Democratic Party Organization Set Up

LD2506100390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] A Baltic regional organization of the Democratic Party of Russia has been set up. The inaugural conference, held in Kaliningrad, elected the board and coordinating bodies of the primary party cells. Our party, said its founder and the chairman of the all-Russian board, Travkin, a people's deputy of the USSR and the RSFSR, unites all those who intend consistently and resolutely to carry the perestroyka started by Gorbachev to the end. We want to introduce genuine people power through the local soviets and to transform the country's economy according to the principles of common sense.

RSFSR

Polozkov 'Officially' Named First Secretary

LD2306062990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0616 GMT 23 Jun 90

[TASS correspondent report from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow 23 Jun (TASS)—Fifty-five-year-old Ivan Polozkov, leader of the Krasnodar Kray CPSU organization, has been elected first secretary of the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party Central Committee. This has been officially announced at the party's constituent congress. One thousand three hundred and ninety-six participants in the congress voted for Polozkov (1,251 against).

The other candidates—Oleg Lobov, second secretary of the Armenian Communist Party's Central Committee—polled 1,066 votes for and 1,581 against.

Polozkov Interviewed on Russian Party Role

PM2406145090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Central Committee, by K. Aksenov and A. Ilin, place, date of interview not stated: "The Art of Finding a Consensus"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] Ivan Kuzmich, it is well known that proclaiming the creation of a party is only half the job, if not less. In your first speech in your new capacity you also spoke of the main task—the formation, establishment, and development of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. How do you see this process?

[Polozkov] The creation of the RSFSR Communist Party coincides with a period in which the party is in the process of transition to a condition that is entirely new to it. It is renouncing government functions and becoming a sociopolitical organization like many others. So here it is not only a matter of formalizing the party in organizational terms, but of getting rid of everything that has caused people dissatisfaction and a negative attitude to the party and finding our feet in this new capacity, in the new system. That is, defining our role, defining the forms and methods of work. That is from the viewpoint of mutual relations with the soviets, social organizations, and state organs. This means that the main thing is to organize work with primary party organizations, party groups, and other party subunits—I am deliberately emphasizing this—because some new party formations will have to be created. Otherwise the party will have no base, no foundations, no means of working within a given organization. Today the most interesting question is: How can you change the mentality of communists? Both rank-and-file and leaders. Many of them are used to the idea of the party commanding and resolving every question. It is necessary to rally the communists on the basis of new relations. We will simply have to start from scratch here.

[PRAVDA] One of the main counterarguments put forward by those who doubted the need to create the RSFSR Communist Party was that this party is being created on a wave of retrogression, and conservative forces could prevail in it. In our view this danger does indeed exist. What is your opinion?

[Polozkov] It does indeed exist. After all, what led to such a negative attitude to the party was indeed retrogression, and we must see it and rid ourselves of it. We are all like this, especially the older and even the middle generation. Therefore to some extent we can be called conservatives. Shouting, speaking, saying somewhere or other that I am a supporter of perestroyka, a radical—that does not mean that you are one. What constructive contribution has been made by those who declare themselves in that way? True, there are some useful things in the "Democratic Platform;" the "Marxist Platform" is also interesting in some ways, but these are only grains of what could be used. Let us collect these precious grains together to seriously renew our party. That is what practical work is. No one is denying that there is plenty of conservatism in the party today. It would be futile to deny it. The conservative taint is on all of us. The task is to remove it quickly and destroy the conservative structure. We can only destroy it when we identify clearly what the communists want. Until we understand them and they us, until we have true party comradeship, conservatism will always pursue us, or at least it will continue to get under our feet for a long time. The cleansing process is long and painful.

[PRAVDA] One delegate, clearly unsatisfied with the results of the election of the first secretary, made a rather caustic proposal: to elect Nina Andreyeva deputy leader of the RSFSR Communist Party for ideology. What is your comment on that?

[Polozkov] What comment can I make? The cool attitude toward me on the part of a certain section of

communists, especially those who do not know me very well and hold certain different ideological positions, is not news to me.

Well, the comrade delivered his barb. He probably thinks he scored a witty point. Fine, it is a matter for his conscience. I think those who know me well do not by any means regard me as a conservative or someone with an out-of-date way of thinking. Wherever I have worked, I have tried to be receptive toward innovations and have engaged in a constant quest. But I am a very cautious man when it comes to radical changes, and I am always guided by the well-known saying: "Look before you leap." I do not regret it. But to associate me with Nina Andreyeva... Evidently some people very much want to stir things up...

[PRAVDA] Obviously the question of the relationship between the RSFSR Communist Party and the republic's soviet organs is on everyone's lips. One task for the newly created party, as you have noted, is to organize the communists to implement the decisions of the First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia. How do you conceive the methods of fulfilling this task? Is the relationship between the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee and the Russian parliament likely to be complicated by your recent rivalry with B.N. Yeltsin on the election of the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet?

[Polozkov] I do not think so. Both we communists and the Russian deputies, among whom there are many party members, are concerned about our Russia's recovery, its flourishing, the embodiment of true sovereignty. Many interesting laws have been adopted at the Congress of People's Deputies. They must be made viable. The Russian Communist Party is committed to this and supports the body of deputies. We have many similar views. As for the form of party work, it is to advance the party line through communist deputies, through their cohesion and their adherence to positions of principle. I repeat, I do not think my recent rivalry with Boris Nikolayevich will affect our relations. I believe that he, like me, is very well aware that politics is the art of finding a consensus. The same is true of all the comrades with whom fate brought me into conflict in the contest for this post. I know them well, they know me well, they were among the first to congratulate me on my election.... For my part, I will do everything to establish businesslike relations not only with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, but also with his deputies and the chairmen of committees and commissions. After all, I am a people's deputy of the Russian Federation, and I will seek contacts. I think our comrades who were elected to the Central Committee will also work in this direction.

[PRAVDA] The results of the vote had barely been announced when you had to take up the reins of the congress immediately, in your new role. Yet in effect the scenario had already been planned by others. Did you not feel the desire at that moment to take a kind of time-out so as to go into things more deeply and change some things to suit yourself?

[Polozkov] No, I had no such desire. True, we did change some things as we went along.

I met with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He invited me to meet with him. We came to an agreement on the subsequent work.

[PRAVDA] If it is not confidential, what did Mikhail Sergeyevich say?

[Polozkov] He congratulated me warmly. He said that a very great deal of work lies ahead in this role. Difficult work. The advice he gave me was to try from the very outset to act as a consolidating force. And that such actions should continue throughout all our work, and then there will be success, then people will be drawn to the party. In general, he gave me very good advice and pointers for my future work.

[PRAVDA] Your platform, as the vote showed, did not have everyone's support. Clearly you will have to take this into account and make some adjustments. What, in particular, must be done to ensure that people occupying different platforms take a step toward one another—in the interests of party renewal?

[Polozkov] I was not expecting everyone to support me and my platform. I knew that a certain group of delegates would not accept it. So it is necessary to meet with those comrades who have a different view and take their viewpoint into account. To invite them to meet with me, to consult with them, and to adopt everything rational for our common work. I hope that when they see that we are interested in them, and not only ostensibly so, then they will work with us.

[PRAVDA] Can it be ruled out that people fr[illegible] he "Democratic Platform" or other currents will be [illegible]e Central Committee?

[Polozkov] It cannot be ruled out. I think they could be elected, and we will be able to work together.

[PRAVDA] Do you believe that the principles for forming the Central Committee and the election procedure for it are the best possible?

[Polozkov] No, I do not think so. It would have been possible to discuss the candidacies more widely in the primary party organizations, and to postpone the elections to the second stage. In order to start work immediately, a certain group could have been selected and these people could have been endowed with rights by electing them Central Committee members, and they could then have prepared for the second stage of the congress.

[PRAVDA] What do you think about quotas?

[Polozkov] Well, regulators of some kind are necessary. If we have no regulators at all, we will see distortions of

some kind in the composition of the Central Committee. We will certainly forget someone, some party organization, especially those in the autonomous republics and oblasts, who have a right to representation. At the same time these regulators should not restrict the opportunity to collect the best possible intellectual potential in the Central Committee.

[PRAVDA] Before the congress, and also during it, views and misgivings were put forward to the effect that the creation of the Russian Communist Party could exacerbate interethnic relations and cause friction between the communist parties of the republics, thereby weakening the CPSU. What do you think on this point?

[Polozkov] Yes, it will depend entirely on how the Communist Parties and their Central Committees behave. If we are able to establish good relations with the Communist Parties of other republics, if we give no grounds for discord but seek contacts then everything will be fine. I think new mechanisms are needed now in relations between the union republic Communist Parties. If we find the right approach, there will be no discord. So we must try to find it.

[PRAVDA] Will you not have to change your work style in your new post and be prepared to compromise? What is your attitude in general to political compromises?

[Polozkov] I have never worked in such a major post, but I feel intuitively that political compromises doubtless are necessary. Otherwise clashes could lead to serious complications. I am not talking about concessions on matters of principle. But unless we seek points of contact, unless we learn to give way to one another, unless we are prepared to listen to one another, things will go badly.

[PRAVDA] If you yourself were given the opportunity to form your own "cabinet," by which we mean a Politburo and Central Committee, what demands would you make on the contenders?

[Polozkov] First, it depends on what avenues the Central Committee will be working in and what structures it will have. The most active and the most knowledgeable people should be selected accordingly, so as to ensure that the Central Committee commissions work actively. This has not yet been possible, but I will approach the second stage of Central Committee elections from this standpoint.

[PRAVDA] Will there be among them, for instance, people with different views and positions? Is pluralism permissible here?

[Polozkov] It is essential. It will certainly happen. Given the present polarization of opinions, the atmosphere of strivings and disputes.

[PRAVDA] Ivan Kuzmich, many people in the republic know you mainly from your speeches at CPSU Central Committee plenums and congresses of people's deputies and in the press. What about your personal life? Could you tell us, in a few words, about yourself, your family, your customs, your pastimes, your hobbies?

[Polozkov] My family consists of my wife, my daughter, two grandchildren, and my wife's parents. They live with me. They are very old. They are teachers, they taught me. We live in Krasnodar in an ordinary apartment in an ordinary block. Four rooms, because of the two infirm old people. My wife works as a teacher of Russian language and literature. As for pastimes—you know, I have gradually lost them all, especially in Krasnodar. I did not have the time. Yesterday I said I like drawing, and one of the speakers promptly took me up on it...but I do like drawing. It is my only pastime.

[PRAVDA] Where were you born?

[Polozkov] In Kursk Oblast, to a peasant family. My father came back from the front seriously wounded in 1943 and died; mother raised us—me and my three sisters, in a village that was razed to the ground in the Kursk battle. We started life with nothing, in a dugout.

[PRAVDA] And you began your career...

[Polozkov] On a kolkhoz. I worked for quite a long time as an ordinary kolkhoz member and a team leader. Then I was nominated for soviet work. I was secretary of the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] organization at secondary school and in the army. When I was demobilized, I becamse secretary on the kolkhoz...

[PRAVDA] Where did you do your service?

[Polozkov] With the Baltic Fleet.

[PRAVDA] Thank you, Ivan Kuzmich. All the best.

First Secretary Polozkov Gives News Conference

PM2406173090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 1

[G. Alimov report on 23 June news conference held by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee: "I.K. Polozkov's News Conference"]

[Text] I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, held a news conference 23 June in the press center of the 28th CPSU Congress and RSFSR Communist Party Founding Congress. After a brief introductory speech he answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists.

Question from Italian correspondent: A few days ago you withdrew your candidacy for the post of first secretary in the belief that this might adversely affect the party's situation. Might your election lead to a split in the party?

[Polozkov] I don't think it will influence a split in the party. I suppose that certain forces that oppose my views may play on this and try to do something. But from the

first days of my work I will try somehow to show the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia that I am not as terrible as I am painted, that I am in favor of consolidation and am a supporter of relying actively on all kinds of opinions. I will endeavor to prove this.

Question from Yugoslav correspondent: You criticized the Politburo in your speech. Aren't you going to develop these remarks at the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Polozkov] I have criticized the Politburo not only at this congress but also at many plenums. I have specifically criticized Politburo members. If by the time of the 28th congress my thoughts have collected so that I have some more criticisms to make of someone, I will make them. That is beyond question, I think.

Question from IZVESTIYA correspondent: What is your attitude toward Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and how will you build your relationship with him? How will you collaborate with the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Polozkov] My relationship with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is as follows: We were colleagues when we were first secretaries, we met, and we exchanged work experience. I believe we have a normal relationship and there are no grounds for any confrontation. I think I will have a businesslike, principled relationship with him directed toward perestroyka and toward improving Russians' life. As for the general secretary, well, I'm sure you all know him well. He has a very good quality: He does not take revenge for criticism. So I have no problems here, even after the criticism voiced in my speech at the congress. Therefore the relationship will be businesslike and principled. I think that we communists, having embarked upon a serious task like perestroyka and the renewal of our society, should relegate personal emotions and personal relationships to the background. That is my guiding principle.

Question: Do you think that Mikhail Gorbachev ought to retain the post of general secretary?

[Polozkov] I will press for him to remain in the role of president and general secretary. Now is a difficult time for the country and the party. Presidential power has still not gathered full momentum in the leadership of the country. You cannot write party power out of the equation either. At this crucial stage our president must also hold the post of general secretary.

Question from Italian correspondent: Are you happy with the way Comrade Shevardnadze is conducting international policy? What is your attitude to Aleksandr Yakovlev?

[Polozkov] As far as Shevardnadze's international policy is concerned, I have never spoken out about this. After all, I am a man from the provinces, from a highly developed agricultural region, and I myself am a specialist in the field of agriculture. I think that Comrade Shevardnadze pursues international policy very vigorously, thrustingly, and energetically. It has never occurred to me to criticize him. I view Comrade Yakovlev with respect, as a man of experience and a very profound and competent man. He has his shortcomings and I am aware of them. If I have to, I will offer criticism.

Question: What do you think about the regulated market economy?

[Polozkov] My attitude is positive, because our economists and our politicians have found no other way of extricating our economy from the state in which it finds itself. Admittedly, people are promising to come up with alternative proposals. We shall see.

Question: How much do you welcome direct investments in the Soviet economy from abroad?

[Polozkov] I am a supporter of direct investments since it is above all finance that we lack today, and we are especially poor as far as modern technologies are concerned.

Question from Spanish correspondent: What is your attitude to the speech by General Makashov, who spoke out harshly against Gorbachev's policies? IZVESTIYA advocated that the general resign...

[Polozkov] I think that in our country—I don't know about yours—a newspaper does not remove generals from their post, although it does create a certain climate of opinion. Yes, he went slightly overboard in his speech—in the matter of language. He could have spoken out in a more restrained manner and set out his thoughts more precisely. But, comrades, a very serious situation has taken shape in army units in our country. They have many problems and they are mounting up. Doubtless under the influence of emotion, the general spoke out overly harshly.

Question from British journalist: How do you intend to react to possible moves to depoliticize the Army and the KGB? What will be your reaction to this?

[Polozkov] My reaction is negative. What does it mean, to depoliticize the army? Have you ever anywhere seen a depoliticized army, let alone depoliticized security services? This is a special state service that performs a specific function within the state. The state is a particular social system, a particular policy and the army also implements that policy. The army cannot exist without politics... That's all.

Question from a correspondent of the bulletin VEK XX I MIR: In your view, can Nina Andreyeva and Aleksandr Yakovlev be members of the same party?

[Polozkov] I don't know Nina Andreyeva, but I believe that she and Aleksandr Yakovlev are at opposite poles. It would be good if they moved a little toward the center.

'First Phase' of Russian Party Congress Ends

LD2306200690 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—The constituent congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which has been in session in the Soviet capital for five days, today completed its first phase.

The congress proclaimed the creation of a communist party in the country's largest republic where almost 60 per cent of CPSU members live and work. Delegates emphasised that the Russian party would be a constituent of the CPSU.

Ivan Polozkov, 55, leader of the Krasnodar territorial organisation of the CPSU (southern Russia), was elected the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The congress also elected part of members of the party's Central Committee. Territorial organisation which today were not prepared to nominate their representatives to the Central Committee will do this during the second phase of the congress.

In a resolution on the current situation and in an address to the communists and to the peoples of Russia, the congress reaffirms commitment to the socialist choice and to the communist perspective.

Delegates on the whole supported the CPSU's draft programme statement and draft rules that the CPSU Central Committee will bring up for consideration at the party's 28th congress (opening on July 2).

It was decided to hold the second phase of the constituent congress of the Russian Communist Party after the CPSU forum so that a programme and rules of the Russian Communist Party could be elaborated and adopted upon taking into consideration the CPSU forum documents.

Mikhail Gorbachev answered delegates' numerous questions tonight.

23 June Communist Party Constituent Congress

Polozkov Elected

LD2306111490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 23 June begins to carry a recorded relay of the 23 June session of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) Communist Party Constituent Congress in Moscow.

Manayenkov calls on Vorobyev of the tellers' commission to read out the commission's report on the vote for first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. He says that 2,648 ballots were counted: one was ruined. The votes were as follows: Lobov—1,066 for; 1,581 against. Polozkov—1,396 for; 1,251 against. Polozkov was thus duly elected first secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee. After some wrangling, the commission's protocol is passed.

At 1042 GMT Polozkov makes his acceptance speech.

At 1048 GMT Polozkov suggests an interval during which principles could be worked out for election of the party's leading bodies. He says: Let us assemble, confer and then continue work.

At 1049 GMT Prokofyev, chairman of the drafting commission, takes the floor. He says: Let us examine the resolutions on the current moment, on pre-congress documents, on appeal to communists, and on mass media. As far as the resolution on the current moment is concerned, he says, you have the draft in your hands. The drafting commission endeavored to take maximum account of all the suggestions and amendments to it which have been received recently. Voting takes place on whether to accept this resolution on the current moment as a basis. It is accepted (voting figures off screen). Prokofyev then reads out amendments and those assembled vote on whether to accept them.

Appeal to Russian People Adopted

LD2306120290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1103 GMT on 23 June continues to carry its recorded relay of the 23 June session of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress in Moscow.

Prokofyev continues reading out the amendments to the resolution on the current moment and deputies vote on them. The document is passed. At 1112 GMT Prokofyev proposes a resolution saying that the policy statement and rules of the CPSU be adopted "as a whole," with further work to be done by the drafting commission. The vote is carried: 2,247 for, 203 against, 41 abstentions.

At 1116 GMT Prokofyev then moves on to an appeal to the people of Russia, and mentions individual amendments, which are also voted on. The drafting commission proposes a statement in the appeal expressing concern at attacks on Lenin, saying that Lenin can't be held responsible for the deformations that came after him. It passes: 2,185 for, 161 against, and 60 abstentions. Speakers make further suggestions about specific points in the appeal, with much debate about the phrase "humane democratic socialism."

At 1136 GMT the debate goes on. A delegate proposes a declaration of human rights. Prokofyev says there is no need for this. Amendments are voted on.

At 1140 GMT a vote is taken on whether to adopt the resolution: 1,946 are for, 401 against, 50 abstentions—the appeal is adopted.

Mass Media Debated

LD2306125390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1145 GMT on 23 June continues to carry its recorded relay of the 23 June session of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress in Moscow.

It is announced that the amendment to the resolution on the current moment is to be put to a vote again, because a delegate suggests that it was unfair to deem the work of the Russian Bureau as unsatisfactory. A vote is taken to determine whether to hold a vote to amend the amendment, replacing the word "unsatisfactory" with "insufficient." It is decided not to put this to a vote.

At 1147 GMT Prokofeyev suggests various amendments to the resolution on the Russian Federation Communist Party Mass Media. These are read out and voted on: 2,161 are for adopting it as the basis, 221 are against, 28 abstain. Amendments continue to be read out. It is noted that the party is a large one—it has 9 million members—it must, therefore, have a publishing house of its own. A delegate suggests that since the RSFSR People's Deputies Congress is also debating the issue of RSFSR's mass media, there should therefore be consultation between both bodies.

At 1200 GMT delegates discuss which papers could be published jointly and which could be published separately. It is decided that the drafting commission will have to work on this a bit more.

At 1205 GMT Prokofeyev makes procedural remarks on yesterday's proceedings.

At 1207 GMT Delegate Tislova from Moscow takes the floor. He asks about Central Committee elections. He asks Polozkov to consider whether it is necessary to elect the Central Committee today. He suggests that this should be done after the party's 28th congress.

At 1210 GMT a delegate from Kislovodsk says: We have been authorized to elect the Central Committee. Delegate Kozlov from Kislovodsk, asks in whose interest it is to drag out the congress. We should go home today, he says, to tackle our local problems. Polozkov says that party organizations with membership of up to 2,000 people will have two representatives in the Central Committee, one additional representative will represent each 100,000 communists. This is then voted on: 2,212 are for, 114 against, 42 abstain.

At 1212 GMT delegates suggest various improvements to voting and its principles.

At 1215 GMT Polozkov reads out notices: Yeltsin could not be present here today because he was receiving deputies, and he was not feeling very well. As for Gorbachev's meeting with workers and peasants, this is being postponed and will take place during the party congress.

At 1220 GMT Polozkov says there will now be an interval of 90 minutes.

The studio announcers says Moscow Television will provide coverage later, and that information of the resulting changes in scheduled programs will be provided.

Congress Closes

LD2306214490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2058 GMT on 23 June resumes coverage of the 23 June session of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress in Moscow. After a brief summary of the proceedings this evening, and mentioning that Gorbachev's address was carried on television earlier, the relay goes over to live coverage of the report from the tellers' commission.

At 2103 GMT the results of the secret ballot vote for members of the Central Committere of the RSFSR Communist Party are read out.

At 2105 GMT the list of elected members of the Central Committee is to be voted on. The results are 1,974 for, 62 against, and 12 abstentions; the first protocol is thus adopted.

At 2106 GMT the question of putting the second round of elections to the control commission on the agenda is raised. The election of the chairman of this commission, it is proposed, should be left to the second stage of congress. This is voted on. The results are: 1,890 for, 42 against, and nine abstentions.

At 2108 GMT the elected Central Committee is instructed to draw up a specific action program.

At 2109 GMT the constituent congress is declared closed. The national anthem is sung.

Polozkov Addresses 23 June Party Congress

LD2306101690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Speech by Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, at the morning session of the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress in Moscow on 23 June—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies. First of all, I must express to you my gratitude for electing me to this post. Thank you for that trust. [applause]

I have had the opportunity to address you from this rostrum on more than one occasion already, so there is no need for me to outline any platform or any thoughts again. But I would very much like to stress several points.

I think you will agree that our party has appeared, has come into being, at a time that is very difficult for the

country: when perestroyka is gathering momentum, when the political situation in society is becoming different from what it was yesterday. In this regard, our party will have to not only pass through a period of coming into being [stanovleniya], a period of growing up, a period in which we shall have to actively accumulate practice in our work. we have to get the feel of that new situation.

I can tell you bluntly—and you will agree with this—that we, sitting in this hall, probably do not yet fully understand what great changes in the life of the party, as in the life of society, are occurring today.

The First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies has just taken place. It adopted very important and very serious decisions aimed at reviving the Russian Federation, strengthening its sovereignty, and improving the well-being of Russian people. One of our priority tasks, for the whole party organization, will, of course, be the mobilization of communists to organize the implementation of the major decisions that have been adopted by the congress.

I think that....[applause] I think that our congress is working actively. [stirring in the hall] Many proposals are being generated. Heated argument is taking place. Here we are seeing different platforms and different views, but I would like to emphasize that very many constructive, rational suggestions have been voiced here. They are new in their approaches and in themselves.

If our party's Central Committee, which we shall be electing, comprehends all that, takes it in and ponders it well, and, on the basis of that great range of opinions, works out a correct and carefully considered program of party renewal on those principles that we have worked out here and on which we still must adopt a resolution, then, I think, the process of renewal of our party will take place successfully and actively.

As for me, I assure you, comrades, that I shall work, as has always been my custom, together with you all, together with the working class and the peasantry, together with all the intelligentsia. I shall attentively heed all suggestions and all thoughts that will promote the renewal, of the party, no matter from which tendency they originate. I shall do everything to consolidate and unite our Russian organization during the first days of its activities. [short applause] In that, believe me, I shall do everything. [applause].

That will become and will be my norm of daily work: reliance on the comrades whom you will elect—the Politburo and the Central Committee; constant reliance on the composition of the congress; reliance on the primary party organizations, and permanent communication with them. I stress that I shall adhere to this implicitly in my practical work. [applause]

I realize perfectly that, at the initial stages, not everything will work out well for us. The tasks are too great and the scale of the restructuring processes under way throughout the country is too immense. Therefore, at the initial stages of our work, we shall, of course, have to be more considered, more restrained, more democratic, and more realistic. It would be a good thing if all the delegates to our congress attuned themselves to such work, to supporting the elected bodies, and then I am convinced, the Russian Communist Party will grow stronger, and it will be a worthy detachment of the CPSU.

Thank you for your trust. [applause]

Polozkov on Policy; Relations With Gorbachev

LD2306152390 Moscow TASS in English 1455 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris, Aleksandr Mineyev and Yuriy Rublevskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, true to the ideas of the October Revolution will base itself on the Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist ideals, Ivan Polozkov, who was elected the first secretary of the party's Central Committee at the party's constituent congress, told a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

The Russian Communist Party leader pointed to the complexity of the situation in which the party is being founded. He recalled that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) voluntarily relinquished its monopoly on power and that the party as a whole and its component—the Communist Party of the Russian Federation—will have to be renewed, and communists will have to learn to work under conditions of a multi-party system.

The main task now is to elect to the party's leading bodies the most active, thinking and bold people who would be able to give an impetus to all restructuring processes, Polozkov believes.

In response to journalists' questions, Polozkov rejected the opinion of a number of new organisations about him as "a conservative unresponsive to innovations." He promised from the very outset to show in practice, not only in words, that he will widely rely on the opinion of the public.

The Russian Communist Party leader pointed out his desire to build relations with Chairman of Russia's Parliament Boris Yeltsin and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev "on a businesslike and principled basis with a view to implementing the policy of perestroyka and improving the life of people in Russia."

"Communists who have undertaken to tackle the remaking of society must push to the background their personal relations," Polozkov said.

He favoured the combining of the posts of the leader of the CPSU and the state at the present stage. Presidential

authority, he said, has not yet moved into high gear and the party still remains the most influential force in the work for perestroyka.

Polozkov stated that he positively regarded the idea of moving to a market economy. He voiced apprehensions, however, that an abrupt transition to a market under the conditions of the current scarcities is fraught with a social outburst.

He admits of the development of private ownership in small-scale production, in agriculture and industry sectors producing prime necessities.

Touching upon the speech made at the Russian congress by General Albert Makashov, who strongly criticised the policy of the government and of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Polozkov pointed to an anxious situation in the Army and to problems brought about in particular by reductions in the Armed Forces.

However, Polozkov believes that General Makashov "somewhat overdid it from the lexical point of view." The Russian Communist Party leader takes a negative view of the idea of depoliticising the Army, the Interior Ministry and the State Security Committee.

Polozkov does not believe that his election "will bring about a split in the CPSU" at the party's 28th Congress. He admitted, however, that "some forces may make use of it."

He spoke out in favour of cooperation with representatives of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU and supported the idea of a round-table meeting of Russia's all political parties and organisations that are interested in society's renewal.

Russian Party Delegates Question Gorbachev

LD2306193790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; address by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev in answers to questions submitted by RSFSR Party Congress delegates, delivered during a break in the proceedings of the RSFSR Party Congress in Moscow on 23 June—recorded]

[Text] First of all, I must seek your advice before delivering a speech before you. I have just this file and a pile of questions here, alongside me. I have this feeling, I sense that you probably do not want questions answered now. [murmur in hall] You want the questions now? OK, then we will start with them. [shouts of agreement from hall]

There were very many questions. I will group them together right from the start. There are about 10-15 requests for the general secretary and the Russian bureau chairman to talk about, to assess the bureau's work, despite the fact that it no longer exists. I think the most important thing that can be said about this bureau and the consequences of its work is the fact that, together with the CPSU Central Committee and the Russian party organizations, it has finally brought about the creation of the Communist Party of Russia. Having set it up at the end of last year, we began forming its structures. Two CPSU Central Committee secretaries took on the special task of overseeing party organizations, and the organizational, ideological, and economic sphere. We began orienting and swinging the Central Committee apparat in a specific direction.

While we were swinging things this way, the debate within Russia's party organizations led to the conclusion that a party should be created. We were drawn into this process. Basically, it was already clear all the work should be geared toward this. Therefore, this bureau. You described this bureau's work as unsatisfactory. That is your right. It is within your purview. The question is settled. I will not invite you to return to this, but its outcome was as I have described it.

I think that in this connection, there was the next group of questions [reading]: How is it, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that you, at the beginning, appeared to be doubtful. Some comrades even read somewhere that I had spoken out against the establishment of a Russian Communist Party. How is that, subsequently, you suddenly, all a once, abruptly changed your mind and occupied a position supporting the creation of a Russian Communist Party?

I think this question is still important even though one might argue that since the party has been established the question is moot. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently important to justify returning to it, to this group of questions. This is because there is a lot of food here for thought, for reflection, and we must be mindful of this.

Comrades, the question of a Russian Communist Party was always, in one way or another, springing up, starting, so to speak, from the time of Lenin, just like the question of Russia and her role. With this, I think, I do not need to return to distant, so to speak, distant history. It is possible to put it more briefly this way: This is all connected to that particular and unifying role of the Russian Federation and the peoples of Russia, which they have played in the creation of our huge multiethnic state. For this reason it was important to think everything over so it would not end up that, while proceeding from the very best motives to react to the concern not only of communists, but also of all Russia's working people, we would go along the path that would stimulate, urge on, and give impulse to centrifugal forces both in the party and in our Union.

By the way, advice to get Russia on this path a little more quickly, came from all, so to speak, from many positions. They evidently calculated hurried, poorly considered decisions would be adopted and as a result such tendencies would be born and get moving. Given the fact that some forces find it difficult, so to speak, to make their way in and prove their point—they did not have arguments enough—they used this situation to realize their

separatist and other similar calculations. For this reason here there is a whole group of problems—political, state—they are all linked.

Nevertheless, and nevertheless, when we all began to reflect on this together, reflect on this together [repetition as heard], and we really came to a new understanding of the necessity of a profound re-formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a move to the real sovereignty of the republics, while preserving for the center what the subjects of the federation will delegate to the center, for this is in all of the republics's interest. When we understood the topicality of this task, and life pushed us toward this, we began to look at Russia in a different way, and at what bodies there are here, what political institutions, what social institutions had been created. For there was a great deal that did not function in Russia. This was linked to the functioning of Union structures. In point of fact the economy to a considerable degree was linked with the Union structures. Practically all political institutions were linked with the Union, to a considerable degree, especially as regards the heights of the Russian, so to speak, echelon, level, and much, much else.

We saw that since we had embarked upon re-forming the Federation, we had to reconsider our views on the position of Russia, too; on what its role is, and on what it should realistically have at its disposal today. That is the first thing.

Second, a process, a real process, of reforming the party has begun. It is a painful one; I will talk about that later, I will not drag things out at the moment. We perceived that this is an issue that worries everyone. Many Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] communists came to hold the view that establishing a Communist Party of Russia could play a consolidating role, as a whole, both for the party organizations of the Russian Federation, and for the CPSU. I should say that I personally see a great deal of sense here in assertions, in arguments such as these.

Last, we have actually entered a process of pluralism. Diverse sociopolitical orientations and trends are already emerging; the embryos of the future parties are already in existence; they are already developing their activity, writing programs, and creating statutes, gathering together for discussion. This process, that is, has really gotten under way. We are on the threshold of a genuine multiparty system. Then the question arises: Will there be other political currents in Russia, other parties? Will there be a communist party? So the events, within the very context of perestroyka itself, relating to society's renewal, the processes under way both in the economy, and in politics and in the sphere of the federation, have pushed us to the point where, evidently, we must take up the challenges time dictates. I therefore consider that no one tried to dodge the issue, we all proceeded together to an understanding of the fact that this must evidently be done.

I am very satisfied that here at the congress, when we turned the conference into an inaugural congress, we of the Russian Federation, communists of Russia, nevertheless remained true to the traditions of internationalism and loyalty to the ideals of socialism, of adherence to the Leninist principles of creation and functioning of the party as the political vanguard. We stated firmly that we are part of the CPSU and that we advocate that our republic, in resolving the issues of sovereignty which have also become urgent tasks, nevertheless has been, is, and remains an equal amongst equals in this union, and will do everything to strengthen friendship among peoples. Comrades, this is extremely important.

I consider this to be a sign of the maturity of the congress, and I congratulate you, as communists, and in your person the communists of Russia, for such a firm position. This is very important, very important indeed. [applause]

Here I will jump from one to another [reading]; here is something about my having changed my views by 180 degrees; here are more about the Central Committee Bureau, the Central Committee Bureau. These are all the first questions which I am receiving. I have put them together. [video shows Gorbachev leafing through written questions, presumably sent up from the floor] Now what? These are all about the bureau. Here Comrade Volkov asks, in part, why in April his idea of creating the Russian Communist Party was not supported, and now everything is, so to speak, but I have explained, in my opinion. All these, so many, questions were on this theme.

Here is a question, and we have discussed it, it is that painful question from workers, to which they direct, in general, attention, that somehow such a situation has been created, that it is as if we are handing out sops at the congress. They have asked that this not be done this way, without giving them accreditation but regarding them as guests or participants with the right of a consultative vote, but that they should be given the possibility, so to speak, of being participants in everything that is done at the congress, but not put it that way, and we should not create difficulties either for the congress or for them, and so on. We, strictly speaking, received it like that.

The opinion of an overwhelming number of our communists as regards the combination of the duties of the general secretary and president are unambiguous, that is Comrade Gorbachev must devote himself to one thing: being the president. Question: I would like to know what is Comrade Gorbachev's position regarding this question?

If it so happens that at the 28th congress elections will be held for a new general secretary, then it would be correct to now name a series of names for discussion in the period before the 28th congress. I ask that you announce this at the congress and express your opinion.

So, Comrade (Spekhov) from Perm, first secretary of the Solikamsk Oblast party committee [as heard] has asked

such a question. Comrades, on this matter I have expressed myself more than once. It seems to me that we must come naturally to the fact that there must be a separation of posts. At the moment, I am convinced we need to preserve the situation as it is, maybe in other forms; here I am not reasoning about myself, but am reasoning in principle. This is because perhaps the most crucial process—a regrouping of political forces, distribution of functions between the soviets and the party, between the centre and localities, the republics and the center, a most complicated process—is occurring just now. It is occurring painfully and this is felt at our congress and in the discussion, so many interests, so to speak, are touched on here. I must say everything we have done within the framework of political reform, as regards the revival of the power of the soviets, how we conducted the election campaigns, what kind of people have come out on to the arena of political activity through these new elections, allows us to say that we are, on the whole, on the right path, bearing in mind all the losses and pains of this business, and the weaknesses. They exist. I am not talking about that just now. Evidently this process will develop in such a way that the soviets will gather strength. We have adopted a law in accordance with which their functions and competences are determined. We are now deciding that local soviets will receive allocations and have their budgets, and will really have material possibilities and not only adopt decisions to solve local questions, that is this process will, so to speak, from bottom to top, go in that direction that the soviets will gather strength, and our people's power will really be one of the deciding factors in the renewal of our society. That is the first thing.

Second, but another thing is also real today; that the party is today the most powerful political organization in society. Whether the process of renewal and distribution of functions, regrouping cadres and political forces in the country will proceed normally, in the spirit of perestroyka, whether it will support positive tendencies or whether a confrontation might arise will depend significantly on what the party's position is going to be. I think the elements of this confrontation were also present at this congress. At the same time understanding was present here, that there is another congress under way next door, of the RSFSR People's Deputies. We, the RSFSR Communist Party Congress, which represent the entire party of RSFSR communists, all RSFSR citizens in this sense, are working as well. We should think about joint efforts, about uniting our efforts, while everybody is playing his own role on the basis of the distribution functions we have arrived at. That is to say at present there is a bit of both. That is to say the process had not been completed. So the question arises, whether in these conditions it is useful, for the country too, whether the division of the posts is useful at present, or should we preserve what we have during this transitional period. I think we must preserve this for now, in whatever form: party chairman, party chairman and deputies, party chairman-general secretary, and so on. I see—and this has been demonstrated here—comrade communists are dissatisfied with the fact, and there are many critical remarks about this, that weaknesses have been displayed at this crucial stage when the party has become involved in its own reformation, when it should neither lag behind the perestroyka processes which are gathering pace, nor give room for the growth of destructive forces in particular. It is necessary that the Central Committee and all links of the party should act energetically. It means that a position is necessary, guiding points are necessary, actions are necessary, different dynamics are necessary. I believe—and I must agree with you, since you know better—this has probably been lacking. In connection with this, it means something in our echelon, at the center, we must implement some sort of modernization in order not to weaken the party's everyday guiding role of its activities. With this point of view in mind, everything should be thought over thoroughly at the congress. Perhaps already in the report to the 28th congress something should be said about this because comrades have said a lot of justified things here. This in fact is how I look at it. But in the final resort, this is how things are: the congress will gather, and ponder everything. I will say straight away—since minds have again just become impassioned, and perhaps for a certain time even emotions, or this still remains in store—thoughts for the congress. Emotions have flared up again today here in brief addresses, and I, looking at both the speaker.. and their passion, and seeing your reactions—sitting there and making notes, and looking when one [person] left the congress for a certain time—and I felt that there is still a feeling of holding a summary trial on very important questions. I would very much like to caution you, you from the RSFSR. After all, this is 60 percent of the congress, you are coming to the congress. If we are going to decide everything very quickly like this, and evaluate everything, or everything is so clear to us, I would very much like to ask you, if you intend to submit or to say something, use the remaining time properly so as to understand the phenomenon, both the history of the question, and the reality, and possibilities, and prospects for it, and make some sort of forecast, and count it all up. Anyone who wants to say something or other about the Politburo—which, incidentially, has come into being over the last three of four years: apart from me and Shevardnadze, and well, Nikolay Ivanovich [Ryzhkov] probably too, yes, and Vitaliy Ivanovich [Vorotnikov]—but all the same, they are all, so to say, novices, novices, and don't forget that they are novices. So, let us recall, let us recall, April 1985: There's no Comrade Tikhonov, or Comrades Gromyko, Grishin, Aliyev, Solomentsev, and so on. Over a certain period practically all the Politburo has nearly been replaced. This is very serious. It is very serious. It is not natural. This means the natural processes in the party were destroyed.

But when I hear that this Politburo is pushing perestroyka forward, and perhaps it has also made mistakes—I will also say this—but when I think when some speaker has nothing left to say but that they should be stood against the wall, because everything else has been said already, you know, I have to defend them. Defend

them first and foremost, so that at our congress, in the party circle, there should be a direct, exacting accounting and everything, and evaluation, but that we should not return to what we are leaving behind. This is very important. I think, you know, if I am now to end this subject, to end this subject [repetition as heard], that the congress will find the chance to evaluate everything as it deserves, to draw conclusions, and I think, there will be a serious renewal of the leadership of our party so that new forces should be brought forward.

I assure you that there is nobody in the present Politburo who is self-seeking, from whom personal comforts or something else of that kind are important. No. The most important preoccupation for all of us, comrades, is to ensure that the cause which all of us in the present Politburo have embarked on is continued and safeguarded against vacillation, mistakes, and miscalculations, that it be given a second chance. That is the main concern of all those who belong to the present leadership. Therefore, let us act according to party principles. Everything that needs doing at the congress must be done. You can be sure that we will vote for it too even if an open vote is taken. [brief applause] That is not the question. If the party needs something, it must be done. There is no doubt whatsoever about this. Nor should there be any.

Well, I have given you my view on this question. The second part dealt with the nomination of candidates. Well, I do not know. We could hold a special session and nominate the candidates for this. But I think you already have all the candidates in front of you. The second part of this question referred to the general secretary, suggesting that he should be nominated now. I think Russia's communists might not like us seizing on this issue, starting to name names, so to speak. [murmurs in hall] If you feel like expressing yourselves on this—and I believe people have already started making proposals—we could devote a special session to this, put forward candidates, and announce their names. I am not against this. It is up to you. [extended murmurs from hall]

Comrade (Grigoryev-Gazizov) from the Tatar party organization makes the following point. The idea that the party's prestige has fallen is not accurate. It is not the party's prestige which has fallen, but that of party committees at all levels and their leaders. What is the answer to this situation? Should we speed up the renewal of party committees' leadership, including the complete renewal of the Central Committee and the Politburo? There are other questions on this subject.

This is a crucial question, it must be said. Ultimately everything really does depend, to a considerable extent, on the position, standard, and intellectual potential of cadres. No structure, even the most perfect, will achieve anything if it is manned by people who are incapable today of thinking in a modern way, of analysing the impulses of life, of uniting people, of going to them, of understanding realities, of drawing up policies and guiding practical work on the basis of this analysis. These are all the duties of the individual. The main element is always the cadres, the cadres. Why is it that here, even under the old system, the command system, there were splendid enterprises and there still are, there were splendid collective and state farms and there still are? (?and people even constantly came to the towns) Those who broke all this, stepped over everything. To a significant extent this is the main thing. When I was in Norilsk, at the metallurgical factory there, miners, metallurgists surrounded me and said: Mikhail Sergeyevich give the command to hit at the headquarters. I, for some reason, remembered this topic and this issue because there is a note here: When you were somewhere, I was reminded, and said you put pressure on from below, put pressure on from below, it is said, you answer us what do you want us to do, what are you calling on us to do? Well, there must be frank talk. I consider that, of course, comrades, we must. I have already said this, restore within the party a normal democratic process of the renewal of cadres. It has started, it has started. I think those who counted on everything only being able to be resolved straightaway by replaceability are wrong. Why? We must pass through and be cooked in this pot of perestroyka before we can rid ourselves of the stereotypes of the old experience and approach and so on. We must pass through these...there were democratic elections.

If at the first elections party people sat in the trenches, then at the latest elections they were already out there fighting hand to hand. Both at rallies and everywhere, they had something to say. This means we are becoming different. Therefore, there should not be simply mechanical replaceability comrades. Simply, well, it is possible to change things. In some places we have rayon committees, the oblast committees where the third, as it were, the third wave has already passed. But things are not changing. But there are some where immediately, right at the beginning of perestroyka...a new person, a modern person came, took all of this in and is acting...these people are working today, and are being successfully supported, and communists are not letting them go. Telegrams are sent when we try to take them. Here, for example, the Voronezh secretary, we were intending to perhaps use him here in the center, the whole delegation rose up, as it were, and announced to me today, well not today but yesterday, and asked that the secretary of their oblast committee not be touched. Well, this does him honor and it is pleasant for me since the message was from the party Central Committee. I will not go into details on this now, but this is why there are these debates. Of course, comrades, when I said to the Norilsk metallurgists that there would not be such a command for that sort of command was given during the cultural revolution of China, this is essentially a Trotskyist slogan: Hit at the headquarters. They hit at them in China and spent 15 years sorting things out later after the cultural revolution. Therefore, simply, one should not treat intellectual potential, even if this is overloaded with stereotypes and the old thinking, in this way. I must say to you that wherever people may have come from,

everyone should go through this school of perestroyka and a new style, new forms, and a new thinking should develop. There will be nothing else. We are all the products of such times. Those who are going into active life now, during these years, will be different, but we are all from those times.

For this reason, it would be very easy but also extremely dangerous to give a simple command. What we need to do is to renew the process on the basis of democratic procedures. The process of renewal has to be carried out on the basis of democratic procedures. Here, too, it has to be done from the grassroots. It is for you to decide. The rules say that you decide. There is a clause about deciding on the director. You decide. In the soviets, in the rayons, you decide. That is how things are being done now. What is more, competitive elections are being held everywhere. I think the process has already been set in motion comrades. We have to see everything that is positive and built on it, and take a look at negative manifestations, take a look at them.

There is one point I want to make in connection with this question of party committees. Not just the secretaries but also the membership of party committees should be chosen by the party grassroots. That will safeguard us against big mistakes, although we will never have a full, 100 percent guarantee of this.

I have been sent the following written suggestion. The writer suggests that we should vote on the question of assessing the activities of the general secretary and of changing the location of the headquarters of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. A move to Sverdlovsk is suggested. [laughter] According to this writer, the RSFSR People's Deputies Congress should be asked to move the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Council of Ministers to Sverdlovsk as well. That came from Comrade Piralkov Bashkiriya. [laughter, commotion in hall]

I think that the subject of the general secretary aroused interest among you here. Everybody spoke on this. I may react later to this a little bit. As far as the relocation is concerned, I think that the newly created Soviet bodies and Russian Communist Party should get a bit of work done and consider all these things. I don't think that the Russians should change their capital. I can say that immediately.

Here is a serious question. I think I should say something about this, if only briefly. In your report, you said almost nothing about the present situation and living standards of Russia's population. Was this a deliberate omission or did somebody touch up the report? Or was ignorance of the situation in the provinces the reason, though I doubt this. The organizing committee was unable to agree to such a report. In order to channel the work of the conference along more necessary lines, in keeping with the aspirations of communists and the entire population, I propose that the conference delegates be shown Govorukhin's film "We Can't Live This Way." I ask you to answer these questions and to implement my requests. Comrade Lavrov from Yegoryevsk—in Moscow Oblast, I think.

It is a fair comment, and at the same time unfair. Why, comrades? As far as the whole specifics is concerned which must become the subject of examination at the congress of the Communist Party of Russia, I think the second stage must be devoted to this, comrades. The Central Committee we elected, headed by the first secretary, must now, thoroughly prepared, work both on the report and on the action program of the Communist Party of Russia in the concrete conditions of Russia, taking into account the problems that have accumulated in the various regions. I assume this must be a very broad discussion. It cannot be exhausted by just one report. I think those who remember the sections—they must be applied, comrades, at the second stage, so that the people can give maximum expression to their views. Everything must be assessed properly, so to speak. Here I think at that stage—and we all will be taking part in it—we will have a real discussion and evidently there we will make good that deficiency that existed at the first stage. After all, the first stage was tied to the fact that we had to carry out the discussion as to whether the party should exist or not, form its bodies, and express our attitude toward the documents the congress must discuss. Although I, in all fairness, tried to say a few things from which is evident both the misfortune and the accumulated problems in the regions and especially as regards social and cultural development, on which, on that position, the Russian regions practically all yield to many republics. The level is lower than in other soviet socialist republics.

Mikhail Sergeyevich [reading], what will the CPSU be like? A union of the parties of the republics, a coordinating center? Or, will there be no CPSU at all? Comrade Shagarov, of Saratov. I am convinced that there will be a Communist Party in our country, and I see a long life for that party inasmuch as it expresses the socialist idea and is bound up with the interests of the working class, the toiling people. It seems to me, it seems to me [repetition as heard] that this theme—the party, the working class, and the working-class movement—it has been raised here today and Comrade Melnikov raised it. I understand why he raised it above all: he feels more strongly about it perhaps than the rest of us. Even the brief conversations and meetings we have had with Nikolay Ivanovich, with the working peasants, however, have once again convinced me this theme must be developed further at our 28th congress. The destiny of our party lies precisely in this. The social base is this, the working class, peasantry, and front-rank intelligentsia.

For this reason I am sure about the long life of the socialist idea and the communist perspective. I am not casting it aside, for me this is not just, as it were, for easy discussion on this topic, and from this it ensues that the Communist Party has a future. But the party absolutely must be a new party. A party which picks up on everything occurring in the country and around the country, a party capable of really expressing now the demands

which have come to a head and people's aspirations, of being the continuing generator of the idea of perestroyka. A consolidating force, a unifying force. If it does not reform itself, it will not fulfil this role in the shape in which it has until now lived and acted. This is why it was so important for us to bring the congress forward, to start the resolution and consideration of these issues and to give a powerful impulse to the renewal of the party. Otherwise it will be [changes thought] either it must change and head this movement of our people, first and foremost the working class, or it will remain on the edge of history. I am in favor of a single CPSU, I am against federalization.

This is again the Communist Party of Russia. A very great issue. I think it will receive some kind of development in a report. I am sure this needs to be done, at the 28th congress. The necessity of convincing people of the expediency of perestroyka and of the location of the republics within the union testifies to the weakness of the argument and to the serious incompleteness of work on these issues. Well, I consider these to be correct remarks. I consider these to be correct remarks. Because, really, comrades, especially now when we have come to a phase of fundamental changes within the framework of the policies of perestroyka, we have not done enough such work. This also includes the fact that we have thrown up the issue of the transition to a regulated market to society in such a form; this is the best argument as to how it is possible, generally speaking, to strike a blow at very major problems in politics. Therefore, I think light needs to be shed on this problem in a report at the 28th congress. This is also about the situation of people and about the socioeconomic situation in the country. In the draft platform and the report, thoughts about the party's backwardness were heard distinctly, and this means of the leadership, in the first instance, in relation to the process of democratization in society.

Why this has happened is unclear. No assessment has been given of the work of the members of the Politburo. I think we began giving that assessment, began making that analysis, here; and it seems to me that we must put this whole range of issues at the center of attention of the 28th congress. In turn, I think the report will present an attempt to assess all this.

The second question is why it is only in the fifth year of perestroyka that the question is being tackled of the unjustified privileges of the apparat. The people expected a rapid moral purge of the party. Well, that is a correct comment. Correct, a correct comment. What needed to be cleared away must be cleared away. In turn we must say that this has nothing to do with the majority of party men. [brief, hesitant applause]

Again, and again, we must distinguish what is due according to law—and we have established the privileges in the state and they will exist—or benefits, and we are now deciding in one way or another and legitimizing some things. It is also a question that some people have been using their official positions to abuse and appropriate unlawful privileges, and I think that is what we are talking about. The people see everything. If it boils down to—yes, yes, yes, yes—if it boils down to the fact that we ought to have settled the question of members of the Politburo using dachas and enjoying other privileges, then of course that is not such a difficult task to solve. It has now been solved. [murmurs in hall] But listen, all the same, to what I am saying. There are allodia and apanage [fuedal terms for granted lands] principalities all over the country. There have been untouchable zones all over the country. The regional comforts provided in all directions, so to say, still exist and continue to take place. Where are the party men, I ask? Where is party control? Where is it set up? So, let us carry this matter through to the end. I am an adherent of that approach: There must be only that which is according to the law.

Here [Gorbachev reading a question] delegate (Golitsyna) says the report says correctly that Russia has not been defended by anyone from encroachments on its rights. They have admitted the fact of the incorrect development of its economy, the weak orientation toward social needs. Tell us why you, as leader, have not put an end to these acts. Name some specific culprits!! Two exclamation marks are written here.

I must say frankly to you: If you look, many of our cadres in the center and in the republic, are as a rule the best people, taken, and coming, as a result of the democratic process from the localities. What we have apparently, so to say, picked out, is the best. And as soon as a person finds himself in this system of work, he does what this system demands. For this reason, this is the issue: we must change the model, of both the political leadership, and of the model for administering the economy, which is what we have all started doing. If we do not do this, this system will put down even any genius, any genius. I can assure you of this from my own experience. [slight applause] For this reason, we must do what we are doing. [murmuring] If we are going to hunt witches and enemies, this is the wrong way. It is different if someone has trangressed the law: we respond to them according to the law. But otherwise, this is the way we must go, comrades.

Here I am reminded [Gorbachev reading from a note that has just been given him] that it was in Vologda Oblast [and not Voronezh Oblast, as previously stated] that they didn't want to let Comrade Kuptsov go. Apparently I made a slip of the tongue.

Here I am reminded, comrades, that there was a promise from me and the Central Committee on a conference of first secretaries of town and rayon party committees. I consider that this is a blunder in our work. It must be corrected. A conversation is necessary.

In your opinion, what are the functions and tasks of the ruling party and its place and role in society in conditions of a multiparty system? I think we shall try to develop this subject at the 28th congress.

Again a topic, we have spoken about it, and I think that it will be present as one of the important questions in the report at the congress. The topic of humane and democratic socialism. Allow me to leave this topic now for the 28th Congress.

What is your attitude toward the attempts by a number of RSFSR people's deputies to bring about a decision on labor collectives, [submitted by the] Sakhalin delegation, three delegates. I have already expressed an opinion on this count. I consider that the party, in changing the style and form of its work has embarked on the path of democratization and renewal, of the separation of functions, but it is not departing from a single sphere in the life of society. Such is our concept of the party. I also remain committed to the party conducting its activities in this way. I am in favor of a vanguard type of party, I am not in favor of a parliamentary type. This is my profound conviction. [applause]

What is your attitude toward's Lenin's expression: demagogues are the worst enemies of the working class? Or was this only topical for that period? In my opinion it is no less topical now. For this reason one must conduct a decisive political battle, a democratic battle against demagogues, especially of the populist persuasion, and show the people what, in actual fact, the latter are proposing and to what they are calling.

Another question here about the combination of posts: What is your attitude toward the initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party in Leningrad and its program statement on the restoration of the leading role to the CPSU and the preservation of the planning-administrative system in the economy? Comrade Kryukov. You know, generally speaking, so that my opinion on this issue be known, in general, I view those searches, even painful searches, that are taking place within the framework of the CPSU, all the same with an understanding of the fact that they spur us on, forcing us to discuss these issues and to find paths for renewing the party. For this reason, I, first and foremost, approach this matter from this position. And I have already said on this count—I think when I spoke in Frunzenskiy Rayon where I was standing as a delegate to the congress, I debated this topic—that there is much that is positive and interesting in what is contained within the democratic platform. But there are also elements that are unacceptable. I illustrated there which elements are unacceptable. The fact of the matter is that it again needs to be perceived here that when one analyzes the platform itself, much that is positive can be seen there, but there are some things that are unacceptable. Well, for example, a parliamentary type of party or the presence of factions with internal discipline. I reject this. I do not agree with this, on principle.

But that is not the point. What are the aims hiding behind this platform, the social and political, the social and economic ones? Where are they calling us? This is another question. You won't find this in the actual platform. But when someone calls himself a supporter and speaks in other halls, then it becomes clearer that there are things there that are unacceptable. But even in this case I consider that we acted correctly, comrades, when, at the congress, and in the form of coreparts—something unprecedented in the history of our party—we allowed Communist Party comrades, who reflected these trends that have arisen in the CPSU, to speak for 15 minutes each. We acted correctly here.

More directly, on the question of the initiative congress. It was concerned with the fate of the party. This was what motivated the communists who met once, then twice, in order to voice these concerns, so that they should be listened to in the CPSU. I welcome this. This is a responsible position. But I must say that around this congress, there was a lot of political speculation, and outside the congress too, including the organizers of this congress who gave interviews where they started making, I'll say it straight, direct attacks on the policy of perestroyka, and I reject this. Because I am categorically for the choice that we made in April when we embarked on the path of the restructuring and renewal of our society. We need to do this if we want to keep pace with civilization.

As for the rest, I think, I don't need to speak about it now. Comrade Tyulkin spoke, and put forward his ideas. He didn't avoid excesses, perhaps, but I don't know, not many people managaged to avoid excesses at this rostrum at this Congress. This is a sign of the times.

The communists are now taking over the methods of the populists: the more strongly you criticize the top bosses, the more prestige you have, and you get a reputation for being bold and decisive. But all of this will pass. Then they will start to realize what is behind this, and what else it has to offer. [applause]

You said in your report that we do not allow anyone to interfere in our internal affairs. So how are we to understand, firstly, that the leaders of Western countries, in particular President Bush, constantly make pronouncements about Lithuania, linking our possible actions there with their positions in regard to the USSR? This is their business. We do not fail to pay attention to this. But we shall not allow interference in our internal affairs. And this was also said to the president.

Secondly, the Mujahidin are constantly interfering in the affairs of our Central Asian republics. The Mujahidin, behind whom are Pakistan and the United States. What is your reaction? I am not going to try to answer this question now. Perhaps it is all clear to someone, but this question is not clear to me, what it means, so I shall leave it for myself.

Could you describe briefly the future apparatus of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and how the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU will be cut in relation to it? Our concern is in the increase in the size of the apparatus, and the increase in documents and papers, which will go out to the localities

and slow down their active work. A timely question. Now that we have set it up, we have to concern ourselves with this all the more.

Comrades, I consider that, having set up the Russian Communist Party—I shall call it that, not by its full title, because it is easier—and in following its Central Committee and apparatus, we must take as our starting point first and foremost that expenditures for the maintenance of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and the future apparatus of the RSFSR Central Committee must not be increased, that we must even try to cut them. For this reason, I think that all this should stay within this framework. Given that these questions have been raised by the CPSU Central Committee, it must share things out in a fraternal way, so to say. That is one thing.

Secondly, where is it to be located? I think in the CPSU Central Committee's building. That is to say, we must apportion a section of the building and hand it over to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In other words, everything on the basis of what there is, in order to avoid building again, expanding the staffing and so on. I think this must be ruled out and I think you agree with this. [applause]

You often call for noninterference in the activity of state and collective farms. So why do you not issue a temporary decree, even if just for two years, forbidding anyone from interfering in the economic activity of those farms that have been leased out, and at collective farms where managers have been elected from a choice of candidates? Comrade (Ilchenko), from Novosibirsk Oblast. Well, let us think about it. If a decree is needed, I am ready. But I think that the transition to the market should set up such a situation.

What is the opinion of the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics about the formation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR? They welcome it, and regard it with understanding.

This one is from delegate Shumakov. Why did you, having proclaimed perestroyka in April 1985, not consult with the country's communists? It was necessary to create a model for perestroyka, determining the mechanisms and the immediate and ensuing tasks. The country and the people should not be experimented on.

This question is so important that I would like to give my reaction to it, if only in brief. Comrades, I cannot accept such an accusation, neither addressed to myself nor to the Central Committee, nor addressed to the government and the whole of the leadership of the country—which developed the process of perestroyka. To imagine that we can fall asleep today and wake up tomorrow and that everything will happen that quickly—this was a model, there is another? You retrace how we progressed and how we gained that experience which has permitted us finally to make decisive steps in politics, in what concerns the political sphere, and in what concerns the economy, the federation, and the party itself.

We could not have presented this realistically—none of this existed within the party or within society—but there was an understanding of the necessity for change, that things needed to be changed radically. And the concept arose, the idea of giving a new lease on life to, and of revealing the potential of, the socialist system within the framework of our socialist choice, through overcoming the alienation of the individual from the authorities, from property, and from culture. Searches began, and the accumulation of experience in all directions from within the framework of this concept and idea. In the beginning, we only had wishes regarding the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, to attain a new productivity of labor, a new level in the growth of national income and in solving the problems that had accumulated. We did not succeed. This is despite the fact that we increased by 80 percent—is comrade Silayev here—increased by 80 percent the capital investment in machine building and [words indistinct] everywhere. Things did not go smoothly. Then we began—set up—at first began to put our old approaches into the projects. So that this did not happen and money was not thrown away on old ways, we set up independent groups of experts. They began to evaluate projects. They did this, it did not work. And as for quality, how can you force the best goods to be produced under the our monopolistic conditions. We set up state control, the state acceptance system. That is, we kept on trying, and you know we convinced ourselves that nothing would succeed if we did not change economic relations themselves, comrades.

You are to judge, but a rapid judgment is not needed. When we even started changing to financial autonomy and to self-management, we adopted a law on enterprises. This is not functioning because everything was held up by the political superstructure, by this command-administrative system which would not give the basic link a chance.

Then we came to the 19th conference with proposals on political reform, and so on and so forth. This is a very serious and profound process. Only Jesus Christ was able to feed 20,000 people with five loaves. No other case is known where everything was solved so simply. These are difficult searches, but we have embarked down a path of fundamental changes which, in the last resort, will lead us out onto the broad road of the renewal of our society. I am certain of this if we now act decisively, understanding each other.

[Gorbachev reads next question] We consider that to stabilize the economic situation in the country it is essential to take measures urgently for discipline in production. In this matter, a decisive step from you is extremely important, a presidential decree for discipline. We are convinced of your resoluteness, of your courage—but that sounds like a hint! I do not know, what do you want? Are you in favor of us having decrees as we did in 1940 on the eve of war? And anyway, who is preventing you from bringing about order? Laws exist. A labor code exists. Work force councils exist. What is the matter, then?

[Indistinct remarks from the hall] Comrades, comrades. I will say this: As soon as we have created a new economic environment, by achieving a regulated market, and we have put everyone in a real situation of earning and living on what he has earned, of competing in the market, for better quality, I will tell you straight: Not one single collective will tolerate idlers. Not one. For this reason, for this reason we have to go down the path we have embarked on. This is the most reliable and most efficient path. But this does not remove, it does not remove either educative or administrative measures, or what our laws today provide.

This one is about meeting with the secretaries of rayon committees. We have agreed that we shall meet.

In speeches by representatives of the Armed Forces addressed to the government and the leadership of the Communist Party, claims have been made about the weakening of the country's defense. Be so kind as to give an answer to delegates. I think that we do not need to mix two questions. The fact that perestroyka has also touched upon such a very important institution and organism as our Soviet Army is objective and as it should be. The fact that we have become engaged, within the framework of implementing the policies of disarmament, with the reforming of the party...[corrects himself] with the reforming of the Army and are preparing, and I think Comrade Alekseyev has now...[corrects himself] Comrade Moiseyev, Mikhail Alekseyevich, will confirm that, I think the draft of the first reform has already been distributed. [indistinct shouts from hall] Yes. We are moving toward reform and this is all dictated by the stage at which society finds itself and the situation and the Armed Forces themselves. These are all normal processes occurring in the Army within the context of great changes inside the country and around the country. And we must do this. It does not to any extent place in doubt that we must not lessen our interest in the Army and in the country's Armed Forces. Moreover, I have already said this and I repeat it publicly once more: The people cannot and will not support the government for a single year if it does not understand the significance and role of the Army in the country's life and in guaranteeing its security and calm and peaceful labor. This issue has already been submitted to us and has been accepted once and for all. And this leadership, which today heads the country, understands this and is acting in accordance with it. What is there, comrades? Once disarmament and the reduction of troops have begun, this actually does affect the Army and affects living people and these processes need to be carried out with great responsibility.

There must be a governmental program here. We have confirmed it for two, for three years, and when we reached two years within these harsh time scales we felt that we had not thought everything through. The situation has become more complex. Officers have felt this and have placed these issues sharply before us. I consider that they are right. In connection with this, the Ministry of Defense, on the basis of instructions from the president, has elaborated and has already presented to the government a national governmental program to resolve problems that have accumulated as regards the social situation and provision for our officer corps, of which we should take care.

Everyone should concern themselves with it, comrades, in all republics, in all cities, in all regions. We absolutely must adopt such a program after discussions and we will monitor it. Moreover, we envisage that the Army will take part in resolving these issues itself, using its capacities and the resources that have been released.

And another thing. Whether our defense has weakened or not we proceed from the principle of our doctrine of reasonable sufficiency, and within the framework of this doctrine we are doing everything so that it may be precisely like this. I cannot agree with some people wanting to draw the conclusions that we are permitting neglect and moreover have already permitted a weakening of defense. This does not correspond to reality.

If the generals, or the officers, or someone else, comes forward and makes comments—critical comments—about omissions in some area, then that must be looked into. But in principle I still, today...if someone is of a different opinion, let him get up and say so. Because today our defense is still reliable, and we are not adventurists, and we are not just simpletons who would enter, you know, into some cheap haggling on these matters. We won't allow that to happen. Everything must be approached equally. But when I say equal, that doesn't mean they have so many and we have so many. They have tanks; we have tanks and they have something else. We have heavy land-based missiles, and they have submarines and bombers. Each has his own specifics, his own particular things. The point is that we won't permit a lowering of the balance, the strategic balance. That's what we're talking about.

They say the United States is carrying out its plan to modernize its armaments. And we're doing the same. The Army's got to be modern. It's got to have a competent, skilled officer corps and reliable modern weapons. All armies do this, and our Army must do it all the more. And we are doing all that is necessary for research, for the long-term for solving the long-term tasks, so that parity is not upset. It isn't easy to do? No, it isn't. It isn't easy to find the resources? True. But you know, that's another matter. But our approaches consist of that.

And finally, dear comrades, our expenditure on the maintenance of our Armed Forces has reached 18 percent of our national income. Nowhere in the world in the developed states is there such expenditure. I'll say plainly that the policy that we are carrying out, the policy of the new thinking, the course toward disarmament, toward getting away from confrontation, lowering military confrontation, have been supported everywhere. And not because one man or another is a good president, but because there too, even such an economy as the U.S. economy has not been able to withstand such an arms race. The United States has an internal debt of 2 trillion

and an external debt of 330 billion or 350 billion. That's the situation. So that is a hopeless path, a path to the abyss, confrontation; and it's a good thing that the whole world has responded and we've turned that process around and it has begun to bear fruit. We must be very responsible. We must deliberate on these matters very competently, instead of standing facing the microphone and letting fly with accusations. [applause] And then... at the meeting with miners you said to put pressure on them from below. Well, I have already responded to this pressure. Comrades are addressing remarks to the Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, proposing that—on the basis of a reinterpretation—they set up new large-scale scientific research centers that might help the party resolve theoretical-political questions, the elaboration of theoretical questions. I regard this as a correct suggestion. [murmurs in hall] No, comrades, I am thinking of large-scale centers of that kind, where as the number of party schools we have is already being cut. [looks through more questions] These questions are repeats. Shall I end? [affirmative shouts from hall] Well I am happy with that. [applause]

Dear comrades, I have received further questions and I have not been able to answer them. I have even more here, more questions. I think I will try to pick out everything that is most important and fundamental from these questions and highlight it in my report, and you will probably have the opportunity...what is it I wanted to say, in a couple of words?

First, a major discussion has taken place at this congress. I will not say that it has left us all with a cloudless mood. On the contrary. I feel delegates have brought home to the congress, to the country's leadership, to the people the complete severity of the current sociopolitical situation in the country, a situation requiring great, active, constructive work by the party, acting in conjunction with both the soviets and other public and political movements and labor collectives. From this viewpoint the congress was rigorous and principled. That is the first point.

Second, how to relate to the fact that we have been brought face to face here with the opposition of opinions, right here at this forum? It even seems to me, in noting all of this, even in declaring the incompatibility of positions on certain questions—and very important ones at that—and in evaluating the situation and the country's prospects. We should, as a conclusion to be drawn from this, issue a call for the consolidation of our party, not for a split.

We must make use of everything constructive that is contained in all the positions that were expressed here, to consolidate our forces, and via the party the forces of the whole of society, on the main road of perestroyka, liberating ourselves from extremism from left and right, from whatever you like. For this reason I should like us to leave this congress, the Constituent Congress of the Russian Communist Party, with this conclusion—because I get information about the mood of people, the delegates and beyond them—that the congress passed off like this, and it shows that we have to go off in our different directions.

It seems to me that the aims, tasks, situation, and concerns of the people, their experiences, are such that communists must do the maximum and go toward them to consolidate both the party and society. This, comrades, is the task of tasks. If someone wants to pillory someone, and get satisfaction from so doing, I will tell you out loud: This is not the right way.

Does this mean we must climb down from one of our principled positions, to the detriment of our options for action? No. I think that within the framework of the socialist option we have huge possibilities for cooperation, and this must be stressed at our congress. A schism in the party will lead to the strongest polarization of forces in society, and this will weaken all constructive forces of the country. At this decisive stage of perestroyka this is a gift to all those who want to bury perestroyka and cause its defeat.

Third, people are expecting practical decisions. I think that here, for various reasons—I have already tried to explain this—we have not yet got to the point of examining the specific problems that have to be tackled. We will start doing this at the 28th congress, and continue at the second stage of our congress. We must give answers to our people. What can they count on, and first and foremost, the working class and the peasantry—what are they waiting for? What should we say on the fundamental questions of the life of our perestroyka at our 28th congress? I think we must use the remaining time to think on this at the level of both the Central Committee and of the delegations, and come with a store of constructive proposals on this subject.

I shall say it straight: From the point of view of the criticism our congress was up to the mark; from the point of view of constructive proposals it leaves very much to be desired. We are now very strong in giving lessons in principledness, as far as revealing shortcomings is concerned, especially in our neighbors or in the bosses. So far we have a very weak store of constructiveness. This is something we need to think about so that we can enrich this part of the discussion at the 28th congress.

Comrades, let us not still-path our personal inconveniences, not what has affected us, with what the people are going through. [as heard] We must leave our own hardships to one side, orientating ourselves toward what is agitating the people. Because I am getting these telegrams and I, comrades, [words indistinct], and there are hundreds of them, people are drawing attention to this. That you, why don't you do less balancing of accounts and more thinking about how to solve as quickly as possible the problems that have accumulated, going out into the forms of the new life and into the realization of those laws and that policy that you have elaborated. This is the time for concrete, practical action. That, too, we must bear in mind. Comrades, I would like

to express enormous satisfaction that this discussion has taken place here. We must think everything over. But it seems that we must go with the aim in mind of enriching the 28th congress. If we draw that conclusion, then the Russian Communist Party, the delegates, will have done the main thing. If we take another path, then it won't benefit the 28th congress, or the whole party or the whole people or perestroyka. Allow me to hope that after this checking of watches [sverka chasov] that has taken place here, with regard for persons, we have said many things to each other here, let us think it over and take with us an understanding that we Russians must do all to ensure the success of the congress, which our people is counting on. Thank you. [applause]

22 June Communist Party Constituent Congress

Candidate Lobov Speaks

LD2206193390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1830 GMT on 22 June begins carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

The video shows delegates assembling. On the platform includes Gorbachev, Lukyanov, Ryzhkov. Gorbachev is chairing the meeting. He greets delegates, announcing that the morning sitting is starting, continuing from where things ended here yesterday, with candidates for party leadership.

At 1833 GMT a military delegate makes a procedural suggestion and calls for a minute's silence for war dead. This is agreed. Candidate Oleg Lobov then comes to the microphone and outlines his career to date. As for his platform, he says he adheres to the platform of the CPSU. He favors progress, particularly in science and technology. The party needs to pay more attention to social affairs. On his attitude toward the Armed Forces, he says he has worked in close collaboration with the Armed Forces. He believes there is room for reduction of the Armed Forces, to reduce tension in society. On his relationship with the soviets he takes the view that there are no unresolvable questions. His attitude to people is based on putting himself in their place.

At 1843 GMT he answers written questions. To one asking what he has acquired from working with Yeltsin in the past he says he has worked with several other prominent politicians, including Kolbyn and Vorotnikov, and he has acquired something from all of them. He replies to a question about his work as second secretary in Armenia, where he was involved in clearing up after the earthquake. Another question asks about holding party posts alongside public posts, he says in general he does not favor it but once again it is best to heed the feeling of the people. There follow questions about his work in Armenia. He supplies some details and data relating to housing built. Another question refers to his work in Sverdlovsk in the early eighties where he was instrumental in having athletic facilities provided. He amplifies on this.

At 1851 GMT he is asked questions from the hall. The first speaker asks his view of the way to peace in Armenia and Azerbaijan. He says it will only happen through round table discussions.

Another speaker asks about his attitude toward multiparty politics. He says he thinks it has come rather too quickly. He thinks the party should have a section to talk to certain groups, though not necessarily all. Another speaker asks how general elections should be conducted. He explains. The next speaker asks if he believes he is morally entitled to lead a Russian Communist Party, considering the number of Russian young men who have died in Armenia. He admits he may bear some responsibility but rejects total responsibility. It is up to you how you vote, he concludes. The same questioner asks a further question about the slowness of reconstruction work in Armenia. He refers to the recent situation there. A speaker asks about priority tasks for the new party. He says it will find new ways of working. The next speaker asks which of his personal qualities he thinks militate against him. He says he is very self-critical. In reply to a further question he provides further data on housing provisions with which he has been involved.

Lysenko Addresses Congress

LD2206202690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1905 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

At 1906 GMT the floor is given to Lysenko. He thinks general elections should be held next year on a multiparty basis. He thinks the most important thing is whether power is in the hands of the soviets or in the hands of the top officials only. He reviews the history of the formation of the Russian Communist Party. Gorbachev only expressed himself in favor of a separate party after the RSFSR Congress People's Deputies had chosen its leader. He says the criticism that has been levelled at Gorbachev at his party conference requires Gorbachev to give a clear indication of his future course. He had been telling his voters that the 28th congress will show finally whether the party will become a truly progressive party or a stronghold of conservatism.

At 1915 GMT Lysenko goes on to answer some written questions. He briefly gives details of his career and the posts he has held. He is asked about his attitude to Travkin. He respects him personally but does not approve of all he does. He believes that property in the countryside must be made the property of the soviets and not collective farms. He believes there must be ideological pluralism in society. He says that communists should choose their leaders by direct elections. He thinks a coalition government should be formed. The

communists of the republic should decide on the nature of the Russian Communist Party and its policies.

At 1920 GMT Lysenko is asked about his attitude toward the Lenin mausoleum and the suggestion that Lenin be removed. Another questioner immediately asks about passports. Lysenko says that in his opinion everyone should be given a christian burial. However he believes the question of the future of Lenin's mausoleum should be decided by the whole people.

At 1923 GMT in reply to a question, Lysenko says he believes the Russian Communist Party should be attached to democratic socialism and should pursue socialist ideas. A military deputy asks about Lysenko's view that the Armed Forces should be de-ideologized. Lysenko says the Army should represent the views of the whole people and not just one party or group.

At 1926 GMT Lysenko criticizes socialism centralism as leading to totalitarianism. Lysenko says he does not regard the intelligentsia as opposed to the workers as the basis of the socialist society. Nevertheless, he thinks the party should also appeal to leaseholders and others in society, otherwise they will leave the Communist Party.

At 1932 GMT he says that in his view the claim that social democracy is anti-communist is deeply mistaken. Lysenko says there is a need of course for party discipline but it should not rest on injunctions from the top and duress.

At 1935 GMT Lysenko says he is well aware of the character of the deputies and the way that they will vote. Therefore he has regarded his nomination as a chance to set out the views of the Democratic Platform so that these views are considered in the future.

Polovodov Outlines Career

LD2206203890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1936 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

Gorbachev gives the floor to Comrade Polovodov, who outlines his career. He reviews the work of the initiative group in the formation of the Russian Communist Party. He says he is proud of the fact that he has made a contribution to the formation of the party. He thinks a priority matter is whether scientific socialism can be linked with the workers' movement. He sees the delegates to the congress as professional revolutionaries. He speaks of the need for aid to be given to the Russian Agrarian Union in revitalizing the countryside. He says it is time to come to the defense of the Army. Science must be made to serve the interests of Russia. He stresses the need for communist unity and the links with the CPSU.

At 1948 GMT Polovodov then goes on to answer written questions. He is asked whether Polozkov and Melnikov are able to represent the interests of the working class. He speaks of their origins as workers. He praises Gorbachev for the fact that he has been able to declare to the world the Soviet people's love of peace. He outlines his educational background and of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. He says he left the countryside originally because he was interested in solving general issues.

At 1953 GMT he says he thinks Yarin is well able to defend the interests of the working class in the Presidential Council. He thinks there should be the election of three representatives from each oblast, two of which will be representatives of the peasantry and the working class.

At 1956 GMT he says he is a roofer by training.

At 1957 GMT a deputy from the floor insists on asking Lysenko a question about his lack of party experience. Polovodov, in answer to a question, says the people attending the initiative group meeting were serious people. He says party cadres must be appreciated.

At 2006 GMT Polovodov says he is 37 years old, married, with two children. He says the working class is united and will able to solve all the problems facing it.

At 2010 GMT Polovodov finishes speaking and leaves the rostrum.

At 2111 GMT Gorbachev puts the proposal to deputies that they vote on starting discussions: 1,914 for 63 against proposal adopted.

At 2015 GMT a deputy from the floor objects that time has not been given to deputies as promised to answer written questions. Another deputy makes a point that only two deputies be allowed to speak in favor of any candidate.

At 2017 GMT Gorbachev makes a point about voting procedures for the election of chairman of the control commission and first secretary.

At 2018 GMT Deputy (?Panina) speaks from the rostrum about the necessity for thorough discussion of the candidates.

At 2019 GMT Gorbachev suggests a 50-minute break after announcements.

Deputies Debate Candidates

LD2206212990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2020 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

Gorbachev states that it has been decided that speeches may be up to three minutes long. Comrade Antonov is to start.

At 2021 GMT Antonov says there should be two rounds of voting. He criticises Polozkov, accusing him of inconsistency.

At 2024 GMT Deputy Tikhomirov speaks in favor of Kuptsov's candidacy praising his work in local party organizations where he was a colleague. Deputy Matveyev supports Shenin who has fulfilled all the promises he made to the electorate of his home region during the past year of his membership of the Supreme Soviet.

At 2029 GMT Depuyty Demchenko supports Polozkov's candidacy.

At 2030 GMT Deputy Gurov from Voronezh Oblast criticizes unspecified inaccuracies in Lysenko's speech and makes a point about not forming parties within parties. He favors Polozkov as a party man, his election represents a vote in favor of a strong party.

At 2033 GMT Depuy Nazarov speaks in favor of Lobnov, on behalf of car workers.

At 2034 GMT Depyuty Lebedintsev from Krasnoyarsk Kray is against the candidacy of Shenin. The party needs a strong leader with democratic ideas; Shenin does not have the necessary qualities.

At 2036 GMT Deputy Kuznetsov supports Kuptsov's candidacy. He has known Kuptsov for years and respects his professionalism.

At 2039 GMT an unidentified deputy from Kuybyshev speaks of the necessity for consolidation and is in favor of Lobov being elected. Deputy Chulkin speaks in favor of Polovodov's candidacy. Deputy Burkatov expresses regret that Bakatin's candidacy has been withdrawn as he would have been the best candidate. Of those left, Polozkov and Melnikov are the most likely to be elected. However, their election will not consolidate forces, it will lead to a polarization of society. Lobov should receive deputies' votes.

At 2048 GMT Deputy Bragin cirticizes a general who spoke earlier, deputies in hall protest. Gorbachev requests that Bragin stick to the point. Bragin says Polozkov is a leader like Ligachev and Belorussian First Secretary Sokolov. Deputies with democratic intentions should do everything possible to ensure that Polozkov is not elected.

At 2053 GMT Deputy Zatvornitskiy speaks in favor of Melnikov's candidacy.

At 2056 GMT an unidentified deputy speaking on behalf of the working class, says that he cannot vote for Lysenko and suggests that he withdraw his candidacy. An unidentified deputy criticises other deputies' conduct, especially with regard to reactions to Bragin's speech.

At 2101 GMT Deputy Kugultinov stresses that a leader needs to be chosen. He says that he does not want to join a new party, there already is a party and a leader and objects to criticisms of Gorbachev.

At 2108 GMT Yashin says the party has never had a democratic tradition, therfore it is not surprising that conservative forces are gathering strength. However, even if they win here, in the end they will not. A consolidation of all of the forces in the party must take place, on the basis of a true democracy. An unidentified deputy representing the Tartar Autonomous Oblast, Krasnoyarskiy Kray. She refers back to the statements made by Lebedintsev, who criticized Shenin. In her opinion, one politician cannot be blamed for all of the problems of the area and she objects to Lebedintsev's claims that he is undemocratic in approach. She supports Shenin's candidacy.

Debates Continue

LD2206224190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2115 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

At 2116 GMT Kryukov takes the podium to speak in favor of Kuptsov, as a reliable member of the working class who has remained faithful to the ideals of the revolution.

At 2120 GMT military communist, Karavayev, speaks for Polozkov as a man of principle and a sense of responsibility.

At 2122 GMT Gorbachev asks if the debate should end or continue; much shouting from the hall. Gorbachev asks for vote on the question: result is 2007 for, 543 against.

At 2123 GMT an announcer voice-over says a tellers' commission was formed. Video switches to caption: evening sitting.

Gorbachev is outlining further procedure, since time is running short.

At 2126 GMT Prokofyev, chairman of drafting commission, comes to podium to report on the commission's responses to various suggestions submitted to it in writing, in particular on the desirability of a message to the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies offering support in the pursuit of sovereignty. He reads out a prepared text. Gorbachev asks for comments. Brief comments from the floor: One says we should be talking only to communists. Another feels rapprochement is desirable. Another asks how, in particular, the party can assist in maintaining law and order, as mentioned in the draft. Another says we should avoid further division between communists and non-communists. Another thinks the address should be to the electors of Russia. Gorbachev says it should remain addressed to the people's congress.

Another suggests Yeltsin should address the party congress and this could lead to a joint decision being adopted. Gorbachev asks if this is a popular suggestion. Murmurs of assent.

At 2139 GMT a delegation complains about military delegates all sitting in a block apart from the rest of the congress, saying this perpetuates feelings of tension.

At 2141 GMT another delegate complains about how people are chosen to speak.

At 2142 GMT a delegate in uniform rejects innuendo against the Armed Forces and calls for greater confidence.

At 2145 GMT Aktyubinsk delegate Babkin speaks on defining roles of parties and organizations.

At 2147 GMT (?Kreysher) from Khabarovsk recalls congress of people's deputies action in dismantling the people's control organization, speaks of serious attempts made there to place CPSU outside law. The position of leaders of local soviets is becoming difficult. He proposes a meeting between leaders of local soviets and Gorbachev to sort things out.

At 2149 GMT Kalinin, of the Moscow party organization, describes some improper doings in the organizations leading up to its recent conference. He flourishes some documents which he maintains have a bearing on this, leading to some laughter in the hall.

At 2153 GMT Alekseyev, from Kazan, makes suggestions regarding quotas of delegates at conferences.

At 2158 GMT Kryukov, from Leningrad, wonders whether delegates are morally entitled to receive salary from their places of work for the time spent at the party congress.

At 2200 GMT Aushev, from Chechen-Ingush, says the current state of the economy is natural, considering the past development of affairs. Even so, he thinks most people would want to continue with perestroyka. He goes on to speak of the persecution and discrimination suffered by Ingush muslims under Stalin, wrongs which have still not been properly righted. Economic development and social provision in the region is behind that of other parts of the country. If something is not done things could get out of control; Ingush autonomy must be restored.

At 2205 GMT Panteleyev, from Tyumen, voices concern over trend in media to depict the party congress as conservative in its leanings. He says this supposed conservatism takes the form of wanting greater social provision, of being concerned about the people. If there is a real struggle for power going on, he says, then it should be conducted honestly.

Voting Inconclusive

LD2206233290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2209 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recording of the 22 June constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party in Moscow.

At this time, Sagalayev of Central Television, speaks of the thousands of enquiries being received by television from people concerned about the progress of the party congress, concerned about its authority. He suggests what he admits could be seen as a naive proposal to set up some working groups to deal with particular areas of public concern: for instance, pensions and social provision; on combatting crimes; on ending party privilege; on creating goodwill towards the Army and KGB.

At 2213 GMT a military delegate makes brief intervention.

At 2214 GMT Polyakov, from Leningrad university, starts to speak, but the recording is cut abruptly.

The screen caption announces "evening sitting"; delegates are seen moving to their places.

At 2217 GMT Gorbachev introduces the chairman of the tellers' commission on the result of the secret ballot for first secretary of RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee: He lists the seven candidates and states numbers of delegates who voted. Then he reads the numbers of votes for and against each candidate. He mentions three "additional" candidates—Bakatin, Vlasov, and Volskiy—who received a very small number of votes. The result is that no candidate has been elected; Polozkov and Lobov will go forward to a second round of voting today, and the result to be annouced tomorrow. Gorbachev asks the congress to vote on endorsing the tellers' commission report. It is accepted by 2483 to 13 with six abstentions. Gorbachev says the new ballot will be held in a few minutes.

At 2225 GMT Gorbachev invites further interventions.

At 2226 GMT Artillery Commander Karavayev voices complaints over what he calls unilateral actions by the government in the military sphere. Yazov and Ogarkov, among others, are seen in the hall. Karavayev calls for an end to untruthful accounts of military matters which have become frequent. The Army will not follow adventurist demagogues and reformers, he says.

At 2228 GMT another military delegate makes some low-key remarks.

At 2229 GMT Gorbachev says Karavayev's concerns need to be addressed.

At 2230 GMT (Saushkin) speaks about delimitation of functions as this affects local soviets. All the party's errors need to be assessed, at all levels, he says. As a state party it is dying and as a new style of party it has not yet been born.

At 2233 GMT two speakers address the topic of social representation of party delegates.

At 2242 GMT Chernov, from Chuvashia, refers to the Ivanov and Gdlyan affair and speaks of the need for the party to be honest above all.

At 2246 GMT Nikolayev from Leningrad speaks.

At 2249 GMT a female delegate speaks for the Army, which has maintained peace for 40 years. A tribute to you, she says, from the mothers of the country! Applause is heard in the hall. The delegate goes on to complain that television is giving too much attention to the Democratic Platform. What has become of Lenin, she asks. Let us have more objectivity. More applause is heard.

At 2254 GMT Alekseyev, from Leningrad, asks if television will today be relaying the platforms of the remaining candidates for party leader.

At 2255 GMT (Tyulkin), from Leningrad, speaks up for positions of socialism and internationalism. Criticism is all very well, he says, but it needs to be based on documentary evidence. He addresses these comments to both the media and delegates in the hall.

At 2258 GMT a delegate repeats the suggestion for a meeting with Yeltsin.

At 2300 GMT a delegate from the floor says that more workers should be elected secretaries of oblast and rayons.

At 2303 GMT a delegate says that the party should think about its aims and goals, that it should not forget its Marxist-Leninist principles. Workers must be considered equal partners within the party.

At 2306 GMT Gorbachev asks for the last speech from the floor. A deputy criticizes the candidacy of Polovodov.

At 2308 GMT Gorbachev says that the congress must continue its work. There is much noise from the floor. He then asks whether discussion should continue on miscellaneous themes but notes that the electoral commission is ready. He is interrupted by shouts from the floor and asks for quiet. He then asks Lukyanov to make announcements, concerning various meetings of various groups after the end of the days work.

At 2312 GMT Gorbachev announces that the whole proceedings will be televised. He then reads out a proposal from a group of deputies that time be given for further acquaintance with candidates Polozkov and Lobov, but this is rejected by a voice vote. At 2312 GMT, a member of the electoral commission reads out the procedure for voting in the next 35 or 40 minutes.

At 2313 GMT Gorbachev concludes the proceedings with the words: "tomorrow the session is here at 1000 [0600 GMT]."

Russian Communist Party Adopts Appeal

LD2306212390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1845 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Jun (TASS)—We transmit the text of an appeal adopted today at the congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party.

Appeal to communists and the peoples of Russia

Comrade communists, Dear compatriots! We, delegates of the congress of the RSFSR Communist Party, appeal to you during days when our country is going through one of the most complex phases of its history. The crisis in the economy, social tension, interethnic strife, separatist moods in individual republics, the activization of anti-socialist forces, the ideological demarcation within the CPSU itself, and serious deformations of the moral foundations of Soviet society—all this conceals a threat to perestroyka and to the very existence of the Soviet Union as a single federal state.

We consider that the RSFSR has always been and remains the guarantor of the stability of the USSR and its unity and power. Today, the republic is going through difficult times. Pain and alarm at the fate of the country's—of Russia's—future is being caused by the inflammation of ethnic strife, the whipping up of distrust between peoples, and the disruption of relations which were formed long ago between people, regions, and republics.

The way to Russia's prosperity lies through uniting the efforts, trust, and brotherhood of the working people of all nationalities.

Supporting the opinion of the majority of Russian communists, our congress has set up the Communist Party of the RSFSR within the CPSU.

Adopting this exceptionally important decision, the congress rejects all attempts to use this step to implement a policy of federalism in the CPSU and its splitting. We declare that the creation of the Russian Communist Party is a step towards consolidating the healthy forces of the party on the platform of perestroyka.

The Russian party organization, finding itself in an equal position with the party organizations of the Union republics, will now be able to more fully express and defend the interests of the working people, and more insistently resolve tasks in the cohesion the peoples of the Russian Federation and in the consolidation the actions of communists represented in the deputies' corpus of Russia and the USSR, as well as in local soviets.

We declare that our aim is humane democratic socialism. The RSFSR Communist Party sets as its aim the creation of conditions of life worthy of man, facilitating his creative development, and will steadfastly

defend the socialist choice and the communist perspective, the interests of the working class and all the working people of Russia, and strive for the republic's political and economic sovereignty and its spiritual revival along the lines of constructive cooperation with the peoples' deputies of the RSFSR.

Supporting the general direction of the economic reform being implemented in the country, whose main content is becoming the transfer to a regulated market economy, the congress considers that such a turn in the economic policy of the CPSU can and must take place within the framework of public agreement, peace, and stabilization of the economic situation. We consider that for the creation of the necessary material, financial, legal, political, and other measures, for the social protection of each individual, communists of the supreme soviets and governments of the USSR and the RSFSR must propose a clearcut program of the staged implementation of the transfer to a regulated economy.

We appeal to all communist members of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets, all people's deputies of the Union and republic, communist members of the governments of the USSR and the Russian Federation, in the elaboration of a program, to take into account the interests of all strata of the population, and envisage a maximum decrease in losses in the transition period as well as the reduction of its length.

We consider that the communists of Russia should strengthen the ideological and organizational unity of the CPSU, and acquire methods of fighting for the political leadership in the republic. The main way to such leadership is specific, real deeds for the good of people, and helping by all means possible the resolution of Russia's urgent problems.

The congress shares the worry of communists and working people of the country at the attacks on the name and cause of V.I. Lenin. The most profound reason for the undermining of the authority of Lenin's teaching is the deformations of socialist development, for which V.I. Lenin cannot bear responsibility. The best answer to this by communists of the Russian Federation will be our work to strengthen the main inheritance from Lenin—the Republic of Soviets, and subjecting all our activity to improving the people's life.

At this difficult time we appeal to the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia of the republic for support in the realization on all our aspirations. Today it is of decisive importance to us. Without this support, the RSFSR Communist Party cannot envisage its existence.

We are relying on partnership and cooperation with the Russian trade unions and All-Union Leninist Communist Youth league, and with workers' and peasants' movements.

We are open for dialogue with all parties and movements advocating socialist renewal of society and acting within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR.

Dear Comrades!

The time demands active deeds from us! The fate of Russia and the fate of perestroyka is in the hands of the working people. We are responsible before the past and future, and before our own conscience and the memory of generations, which have bequeathed us unity. We appeal to your sense, to your hearts. Let us consolidate for the sake of the genuine revivial of Russia and the strengthening of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

Party Congress Issues Appeal to Deputies

LD2306085790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1905 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jun [TASS]—Below follows the text of the appeal to the First Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] People's Deputies that was adopted at today's meeting of the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party:

Esteemed people's deputies!

We, delegates of the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party, greet the delegates of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, we share your profound concern about Russia's destiny. We believe that the overriding priority [svyataya svyatykh] of our joint actions is the interests of the people, its well-being and spiritual rebirth, and social stability. We support the efforts to strengthen RSFSR sovereignty, that are being undertaken by you, your striving to bring the republic out of the crisis in the shortest possible time, to implement radical reforms, and to consolidate the social currents that are coming out in favor of the fundamental interests of the working people. Our congress and the leading bodies of the party of Russian communists express readiness to give political assistance to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and to the local soviets of people's deputies in the confirmation of their sovereignty and in strengthening legality and law and order.

At this critical period for the republic and the country, the congress of Russia's communists proposes to the congress of people's deputies that they should come out jointly for the civic agreement of all progressive forces of society, for humanism and democracy, for socialism and the rebirth of our fatherland!
[Signed] Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party

Report on 22 June Russian Constituent Congress

LD2206102190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] At the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party [CP] Congress. Our correspondent Yakov Smirnov reports from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

The Constituent Congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR has entered a new stage in its work. At this morning's session, which is being chaired by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the speeches by all the seven candidates for the post of first secretary of the republican CP have ended. Comrades Kuptsov, Melnikov, Sheynin, Polozkov, Lobov, Lysenko, and Polovodov spoke about themselves and their platforms. They answered numerous questions.

Naturally the question of forecasts arises. To whom of the candidates will the majority of the congress give preference? None of the delegates with whom we spoke during the interval would take it upon themselves to answer these questions. But each one of them understands that a great deal depends on this election as to what the RSFSR CP will be like, whether its renewal and democratization will be genuine, or remain just pronouncements.

At the present time at the congress delegates are commenting on the candidates, expressing their own opinions for or against. Never before in the party, at least within my memory, has there been such a frank and varied discussion. Thus, Delegate Antonov from Tolyatti called upon candidate Polozkov to withdraw his nomination, but Comrade Demchenko from Rostov called for people to vote for Polozkov. Incidentally, against a background of applause from the auditorium, Delegate Sysoyev from Kuybyshev spoke against Polozkov. Comrade Matveyev from Krasnoyarsk spoke of the worthiness of candidate Sheynin, but Comrade Lebedintsev from the same district spoke of his inability to head the RSFSR CP.

Up to the present moment, 12 people have spoken, and as you can tell there are directly contradictory opnions. Everything will be decided by secret ballot, which is also to take place today. Will any of the candidates nominated become first secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR CP after the first round of voting. That is doubtful.

So, we will just have to be patient, comrades, and wait. On this note I end my report on the work of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR CP from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

Gorbachev 21 June Russian Party Congress Speech

PM2206120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Second Edition pp 1,2

[TASS report: "RSFSR Communist Party: Starting Out"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] M.S. Gorbachev chaired the evening session. Opening it, he said: The presidium has received an appeal to RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies to take part in the congress' work, since the question of the relationship between republic and Union and about the delegation of rights—a question linked with the Union treaty—has emerged there again. This is a question that requires attention and a detailed exchange of opinions.

Now let us think about what else we are going to do at the congress. That is the point we have reached. First and foremost, I think, we need to return to the agenda. Am I right? We are now conducting work precisely on the agenda. As for the questions on the conference agenda, they remain. Are there any objections? No. And in this connection it is only by developing these two questions as special questions that we can examine and adopt draft resolutions on the current period, on the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress, and on the draft CPSU Statutes. Drafts of these documents have been distributed to you. Delegates have persistently advocated that we reach agreement, and I have said—let us decide right now to set up a party and recognize the need to elect a Central Committee. Now we have already reached the point of agreeing on when it is to be elected. And when it will be included on the agenda. Now or in the second stage? There was a long discussion on this yesterday—and not only yesterday but at the first conference [sovet] of delegation representatives. Yesterday we broke up at around midnight, as I recall. We examined four or five options, there were debates, and we listened to all the delegations' arguments. The discussion was quite good and thorough. And we dwelt on one of the options. If you want me to recount it all in detail I will. I now want to set out the results. After all the discussion, we dwelt on the following option: To include the election of first secretary, chairman of the Control Commission, and the Central Committee on the agenda of the Russian Communist Party.

On what was this based? There were also proposals that it would be better to elect the first secretary now and set up an organizing committee under his leadership. Let the organizing committee draw up proposals on the Central Committee's composition. And that we should elect the Central Committee later, at the second stage. Such a view was held.

There was also the following view: That some Central Committee members should be elected [now] and the rest elected [doizbrat] at the next stage. But many delegations—and this view ultimately prevailed, virtually everyone, with few exceptions adhered to it (admittedly, it was altered somewhat in the process)—nonetheless advocated that the first secretary, the Control Commission chairman, and the Central Committee be elected.

On what basis did we proceed? We proceeded on the basis of the arguments heard here in the debates: To come to the congress with a Russian Communist Party leadership. But the main point is that the secretary and Central Committee have already started work today and are preparing the second stage of the congress in order to ensure that it is a fruitful and effective session and in order to produce a specific action program for Russian communists at this stage. Since, if we fail to resolve these

questions now, the second stage will be very busy, we will waste time on these questions, and we will postpone the very work that working people are expecting from Russian communists.

One other argument—it proved quite convincing for many people. This is the fact that it turned out that most party organizations, apart from Leningrad and Kuybyshev, ultimately adopted at their conferences resolutions on names to be recommended for the CPSU Central Committee and for the Central Committee of a future Russian Communist Party. And there are real candidates who have been recommended at these party conferences—apart from two. These two party organizations will retain a quota. They will submit candidates at the second stage and realize their opportunities.

So I would sum up the discussion for you. The question was raised of whether to elect a Politburo or not. And did you notice that I have not talked about electing a Politburo? Comrades advocated that a first secretary and Central Committee be elected—on the basis of proposals which we already have. But the Politburo is not to be elected now, nor are Central Committee secretaries. This is to enable the first secretary to consult with the Central Committee and decide the matter at the second stage. To choose the people, so to speak.

That, basically, is how our many hours of discussion on the question ended. That is to say, we agreed to include on the agenda the election of a Central Committee, the first secretary, and the Control Commission chairman. That is where we've gotten to.

This means that this is the opinion. We asked delegation leaders and representatives to ensure that everyone (admittedly, it was late and I do not know whether they managed to do this in the morning) met with the delegations, consulted with them, and arrived at the result of our several hours of discussions, so to speak. And in order to finally resolve this issue and then switch to an exchange of opinions I must tell you the following. We went and asked: What are we going to do about nominations, what approach will we take to nominating candidates for the Central Committee? The following opinion prevailed on the eve of the conference and yesterday as well: Each kray party organization and oblast party organization will recommend two persons for the Central Committee—I am talking about the Central Committee now. Autonomous oblasts and national okrugs will recommend one person each. But in this connection I raised the question that there are party organizations such as Moscow and Leningrad, there are certain very large party organizations, and it is hard to imagine that Moscow or Leningrad will be represented by just two delegates each. Everyone agreed that this would be an infringement. That was the general view.

That is why the following proposal appeared: What about one person to represent 100,000? It then turned out that if this approach is used, 37 of the country's oblast and kray party organizations will only be able to send one man along. Yet the other proposal produces an imbalance.

By and large our comrades acknowledged that the Leningrad and Moscow party organizations must work on it, discuss the matter, and must be given the opportunity to submit their own proposals so that they can be considered when resolving the question.

When we took this approach, another question cropped up: Let every party organization that recommends two persons—those who send two along—take into account that one must be a worker, without fail, from a worker or peasant background. This demand was also introduced. The makeup of the personnel emerged on this basis. I will not touch on this now. I simply had to put you in the picture.

Hence the first question: The conference of representatives moves for you to consider the inclusion on the agenda—in addition to the points that I have mentioned—of the question of adopting resolutions on the current period, the draft platform, and the statutes. And then the inclusion on the agenda of the election of the Communist Party's leadership bodies, that is the first secretary, the chairman of the Control Commission and the Central Committee, and the Control Commission.

Last, this is the last point to complete the proposals with regard to the agenda. This question has been subjected to debate, it has been raised by life. A fight is now under way for the mass media. Many of our newspapers are both party and soviet newspapers. The situation is just the same in the Russian Federation. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is the newspaper of the Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the government. So this question has cropped up.

Everyone realizes—both party organs and the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers—that we should probably remain co-owners at this stage and live with the current situation. But at the same time both sides acknowledged that a Communist Party like (this is exactly the same incidentally at soviet level, but that is their affair, they are having their own discussion) the Russian Communist Party must have an autonomous press organ of its own. It must have its own party journal. This was deemed necessary at the conference of representatives. In this connection the congress must appeal to the CPSU Central Committee to share its possessions—newspapers and journals—and assign press resources to the Russian Communist Party from existing ones. This is a question that will take some time.

The following question arose after this exchange of opinions: What is a party without press organs, this is all the more necessary for such a powerful party? The question of the need to include the question of RSFSR Communist Party press organs on the agenda also arose.

That is why the resolution contains clauses regarding what we will elect and how, and saying that we will

include points on elections to leadership bodies and on press organs. These are the proposals that we approved initially for the agenda and which the conference of representatives is submitting for your consideration.

I may begin with things that are not, in my view, in any doubt, we will then move onto the election and will begin with an exchange of opinions. I think that our comrades will have something to say.

I believe that the question of the resolutions must be included for consideration—the resolutions on the current period, on the draft platform, and on the draft statutes—so that we can voice our attitude, our ideas for the 28th Congress. That is normal, isn't it? Do our comrades have any doubts on this? What are they?

There was then an exchange of opinions in which delegates A.A. Ivanov, R.B. Mazepa, A.M. Kaplin, A.N. Mikhaylov, A.A. Volkov, V.A. Rudenko, and others took part.

Moscow TV Relays 22 June Supreme Soviet

Committees Viewed

LD2206123790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 22 June begins carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet session held in the Council of Ministers building in Moscow.

The relay begins with discussion of the electronic voting system, which shows that out of 239 deputies, only 82 are present with 157 absent. The electronic system is being monitored.

At 1105 GMT session chairman Khasbulatov asks deputies to look at their lists of members of different committees. There are cries from the floor: Some deputies do not have the confirmed list of 18 committees.

At 1108 GMT Deputy Gleb Yakunin asks for a change in the name of the Committee on Freedom of Conscience. He wants the words "charity" and "mercy" to be included. Another deputy rises to object.

At 1110 GMT a deputy raises the problem of a nonmember of the Supreme Soviet having been elected to a committee through oversight. The chairman says that the lawyers are checking this.

At 1112 GMT a deputy rises to point out that Yeltsin is not a member of the Supreme Soviet. Other deputies then raise procedural points. Khasbulatov points to the desirability of including as many people's deputies as possible in the work of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Deputies continue to raise procedural points with regard to the composition of the committees, revolving around the need to ensure parity between different groups of deputies and between the houses of the Supreme Soviet in so far as their representation on these committees is concerned.

At 1120 GMT Deputy Afafonov says that the session should stop this general discussion and discuss the specific leadership of the committees. Khasbulatov agrees.

At 1122 GMT a deputy says that if the law doesn't require a committee chairman to be a member of the Supreme Soviet, one should proceed according to the law. Khasbulatov says that the law does require this. Deputies continue putting forward proposals and voicing their views regarding procedural matters.

At 1132 GMT the 49th anniversary of World War II is marked with a minute of silence, after which the debate continues until 1137 GMT, when Khasbulatov sums up the discussion.

At 1139 GMT Deputy Shakhray reports on the structure and functions of the Committee for Legislation.

At 1145 GMT questions are put to Shakhray.

At 1153 GMT Deputy Krasavchenko presents the Committee for Economic Reform and Ownership Issues.

At 1201 GMT questions are put to Krasavchenko.

Committee Chairman Proposed

LD2206131590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1208 GMT on 22 June continues to carry a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet held in the Council of Ministers building in Moscow. Khasbulatov invites deputies to register. Several deputies make proposals on the composition and chairmanship of parliamentary commitees.

At 1213 GMT a call to register is repeated: 251 present in total, 129 in one chamber, 122 in the other. Khasbulatov asks deputies to repeat the process, in case some have been missed: rerun shows same total, made up of 136 and 115—there is still no quorum.

At 1219 GMT deputies make procedural proposals from the floor.

At 1223 GMT Khasbulatov reads the list of proposed chairmen of committees: Shakhray for legislation; Krasavchenko for economic reform and property; Granberg for interrepublic relations; Travkin for sovies of people's deputies; Fedorchenko for industry; Kamenev for rural social development; Basin for construction; Shorin for science and education; Askalonov for health; Rudskoy for invalids; Lakhova for women; Smirnov for youth; Revyakin for ecology; Lukin for international affairs; Kovalev for human rights; Aslakhanov for law and order; Yugin for media; an Polosin for freedom of worship.

At 1232 GMT Khasbulatov reminds deputies of proposed chairmen of the commissions of the individual chambers.

At 1238 GMT Aslakhanov, Travkin, and others call for the chairmanships to be settled as a matter of priority. Khasbulatov points out there is no quorum. Other procedural proposals are made from the floor.

At 1248 GMT Khasbulatov reruns the registration process: 126 in Soviet of Republic, 125 in Soviet of Nationalities—still no quorum. More procedural exchanges between Khasbulatov and deputies follow. Khasbulatov explains that Yeltsin is absent because he has lost his voice.

At 1255 GMT Khasbulatov reminds deputies that buses are waiting to take them to the congress. At this point the relay ends.

Moscow TV Relays 22 June Congress Proceedings

Economic Council Viewed

LD2206144290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1256 GMT on 22 June begins carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedinsg of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic [RSFSR] Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin. The cameras show deputies in congress hall. Yeltsin, in the chair, invites deputies to take their seats and then to stand before the republic's flag in honor of the anniversary of the war dead.

At 1300 GMT Monokhin acquaints deputies with a statement from the Democratic Russia bloc. He enumerates the congress' achievements to date and criticizes the obstructive behavior of the apparatchiks in the communists of Russia grouping. He calls for a new movement to unite democrats in soviets at all levels.

At 1303 GMT a deputy objects to the way in which one of his speeches was presented by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

At 1305 GMT another deputy calls for the resignation of the general who attacked democracy at the RSFSR Party Congress. Yeltsin offers to pass the proposal to the national president.

At 1307 GMT a deputy complains about the low priority given to the media at the congress. Yeltsin answers her objections.

At 1311 GMT deputies continue to raise matters concerning their constituencies. Yeltsin gives brief replies to each point.

At 1324 GMT Yeltsin brings discussion to a close and announces the first point on the agenda: Adoption of a decision on the constitutional commission. Deputies are asked first to register: 783 present: quorum is 708. Yeltsin proposes a procedure to deal with deputies who register and then leave the hall.

At 1328 GMT Yeltsin asks deputies to rise for a minute's silence in memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic War. Going on to business, he takes a vote on whether to confine consideration of the first point to 20 minutes: agreed.

At 1330 GMT Yeltsin explains that the draft decision is in two parts: Supreme Soviet to adopt a law on referendums by September 1990, then constitutional commissions to hold a referendum on main principles of the draft RSFSR Constitution, with a vote taken on each individual provision, for subsequent discussion by the congress next January.

At 1332 GMT Yeltsin agrees with a deputy's proposal that the constitutional commission should keep deputies informed of its progress.

At 1334 GMT a vote is called on the decision: passed by 804 to 10, with four abstentions. Registration process is repeated, as some deputies did not manage to do so first time: 831 now present.

At 1337 GMT Yeltsin moves to point two on the agenda: Abolition of the State Acceptance Service on RSFSR territory. A vote is taken on whether to discuss the issue: Rejected by 648 to 161, with nine abstentions. A deputy takes the rostrum to described the measure as premature before the introduction of market relations. Other deputies express views on this and related issues.

At 1346 GMT a vote is taken on ending discussion: Passed by 780 to 21. Khasbulatov reads the text of the decision. Yeltsin calls for a vote on adopting the whole decision: passed by 776 to 23, with 13 abstentions.

At 1349 GMT a vote is taken on a deputy's proposed amendment: to exempt the construction sector from the abolition: Rejected by 640 to 165, with 19 abstentions.

At 1350 GMT the next point on agenda is read: Formation of standing commission on deputies' ethics. Yeltsin explains that the decision is in two parts: To set up the commission, then to instruct the Supreme Soviet to approve its members. Deputies express views on what the vote should cover.

At 1354 GMT Yeltsin reads the text of the draft on creation of commission on deputies' ethics. A vote is tken on this, and the decision is adopted.

At 1358 GMT Yeltsin moves on to the next item on agenda: The creation of a Higher Economic Council of the republic. A deputy raises objections to its creation.

At 1401 GMT Deputy Rogacheva speaks in support of the council's creation.

At 1406 GMT Tikhomirov speaks in support of such a council being created. He says attention should be paid to experience elsewhere in European parliaments.

At 1408 GMT Yeltsin says that very many leading RSFSR intellectuals want to take part in such a Higher Economic Council. He speaks of the possible mechanism for forming the council.

At 1410 GMT Deputy Khasbulatov recommends a draft on forming the council so that the people's deputies maintain control over the council. The council must become an important instrument to help people's deputies and members of the Supreme Soviet in conducting economic reform.

At 1413 GMT Ovchinnikov supports the draft text on the subject that has been handed out to deputies.

At 1414 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote on a proposal to curtail discussion. The proposal is adopted.

At 1415 GMT Goryacheva reads a draft text of the decision on setting up a Higher Economic Council. Yeltsin calls for a vote. The text is adopted with 751 votes for, 57 against, and 13 abstentions.

Atomic Power, Waste Viewed

LD2206153890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1418 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin.

The next item on the agenda is a government program on radioactive waste and measures to improve the radiological and ecological situation. Deputies note the timely nature of such measures. Deputy (Khudovkin) speaks of the dangers of radioactive waste dumps.

At 1422 GMT Deputy Vorontsov speaks against having the Ministry of Atomic Power as the supervising authority with regard to point four of the draft program.

At 1425 GMT Deputy Lisin says he does not agree with one speaker's proposal that the nuclear power network should be closed down.

At 1426 GMT a deputy from Kursk says that the threat from atomic power stations does not only come from the burial of waste but also from the organization of the stations. Another deputy stresses that some of the points need technical knowledge to judge successfully.

At 1429 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote on the proposal that the debate on this point should be curtailed. The proposal is adopted.

At 1430 GMT Deputy Kamenev is given one minute to speak further on the document. He objects to the fact that a committee of the congress is in effect being transformed into an executive body. Yeltsin says this is not so.

At 1431 GMT Deputy Gritsenko calls for caution in the wording of the document, since atomic power is an all-Union responsibility.

At 1434 GMT Deputy Sokolov says that in Leningrad Oblast the problem is not only atomic waste but also the burial of toxic waste.

At 1435 GMT Yeltsin interjects that here we are discussing atomic waste. Other matters will be dealt with in a separate decision on ecological safety, he says. He confirms that people's deputies are entitled to visit any installation. That has already been decided, he says. He again takes a vote on the proposal to curtail the discussion. The propsal is adopted.

At 1439 GMT Yeltsin says since a number of significant amendments have been proposed a vote is now to be taken on accepting the draft programs as a basis. The deputies vote in favor of accepting it as a basis by 779 votes for, six against, and three absentions.

At 1440 GMT Yeltsin calls for votes on various proposed amendments to the draft, and voting takes place.

At 1455 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote on an amendment about considering the construction of new atomic power stations on the RSFSR's territory as inadmissible. The propsed amendment to the draft is adopted by 601 votes for, 162 against, and 26 abstentions.

At 1457 GMT a deputy says that point 7 is really a technical point and should be removed from the draft. Yeltsin says in his view point 7 is a political matter and not a technical matter. Another deputy objects to point 7 being in the draft.

At 1500 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote on not accepting point 7. The voting is postponed while Deputy Petukhov speaks on the subject.

At 1502 GMT Gritsenko stresses again that points 6 and 7 are purely technological matters and should not be discussed in the congress hall.

At 1505 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote on a proposal that the RSFSR Council of Ministers be instructed to make proposals on banning the burial of atomic waste on the territory of the RSFSR from 1 January 1991. This proposal is adopted by 671 votes for, 139 against, and 16 abstentions.

At 1510 GMT a deputy raises the question of the South Urals AES (nuclear electric power station), the construction of which has been started. Yeltsin says that the vote was in respect of stopping the start of construction of new atomic stations.

Loan Repayment Debated

LD2206162690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1512 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin.

A deputy speaks of the danger of having atomic waste processed abroad since there is a danger that the waste can be used for atomic weapon purposes.

At 1516 GMT voting on amendments continues.

At 1520 GMT Yeltsin announces 30-minute break.

At 1521 GMT the relay of proceedings after the break continues.

At 1522 GMT deputies continue to resume their places.

At 1524 GMT deputies begin a debate on a draft decision on cancelling the loans owed to USSR banks by collective farms and other agro-industrial enterprises.

At 1525 GMT a deputy from Nevinnomyssk suggests amendments to the draft and emphasizes the debt problem of farms.

At 1526 GMT other amendments to the draft are proposed.

At 1529 GMT a deputy supports the writing off of the loans but adds that the collective and state farms should be written off as well.

At 1530 GMT Deputy Kuznetsov thinks that the cancellation of the loans is premature.

At 1531 GMT various deputies defend collective and state farms.

At 1536 GMT another deputy proposes that the debts of collective and state farms be cancelled.

At 1537 GMT Deputy Isayev emphasizes the catastrophic state of agriculture in the RSFSR. He says that much work went into the drafting of the present draft.

At 1540 GMT Deputy Guzhvin speaks on the importance of collective farms, especially in Astrakhan Oblast, which provide the republic with a great deal of produce and yet the republic has a negligent attitude towards the farms. He says more attention should be paid to maintaining them.

At 1543 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote to curtail debate on the subject. Proposal is adopted. Yeltsin proceeds to take a vote on adopting the draft decision regarding writing off the loans to collective and state farms. The decision is adopted. Yeltsin moves on to take votes on various amendments regarding the loans.

At 1555 GMT the transmission is abruptly stopped in the middle of Yeltsin's sentence, and the announcer says that it will be resumed in 15 minutes.

Miners' Appeal Read

LD2206180790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1609 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin.

A deputy proposes to vote for draft amendment 1.

At 1612 GMT another deputy speaks for writing off the loans, as farms have no money to repay them.

At 1613 GMT an unidentified deputy proposes changing the wording of amendment 1 and calls on deputies to vote for writing off the loans in full rather than just R70 billion.

At 1615 GMT a deputy from Chita Oblast proposes that the loans should be cancelled partially at least, because complete cancellation may not be possible.

At 1618 GMT Deputy Bespalov proposes that the wording of amendment 1 should be changed to the effect that the loans of farms should be cancelled but not the loans of enterprises.

At 1619 GMT another deputy says that loans to enterprises should also be written off.

At 1620 GMT Deputy Kamchatov says that he will abstain from voting on the amendment.

At 1621 GMT Deputy Tikhomirov says that if the loans are fully written off it will lead to the rocketing of inflation. Deputy Nazarchuk, who says that he works in the agrarian group, recalls his recent report on the subject that is being discussed. He proceeds to explain that the draft proposes long-term credits and short-term mortgages to farms. He says that he was the one who prepared the draft in the first place, and as such he calls on deputies to propose the draft.

At 1623 GMT Yeltsin takes a vote to curtail the debate on amendment 1. Proposals on curtailing the debate are adopted. He reads out the draft decision according to which loans are to be written off from July 1990, interest rates are to be altered on debts for the farms for July 1990, and the RSFSR Council of Ministers is to be instructed to set up a system for writing off the loans. He puts this to a vote: The decision is adopted.

At 1629 GMT Deputy Kiselev reads out an appeal from Kuzbass miners to the RSFSR congress: the bureaucratic system should be disbanded; the patience of the people is running out. The miners are calling on RSFSR deputies to take urgent measures to prevent the country from failure: a fundamental economic policy should be drawn up; a new government of the republic should be set up which will take into account the interests of the miners and all of the people; and living standards should be rising all the time so that the government could keep people's trust. Commissions and committees of the congress should replace the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, and an amendment should be introduced into the Constitution of the RSFSR. Kiselev then proposes that deputies vote on the appeal.

At 1634 GMT Yeltsin says that the deputies will take into account the miners' appeal. He then proposes that no vote be held on the appeal. He addresses the question specifically to Kiselev who insists that the vote should be held. Yeltsin questions him as to what exactly the vote should be held on: Kiselev answers that the vote should be held on committees and commissions. Yeltsin says that the question will be discussed in the future all the same, and there is no point in taking a vote on something that has not been thought through properly. Yeltsin is nevertheless compelled to take a vote on the appeal, and it is not adopted.

At 1642 GMT Yeltsin moves on to the next subject of the agenda—the demarcation of the management functions of organizations on the territory of the RSFSR. He proposes that certain ministries of the RSFSR should be separate from USSR ministries.

At 1645 GMT A deputy speaks on need to disband departmental network.

At 1647 GMT Depty Ryumin says that the Ministry of Defense must remain under the full jurisdiction of the USSR.

At 1652 GMT Yeltsin says that he met some deputies from the military profession today, and that they have made some remarks with which, he thinks, deputies will sympathize. He does not detail the remarks.

At 1653 GMT various deputies make remarks regarding the status of the defense ministry.

At 1655 GMT Deputy Tsypkin says that the draft should be adopted and proposes three amendments.

At 1658 GMT Deputy Rudenko also proposes that the draft be adopted.

At 1659 GMT Deputy Selionov in a military uniform proposes that Yeltsin makes public the remarks of military deputies that he met today.

At 1700 GMT Yeltsin says: Regarding special representative-ministers (in the 7th amendment), the military deputies feel that the word "control" (kontrol) is removed from the wording. He mentions another remark.

At 1704 GMT another deputy says that the draft should be adopted.

At 1705 GMT Deputy Babeyev opens his speech by talking about RSFSR sovereignty declaration. He then proceeds to say that no conflict should be waged between Union and republican ministries. The problem is that the RSFSR Council of Ministers will be inevitably subordinated to the Union Council of Ministers. Having all this in mind, he proposes that RSFSR Supreme Soviet should work towards a new Union treaty to avoid possible conflicts between the interests of the Union and the republic.

At 1709 GMT Deputy Sudilov proposes that the draft under discussion be adopted.

At 1710 GMT Deputy Ivanilov says that the draft be adopted in the form in which it now exists.

At 1711 GMT (?Ochalov) from Tula Oblast, commander of air landing forces, says that he has no sympathy for the draft. It should be thought out better. He lists certain points from it which are, in his view, debatable. The draft will precipitate conflicts between Union and republican ministries, and needs a great deal of work.

At 1712 GMT various deputies express their views on the draft.

At 1718 GMT Deputy Voronin says that more time should be devoted to the elaboration of the draft and that it should then be submitted to the next extraordinary congress. The draft, he says, contravenes Union laws.

Yeltsin Ends Congress

LD2206195490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1725 GMT on 22 June continues carrying a recorded relay of the 22 June proceedings of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputy session in the Kremlin. A Moscow deputy emphasizes the need to consult people, to win their trust. There is applause.

At 1729 GMT Yeltsin asks for vote on whether to wrap up the debate. The decision is passed by 741 to 47, with four abstentions. Vote is then taken on whether the resolution should be decided by a named vote: this is passed by 652 to 84 with 10 abstentions. Yeltsin announces that ARGUMENTY I FAKTY has declared its intention to publish full accounts of the debate, including details of who voted how. There is applause.

At 1733 GMT a vote is taken on the resolution as a basis: the result is 703 for 57 against, 22 abstentions. The result is greeted with standing ovation.

At 1735 GMT Yeltsin says they will move on to voting on amendments point by point. He reads out the first one and takes a vote: he announces it has been passed.

At 1739 GMT he reads out another amendment relating to the need for constitutional chance in line with the declaration on sovereignty: this is passed by 787 to 12, with 10 abstentions.

At 1740 GMT there is a brief intervention at the microphone suggesting further refinement to wording. Yeltsin calls a vote to decide whether this should be voted on: this is passed by 779 to 16 with 11 abstentions. So the amendment is voted on: voted down by 425 to 293.

At 1744 GMT Deputy Skudnov from Gorkiy says all this voting on minutiae is dragging things out excessively, undermining the integrity of the congress, and might even be deliberate sabotage.

At 1745 GMT another deputy proposes a further minor change of wording in Article 1.

At 1746 GMT Deputy Silayhev from Omsk speaks of need to include mention of nuclear power industry ministry in Article 2.

At 1748 GMT a deputy in military uniform makes suggestion for a change of wording concerning institutes and enterprises of the defence industry. This leads to much heated dispute in the hall, with numerous alternatives suggested. One deputy makes the point that they have passed the resolution as a basis and that should be enough for now. Another points out the complications that could arise from the location of major space facilities in Kazakhstan, and suggests the answer is to make reference to defence industry establishments forming part of Union programs. Yeltsin puts this to vote and declares it to have been passed by 644 to 99 with 26 abstentions.

At 1758 GMT another deputy suggests that since the resolution has been passed as a basis, it should now be left to the Supreme Soviet to instruct the drafting commission to tidy it up.

At 1800 GMT an amendment on Article 7, concerning supervision of military and KGB activities, passes by 700 to 41 with 20 abstentions. Yeltsin explains what will be the position and function of a future RSFSR minister of defense.

At 1802 GMT another amendment is voted on.

At 1804 GMT a vote is taken on whether the Ministry of Navy should be mentioned. This passes by 626 to 103 with 13 abstentions.

At 1807 GMT a vote is taken of resolutions: this passes by 695 to 38.

At 1809 GMT Yeltsin reminds deputies that ceremony for laying of wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier will be taking place shortly. In the meantime, there will be replies from a representative of the Secretariat to deputies questions, then Yeltsin will deliver his concluding remarks.

At 1810 GMT a representative provides these replies from the podium.

At 1815 GMT an unidentified deputy speaks on refugees. He thinks this subject should be on the agenda. Yeltsin says this issue will be covered by bills to be debated in the Supreme Soviet in July. He outlines other business for the Supreme Soviet on 3-4 July and 11-12 July for consideration of nominations for government posts and then to endorse the government. After that they can go on holiday, he says.

At 1820 GMT Yeltsin then moves to the podium to deliver some remarks winding up the congress.

At 1830 GMT at the conclusion of his remarks, the congress rises to applaud.

Deputies Issue Resolution on Demarcation of Power

PM2406163090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jun 90 Single Edition p 1

["Resolution of the Congress of Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic People's Deputies on the Demarcation of Functions of Management of Organizations in RSFSR Territory (Basis for a New Union Treaty)"—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text] The USSR has embarked on a period of profound transformation of the Federation and confronted the need to conclude a new Union Treaty.

Guided by the declaration on state sovereignty of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], The Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies resolves:

I. To instruct the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Commission to draft the basic principles of a new Union Treaty.

II. In the course of preparing a draft Union Treaty, to adopt as a basis the following principles of demarcation of functions of the RSFSR and the USSR:

1. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is directly subordinate to the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

2. Functions of direct management of organizations, enterprises, and institutions in RSFSR territory are exercised by the following USSR departments:

the USSR Defense Ministry;

the USSR KGB;

the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation;

the USSR Ministry of Railways;

the USSR Ministry of the Maritime Fleet;

the USSR Ministry of Communications;

the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification (excluding capital construction);

the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry;

defense sectors of industry and cosmonautics with regard to orders from the USSR Defense Ministry and union programs.

3. The RSFSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is subordinate only to the RSFSR Council of Ministers and collaborates with the USSR MVD.

4. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet:

1) is to put forward an initiative appealing to union republic Supreme Soviets to hold interparliamentary consultations on preparing the fundamentals of a new Union Treaty.

2) The RSFSR Council of Ministers, in conjunction with the USSR KGB, is to study and submit for examination by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet the question of collaboration and the system of leadership of state security organs in the RSFSR, the formation of the RSFSR KGB (with a renewal of functions), and the transfer to that committee of all USSR KGB organizations located in RSFSR territory.

Protection of the state border is left to the USSR KGB.

3) The question of the creation of an RSFSR customs service is to be examined.

5. The Russian Republic Bank of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] is to be reconstituted as the RSFSR State Bank, subordinate to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and is to be given powers in the sphere of monetary and credit policy.

An RSFSR Foreign Economic Bank is to be formed, subordinate to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

6. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to examine the question of the system of management of enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry and Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises in RSFSR territory.

7. For collaboration with enterprises and organizations of union departments in RSFSR territory (the Defense Ministry, KGB, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Power and Electrification, Ministry of Nuclear Power Generation and the Nuclear Industry), special RSFSR representatives are to be appointed, with the rank of RSFSR ministers. As far as the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR KGB are concerned, the aforementioned representatives are to be charged with the duty of promoting the strengthening of an integrated infrastructure in the interests of the country's defense, the implementation of a profound military reform, the provision of amenities for the troops, and the implementation of social programs.

8. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to draft within a month and submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet proposals on the structure of management of sectors under union jurisdiction and the time frame for their transfer to the system of the RSFSR national economy, mainly with a view not to the creation of republic ministries, but to other modern forms of organization and activity of autonomous enterprises.

9. The RSFSR Council of Ministers:

1) is to embark on the conclusion of contracts on economic, trade, social, national, cultural, and other questions with all the union republics on an equal, voluntary basis.

2) is to conclude contracts with the USSR Council of Ministers for:

—the exercise of the functions of union departments in RSFSR territory;

—financial operations, money circulation, emission, and the payment of sums into the union budget calculated on the basis of each article of the budget and the union program in accordance with the RSFSR's interests;

—the implementation of currency operations through the RSFSR Foreign Economic Bank;

—the handover of a number of functions of the USSR Foreign Ministry concerning the republic's interests to the RSFSR Foreign Ministry.

10. The RSFSR Council of Ministers is to propose to foreign states that direct contracts be concluded with the RSFSR, making provision for the training of specialist cadres, the attraction of foreign capital for the construction of housing, roads, hospitals, and tourist complexes, and the receipt of credits (on acceptable terms) for the resolution of the food problem and the provision of goods and organization of the service sphere for the population.

It is to appeal to international organizations for help and aid in minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl national ecological disaster for oblasts of the RSFSR.

Moscow, Kremlin, 23 June 1990.

Yeltsin Chairs People's Deputies Session

LD2206111390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Congress of People's Deputies. Yuriy Korotkov is at the microphone.

[Korotkov] At the present time at the Kremlin Great Palace, the afternoon session of the Congress of People's Deputies is under way. It is being conducted by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. There are eight issues on the agenda. Two have already been resolved. A decision has been adopted on the Constitution Commission; the State Acceptance Service has been abolished on the territory of the Russian Federation. A decision has also been adopted to find jobs within the next two months for staff of the State Acceptance Service who were made redundant as a result of its abolition. It has been determined that in connection with the transition to market relations, enterprises themselves will have the right to establish methods of monitoring the quality of the products they produce. The issue of electing a standing commission of the congress

on deputies's ethics and the temporary regulations regarding the commission is now being discussed. Many deputies are expressing doubt that such a commission is necessary on a permanent basis, and whether such a large number of deputies—40 people—is necessary. They say that five to seven people are sufficient. Debates are currently going on over this issue.

On the congress agenda for today, moreover, there are the following issues—on setting up a Supreme Economic Council affiliated to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, working out a state program on the handling, utilization and storage of radioactive wastes and spent nuclear materials and emergency measures to improve the radio-ecological situation, on cancelling loans owed to USSR banks by the collective farms, state farms and other enterprises of the Russian Federation State Agro-industrial Committee and the State Agro-industrial Committee of the Nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR, and demarcation of the management functions of organizations on the territory of the Russian Federation. The address of the Kuzbass miners to the people's deputies is also expected.

If all these issues are decided, then it is possible that the Congress of People's Deputies will finish its work today.

But I remind you that this morning, before this session, there was a joint session of the chambers of the republic's Supreme Soviet. It was assumed that at that session the structure of the Supreme Soviet committees and the commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities and the Republic's Soviet were examined, the functions and main trends in activity were defined. The chairmen of the committees and their deputies were also to be confirmed, but unfortunately the constructive discussion did not take place, since there was not a quorum, and the issue was hardly discussed and was left unfinished.

I end my report from the Great Kremlin Palace.

Yeltsin Closes Congress of People's Congress

LD2206170690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1528 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Closing speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies session in the Kremlin on 22 June; from the "Congress Diary" program presented by Igor Zorin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed people's deputies:

We are concluding our work. The First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies is passing into history, and in this regard I should like to say a few words.

Deputies will probably agree with me that there has never been such a congress in Russia. [applause] It will leave its mark on the memories of each of us, on the memories of all our electors, and of all Russian people. All of us are evidently left with a certain feeling of dissatisfaction, that we could have acted more productively.

In evaluating the work of the congress it needs to be noted that it reflected trends which are developing in Russia today. I should like to single out as the main trend a growing radicalization of moods and expectations among our electors. Both before the congress and during the congress the breathing of the peoples of Russia was palpable, as was their will to act more daringly and to achieve results. All of us have realized that the Russian giant is awakening.

The novelty of the situation...[applause] The novelty of the situation lies also in the fact that for the first time in the years of perestroyka there has been set out at a forum as representative as was our congress the rich palette of differing political currents, ideological directions, and positions. Weighty accounts of themselves have been given both by radically-minded deputies and representatives of the more moderate wing. The voice of nonparty deputies and religious figures have also been clearly heard.

By life itself, and not by the whim of fashion, we have been placed in conditions where it is impossible to get by without compromise. Real compromises at that, begot through pangs experienced by the deputies themselves and not born somewhere in the belly of the apparatus. Though we have not managed to do everything I think we have achieved much. It is very important for us to enrich this experience in the future. A mechanism was set up at the congress to coordinate the various positions, the conciliation commission. We have adopted and made use of the principle of having alternatives when putting forward candidates. We, if one is to give an overall assessment, tried to overcome the confrontational logic. Our congress proved that any crisis moments, any impasse situations, can be overcome if we begin to listen to and hear each other, [applause] if we begin to meet each other half way, if we begin to master the art of political compromise. From the height of the present day, one can say that in spite of all the diversity that exists among us we also have some things in common—the interests of the peoples of the Russian state. [applause]

It is pluralism, which really has been present at the congress, which has been the soruce of the intensive work in which each deputy, each group was engaged in searching, was in a state of intensive work, and, if you like, of competitiveness and competition. It is only from this that a realistic, strong and dynamic policy can be born. It is only in such an intensive creative atmosphere that there can be political illumination and discovery. It is only here that we can take account of the nuances and avoid mistakes and miscalculations.

Of course, it is still too early for us to rest on our laurels. The course of the congress has shown that we still have much to learn. There has not always been sufficient

restraint and sufficiently high political standards. We have not yet mastered the norms of deputies' ethics. At times we were overwhelmed by a wave of emotions. I think that each of us here sould be extremely self-critical, not excluding the chairman. I believe that all of us, without exception, are making the first steps in really civilized politics. [applause]

We must use use all opportunities to enhance our political qualifications, absorb world political experience and make a study—including a practical study—of the work of the parliaments of various countries and of the Euro parliament. I hope everyone agrees—will agree—with me that the summit of our congress has been the discussion of the question of the sovereignty of Russia and the adoption of today's resolution on demarcation of functions between the Russian—Russia and the center.

A sensation in the good sense has been the full unanimity of the deputies when we included the question of a declaration of the state sovereignty of Russia in the agenda of the congress. As a result of stormy debates [short applause] we adopted the declaration of the state sovereignty of the RSFSR. What is its meaning? The supreme body of power of the republic, expressing the will of all its peoples, has proclaimed that the Russian Federation is an independent sovereign republic within the USSR.

The Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the Supreme Soviet of Russia elected by the Russians, and no one else, are the supreme bodies of power of our republic. [applause] They will themselves determine—and have today already determined—what proportion of power should be transferred to the center. We have a lot of work ahead of us in giving legislative shape to a system of direct and equal relations between the RSFSR and the other Union republics.

By taking that path, we shall be able to considerably improve and enrich relations between the republics and rid the center of mediatory functions which are alien to it. This is of the greatest importance not just for Russia, but also for the future of the whole union. [short applause] We have not been able to solve all the problems, though our work has gone on for rather longer than planned. No doubt it could not have been otherwise. On the very first day we managed to break the agenda foisted on us by the apparat. The deputies have not been extras at the congress, or mere electors. The congress has shown that there are issues on which we, the deputies, are agreed and which can form the foundation of a genuinely coalitional policy. It is especially important and valuable to me as chairman that our body of deputies can be above group, bloc and party bias and rise, at the most decisive moments, to the level of historical responsibility.

New republican organs of power have been formed at the congress and they have already begun their work. A new bright pleiad of Russian politicians has appeared. I am sure that they will show their worth in the very near future. No matter what positions they occupy we should treat them as our most valuable capital, our national wealth.

I believe that we should cast aside everything personal which perhaps takes place in relations among some of us. We must not forget for a moment that we are entrusted with deciding the fate of Russia. Everyone will be found a worthy place, everyone will be found something worthy to do. Everyone of us should be able to realize his capacities on behalf of Russia's future. I think that we have every grounds to state: We have the chance to give greater dynamism to the process of the renewal of Russia and we do not have the right to let slip this historic opportunity. [applause]

All the best, dear deputies. [applause]

Western Republics

Moldavia Parliament Adopts Sovereignty Declaration

LD2306204890 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Golya]

[Text] Kishinev June 23 TASS—The Moldavian parliament at its first session today completed the formation of a republican government. There will be now only 17 republican ministries instead of the previously existing 50.

A heated debate developed over a draft declaration of Moldavia's sovereignty. Following the introduction of amendments and an article-by-article vote, the declaration was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes.

The declaration proclaims that land, mineral and other natural resources on the Republic's territory as well as the entire economic, scientific, technical, financial potential, and national valuables are the exclusive property of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The declaration envisages the supremacy of the Moldavian Constitution and laws throughout the republic's territory. The laws and other normative acts take effect in Moldavia only after they are ratified by the republican Supreme Soviet.

The session endorsed the conclusion drawn by the commission of the republican Supreme Soviet "On a politico-legal evaluation of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact and the secret protocol dated August 23, 1939, and of their consequences for Bessarabia and for northern Bukovina".

Some deputies voiced their disagreement with the draft document and suggested that the consideration of the document be postponed to the autumn session. But a majority of deputies insisted on the endorsement of the document the essence of which is that subsequently all festive activities are cancelled on June 28, the date when Bessarabia was incoporated into the USSR.

The session suspended its work until July 25. During the period the Financial and Budgetary Commission and the Commission on Inter-Ethnic Problems are expected to prepare materials about the republic's transition to a market economy and recommendations about the formation of a Gagauz autonomous entity on the republic's territory.

Kebich Continues as Belorussian Prime Minister

LD2306160890 Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Bogdanov]

[Text] Minsk June 23 TASS—The resignation of the previous government of Belorussia was accepted at the Belorussian parliament session today. It was decided to begin to elect a new chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers without delay.

A group of people's deputies, who came forward with this proposal, substantiated it by the need to vest the head of government with powers to conclude economic treaties with the other republics of the Soviet Union.

Vyacheslav Kebich, 54, was reelected the chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers. He began his working career in 1958 and rose from a technology engineer to general director of the Minsk production amalgamation for the manufacture of broaching and cutting-off machine tools, one of Belorussia's largest enterprises.

Kebich was on party work for several years. Since 1988 he worked as deputy prime minister of Belorussia and chairman of the republican State Planning Committee.

He is a member of the Bureau of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee and a USSR people's deputy. In April this [year] he became the chairman of the republican Council of Ministers.

The Belorussian Supreme Soviet instructed Kebich to prepare proposals on a new composition of a government.

Ukraine Democratic Platform Threatens Split

LD2206145190 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Valeriy Khmelko, a representative of the republican and Kiev coordinating councils of the Democratic Platform within the Communist Party of the Ukraine, was given the floor at the party congress. He listed eight ultimative demands and stated that should they be rejected, the Democratic Platform will convene a forum of its own in order to gather support. Here is Ihor Begey, member of the Democratic Platform.

[Begin Begey recording] I am a delegate from Lvov. My impression of the congress is that a significant number of delegates suffer from nostalgia for the good old days. However, I personally would be against rushing to extremes. We must try to find compromises. We have to concentrate on political and ideological questions, now, immediately.

At the same time, as I see it, our congress should understand and arrive at the conclusion that the causes of our difficult present-day situation and the crises in all spheres of our life lie in the absence of freedom in all walks—in politics, in state matters, in economic and spiritual life. We must understand that if we fail to achieve these freedoms and if we fail to decide the destiny of the Communist Party of Ukraine precisely at this 28th congress, then it will be doubtful whether we'll be able to overcome the crisis. I see only one way-out: We must have state, political, and party sovereignity. [end recording]

Reportage on 28th Ukrainian Party Congress

Medvedev, Yakovlev Criticized

LD2306000790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] Kiev, 22 Jun (UKRINFORM-TASS)—Reports on the work of sections occupied a central place today at the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, which is taking place here. They have provided the fullest possible picture of the state of affairs in the party, the Republic, and the country, and made it possible to pool ideas on ways of finding the best solutions in various spheres of public life.

Almost all those who spoke at meetings of the sections expressed concern at the present situation in the party and the country. They stressed that the fundamental reasons for the present economic and political crisis are to be found not only in the period before perestroyka. Mistakes made in recent years are also to blame. They spoke of the need to uphold the principles of democratic centralism in its Leninist understanding. They proposed that delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Ukraine should seek a personal assessment of the activities of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee secretaries during the years of peresroyka. They pointed out that the leaders of the republic's party organization could not have failed to see or notice the many mistakes that have been committed, either. The lack of clearcut political reference points and policy guidelines from the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and its Politburo and led to a situation in which party committees did not have a clear program of tactical actions and lack such a program even now.

They noted: in the ideological sphere, we are steadily surrendering our positions, retreating and failing in practice to defend Lenin. There was criticism at the congress of Vadim Medvedev and Aleksandr Yakovlev, both members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, who, some deputies thought, had procrastinated and been indecisive in drawing up the outlines of

the party's ideological work in the new conditions, in upholding Marxist-Leninist ideas.

The satisfaction of requests made by representatives of national groups living in the Ukraine, the language situation, and the implementation of the law on languages in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic dominated the discussions of the section dealing with "the policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party in harmonizing interethnic relations". The delegates stated, in particular, that an autonomous formation should be established in the Crimea within the body of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Altogether, more than 300 delegates have spoken, to date, during discussion of the congress agenda, at plenary sessions, and at meetings of sections. Vladimir Ivashko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, has delivered his final remarks at the congress.

The congress delegates sent a greetings telegram to the Presidium of the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party, in which they conveyed ardent and cordial congratulations on the formation of the RSFSR Communist Party.

Candidates for the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party were nominated at the congress. Discussion of these candidates has begun.

RSFSR Congratulated

LD2206220390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] The [Ukraine Communist Party] congress delegates have sent a congratulatory telegram to the Presidium of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. They warmly and cordially congratulate it on the formation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR within a single CPSU in the process of renovation.

The telegram says: We consider that this is a major and significant event in the life of our party, and we express the hope of fruitful, fraternal cooperation of the communists of the Ukraine and Russia in the interests of the cohesion of the CPSU and all the peoples of the country.

New Party Leader Elected

LD2206231290 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev June 22 TASS—The 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress today elected Stanislav Gurenko, 54, first secretary of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee. He replaced former First Secretary Vladimir Ivashko who was recently elected chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Gurenko was elected on the alternative basis.

Gurenko had only one rival left after several candidates had withdrawn their candidacies. He was Ivan Saliy, first secretary of the Podolsk regional party committee and chairman of the regional soviet.

Guberko graduated from the Kiev Polytechnical Institute in 1958. He is [a] mechanical engineer. He is [a] candidate of economic sciences. He was first an engineer at a machine-building plant in Donetsk and then became its [passage indistinct].

Hundreds Abstain in Votes

PM2206154990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Sergey Tsikora report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Congress in Two Stages"]

[Text] Kiev—The Ukrainian Communist Party Congress has decided to divide its work into two stages.

The second stage will take place after the 28th CPSU Congress, when its decisions are known. The decision to elect the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary not at the end of the congress but in the first stage, to enable the delegation of the republic's communists to attend the all-Union congress headed by a leader whose powers have been confirmed by the entire Ukrainian party organization, is closely linked to that question.

Another question has been resolved—on safeguarding the minority's rights. The decision was as follows: If 200 congress delegates unite they will have the right to submit for examination their own draft resolutions on any question.

Of the other items due to be discussed, I would note the proposal on the election of republican party newspaper editors by the congress, the design of party symbols, and the examination of the status of the primary party organization. The delegates considered it necessary to finally find out who precisely covered up the information on the true scale and possible after-effects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and for what reason, and a specially created commission was instructed to find this out.

Now for the first evaluations of the Central Committee report "On the Political Situation and Basic Guidelines of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Activity at the Present Stage." The delegates' attitudes to it vary. The barometer of opinions swings from describing the Central Committee report as a "political lecture" to recognizing it as a sober, sensible, and constructive document which answers the questions of the present day and offers a perspective of the future. There was keen criticism from the congress rostrum and it was aimed at everyone—both the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party and members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. Representatives of the "Democratic

Platform in the Communist Party of the Ukraine" even issued a special statement in defense of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and qualified the criticism of him from the rostrum by some delegates as "a right-wing attack."

The congress is characterized not only by its keen discussion but by the as yet unknown stance of the bloc of "trappist" [molchalnik] delegates. The tellers commission has been instructed to find out how many of the delegates sitting in the hall have not been taking part in the voting. It turns out that the number varies from 200 to 400 people. (There are around 1,700 congress delegates in all). Whose side are they on? What position do they adhere to? What are they waiting for?

Gurenko Interviewed

LD2406111990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by correspondent S. Kurilik, identified by screen caption]

[Text] [Announcer] The first phase of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress ended today:

[Kurilik] The delegates debated and adopted today a number of important documents, including a resolution on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the upcoming party congress and a resolution on the draft rules of the CPSU. The Ukrainian communists will be submitting more than 400 proposals to the congress on amendments and changes to the new rules. The congress also adopted the keynote working principles of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and the Auditing Commission were elected today. More than one third of the members of these central bodies are representatives of the working class and peasantry. In a secret vote the congress delegates elected the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. There were two names on the voting slips—Saliy, first secretary of the Podolskiy Party raykom in Kiev, and Gurenko, second secretary of the Central Committee. More than 80 percent of the votes went to Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko:

[Begin video interview] [Kurilik, interviewing Gurenko] So what's the first step on what is obviously a long and lengthy road?

[Gurenko] The first step, I think, is to form the Central Committee and consolidate it around the tasks facing us, to find secretaries and department heads... this is not easy nowadays, and even taking into account the voting results, they are eloquent enough, but at the same time more than 200 delegates voted against, which is also food for thought. What we need now is a real program, a concrete program that everyoned understands, but for us communists the first thing is consolidation—unity within the party, unity within the CPSU. What we need now is protection of the workers' interests, we need to plot a course toward stabilization, because to promise today an easy victory or to promise the earth tomorrow would be political charlatanism. [end interview]

[Kurilik] Later in the day there was a plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, at which the Politburo members were elected and the Central Committee was formed. [video shows congress in debate, interview with Gurenko]

Resolutions Adopted

LD2306184990 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 23 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Grigoryev]

[Text] Kiev June 23 TASS—The leading bodies of the Ukraine Communist Party were formed today at the party's 28th congress. The delegates elected a central committee and an auditing commission.

The congress passed a resolution on the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee for the 28th Congress of the CPSU and draft rules of the CPSU. The delegates believe that these documents may become a basis for consideration at the CPSU congress.

The delegates adopted a resolution on a state sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR. The congress authorised communists, who are people's deputies of the Ukraine, to expedite the adoption by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of a declaration of the state sovereignty of the republic and to take part in the elaboration of a new union treaty.

On a suggestion of delegates—coal miners, the congress adopted a resolution assessing the decisions of Soviet miners' first congress which was held in Donetsk last week.

The resolution criticises the CPSU Central Committee and the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee for "indifference and non-intervention" in view of unsatisfactory implementation of the accord with the government reached during last year's strike and the Soviet government appropriate resolution adopted after the strike.

The congress also adopted a resolution on programmatic principles for the activities of the Ukraine Communist Party and a statement on the elimination of the aftermaths of the Chernobyl accident and the protection from the disaster effects.

Ukrainian Communist Party Chief Stanislav Gurenko emphasised in his remarks that the congress revealed the republican communists' deep concern over the state of affairs within the party and society and their awareness of their responsibility for overcoming the crisis situation and the need for urgent practical actions.

The congress has completed the first phase of its work. The second phase of the congress will take place after the 28th CPSU Congress.

Belorussian Plenum Views Draft CPSU Platform

LD2406113290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Txt] A plenum of the Belorusian Communist Party Central Committee was at work in Minsk today. During it, it was noted that the majority of communists in the republic support the provision in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform on the party's commitment to the ideas of the October Revolution, though they believe that the program of action is in need of serious and profound elaboration.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Forms Presidium

LD2206025890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] As reported from Minsk, the session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet ended with the formation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium comprises 25 members: chairman of the Supreme Soviet, his two deputies, and 22 standing commission chairmen most of whom are party and local soviet workers.

Belorussian National Democratic Party Meets

LD2406224290 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 24 Jun 90

[Excerpt] The National Democratic Party of Belorussia has held its constituent conference in Minsk. Party leaders say the new organization intends to work for the republic's ethnic rebirth and economic independence. [passage omitted]

Pro-Soviet Moldavian Deputies Stage Walkout

Situation Viewed

PM0106095990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 May 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Own correspondent Eduard Kondratov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Empty Seats in Moldavian Parliament"]

[Text] Kishinev—The Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session has started a new parliamentary week. Nominations for the posts of deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers are being examined and the personnel of standing commissions confirmed.

The situation prevailing in the hall of sessions cannot be described as normal: Many seats are empty. Around 100 deputies, representing mostly the republic's industrial cities, are not taking part in the sittings. As already reported, they walked out of the Supreme Soviet a week ago in protest at extremists' infringement of their inviolability as deputies. As yet there has been no official response to the demand of the "Soviet Moldavia" Deputies Group that parliamentarians' safety be ensured.

The discussion of alternative drafts for the structure and functions of the future Council of Ministers in the absence of deputies representing Moldavian industry has scarcely been of benefit to the republic's parliament. The republic is tensely awaiting the resolution of this parliamentary conflict. The peaceful, sometimes placid course of this last week's session is interrupted by emotional outbursts whenever the deputies who are continuing to take part start talking about the situation that has now arisen in the cities and rayons on the left bank of the Dnestr and in Bendery. Sharp words are ringing out yet again from the rostrum regarding interethnic conflict, the nonrecognition of the laws on language and the state "tricolor," the next scheduled referendum, the idea of autonomy for the Dnestr region, and the illegal—from the standpoint of the parliamentary majority—decisions of local soviets. Calls for punitive sanctions to be applied to lawbreakers are being heard increasingly often.

Deputies Return

LD2206004190 Moscow TASS in English 2111 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow June 22 TASS—Deputies of the Moldavian Parliament from several cities on the Dnestr River, who walked out nearly a month ago in protest at the "moral and power pressure" on them within parliament and outside it, have returned to the session, Soviet television reported on Thursday.

The parliament has adopted a resolution on the protection of deputies' immunity. The picketing of the parliament's building has been lifted.

The session adopted another resolution on setting up a commission to give political and legal assessments to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact with regard to Bessarabia and North Bukovina.

Moldovan Front Wants Day of Mourning 28 Jun

PM2506131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Eduard Kondratov report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Holiday or Day of Mourning?"]

[Text] Kishinev—The Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has postponed for one month the examination of the question of the historical and legal assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact regarding the fate of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

The reason: There is a large number of documents which haven't been studied properly. A special parliamentary commission will work on them.

Nevertheless, the Moldova People's Front has appealed to parliamentarians in the newspaper LITERATURA SI ARTA to declare 28 June a "day of national mourning

on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet troops' occupation of the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina." It is proposed that on that day the republic's state flags be lowered to half-mast and that streets and institutions named in honor of 28 June—until now the republic's official liberation day—be renamed.

The People's Fronts of Romania and Moldova and a number of Romanian-Moldavian societies have also published an appeal to the two republics' inhabitants calling on them to wear mourning dress and form "human chains" on Sunday 24 June to epitomize the people's unity and provide a symbolic protest against aggression.

However, the appeal says, the sociopolitical atmosphere in the country makes it necessary to abandon the idea of a mass crossing of the state border by Moldovan and Romanian inhabitants on 24 June.

On the same day SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA published extensive materials from the roundtable meeting of historians who, on the basis of documentary evidence, produced a far from unambiguous assessment of the events of June 1940.

Caucasus

Armenians Killed in Clash With Security Forces

AU2506100090 Paris AFP in English 0942 GMT 25 Jun 90

[Text] Moscow, June 25 (AFP)—Three Armenian extremists were killed and four people injured in an exchange of gunfire with Soviet Interior Ministry forces Sunday near the disputed Caucasian region of Nagorno-Karabakh, INTERFAX, a semi-independent news agency reported Monday.

Those injured included one Armenian and three Soviet soldiers.

The exchange of fire, in the Kelbajar region, occurred as the soldiers were engaged in a reconnaissance mission aboard a helicopter, INTERFAX said.

Two Armenian extremists, including the one injured, were arrested and taken to Stepanakert, the chief town in Nargorno-Karabakh, a mainly Armenian enclave inside Azerbaijan which has become the focus of a feud.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 23 Jun

NC2406101090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] The republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium met, with Chairman Grant Voskanyan presiding.

The Presidium heard a report from Ashrafyan, the republic's justice minister, about the bylaws of the Defense Council. The Presidium instructed that work should continue on the formulation of the bylaws and the structure of the Defense Council.

The Presidium also heard a report from Kazaryan, deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the commission looking into the temporary suspension of the 1990 spring conscription in the republic, on the progress of the commission's work.

The Presidium instructed the preparation of relevant proposals concerning the aforesaid issues to be submitted for examination during the next session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

The Presdium also set up a working group on the formulation of the new union treaty, and on accredited representatives to the working group of the USSR Federation Council.

In its previous session the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium gave a positive reply to the wishes and requests of the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies, labor collectives, and citizens for the postponment of the elections of the people's deputies for the local soviet set for (?8 June), and had considered taking this issue to the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the republic. The republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium is still receiving letters and proposals on this subject from the local soviet of people's deputies. After taking these into consideration, the Presidium decided to suspend temporarily the election campaign for the local soviets and resume the pre-election campaign at a legally set timetable after the newly elected Supreme Soviet of the republic sets the date for the elections of the people's deputies for local soviets.

The Presidium also examined other state affairs and passed relevant decisions and decrees.

Armenian Government Reprimands Refugee Committee

NC2406100090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 24 Jun 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] According to the paper, the republic's Council of Ministers examined the shortcomings and failures in providing social services and employment to the refugees from Azerbaijan.

The government examined the activities of the State Committee for the Reception and Settlement of Armenians Returning to the Armenian Republic and noted that the efforts for a solution to the problems of more than 250,000 refugees are insufficient. The Council of Ministers brought the existing serious shortcomings to the attention of the committee's leadership.

It also acceded to the wishes of committee chairman Azatyan to be relieved from his post. The Council of Ministers also reprimanded Vardanyan, deputy chairman of the committee, for his disorderly work in

implementing the decisions of the republic's Council of Ministers on refugee affairs.

Attacks on Soviet Army in Armenia Detailed

NC2306124390 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Statement issued by the military command; date and place not given]

[Text] Attacks on military servicemen and on protected installations are continuing in the [Armenian] republic.

Thus: A general [word indistinct], who was travelling from Yerevan to Leninakan in a Volga car on 19 June, came under fire from a group of unidentified persons using a small caliber rifle. The group fired from a (?Riga) car. Unidentified persons fired on the staff headquarters of the Army unit at four o'clock on the morning of 20 June causing damage to the building. Unidentified persons launched a hooligan attack on the Yerevan military police (?guard post) at 2300 on 21 June. During the attack the group beat up the military police and smashed the windows of the (?guard house).

The servicemen justifiably raise the following questions: Will such attacks ever come to an end? Who stands to gain from the constant provocation of clashes with the Army? We are aware that the Armenian people are very sensitive about such terms as attackers, extremists, and terrorists. Yet, how else can one describe those who commit such acts? We are convinced that only mutual understanding and reciprocal respect among all the forces can stabilize the situation in the republic and the region.

Demographic Changes in NKAO Examined

NC2206151690 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 2030 GMT 21 Jun 90

[From the review of HAYRENIKY DZAYN]

[Text] The HAYRENIKY DZAYN weekly has published a dispatch from Melora Bagdasaryan, a worker at the Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, NKAO] radio and television committee. The dispatch says: There is a deafening silence in Artsakh. The Organizational Committee, appointed by Azerbaijan and supported by the army units and military hardware, has invaded the oblast center and is extending its clandestine activities. The Armenian villages are being disarmed daily, and persons designated by the Azerbaijanis are being detained. Fear and terror are being spread by the searches of enterprises and houses.

Everything is being done to break the will of the Armenians of Artsakh, to dishearten them so as to reimpose the chain of slavery and colonialism on them. Those army units which have been introduced into the NKAO ostensibly to defend law, order, and legality are today openly serving our opponent and are acting on his advice. The scheme is obvious: To step up the development of Azerbaijani settlements, bring about a speedy change to the demographic situation in the oblast, and thus shut the door to a solution of the NKAO problem. This plan is being implemented by overt and covert methods, with every sort of assistance rendered to the opponent by the abovementioned parties. If things continue like this and if eventually a referendum is held—it is hard to say when it might be held—it will work against us. [passage indistinct]

Armenians Criticize Azerbaijani Moves in NKAO

NC2206155890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 21 Jun 90

[Text] The Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] regards the creation, on an equal basis, of a so-called Organizational Bureau in Gadrutskiy rayon as a new violation of its constitutional rights. The Organizational Bureau is headed by Zubkov, the representative of Azerbaijan.

The NKAO Oblast Party Executive Committee gave this information to an ARMENPRES correspondent. This move by the republican Organizational Committee came in the wake of a decision by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau on the expulsion of Grigor (?Balyan), first secretary of Gadrutskiy Rayon Party Committee, from the CPSU and his post.

The powers of the Gadrutskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies and its executive committee have been suspended on the orders of Azerbaijan President Mutalibov until new elections for the soviet take place. The duties of the executive committee have been transferred to the temporary Organizational Bureau of Gadrutskiy rayon.

I think that a similar fate awaits all the party and soviet leaders of the oblast, said Grant Melkumyan, second secretary of Stepanakert City Party Committee. The explanation for this is simple: We are united with our people and their aspirations and do not side with the Organizational Committee and its obvious plans.

This is the second time that the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has expelled our communists from the party, Shmavon Petrosyan, a worker at the oblast party executive committee, said. As is known, Vachakan Grigoryan, the former first secretary of Martuninskiy Rayon Party Committee and USSR people's deputy, was also excluded from developments at the demand of that republic. Under these conditions, it is hard to reconcile the declared intention of the Organizational Committee to establish ties with the local party and soviet leaders with all the treatment so far given to the elected officials of the people of Artsakh. If this treatment continues, added Petrosyan, than it might be possible that the Armenian autonomous formation will really be without any Armenian leader possessing any power. There is also no clarity about the whereabouts of the Union Monitoring and Observation Commission which is under obligation to monitor all that happens in

NKAO so that the stipulations of the infamous 28 November 1989 decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet are not violated. Otherwise, the impression that the NKAO exists only formally and is vested with many fewer powers than an ordinary rayon will gain ground.

Another cause for amazement is the fact that the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau decided to expel Grigor (?Balyan) without first inviting him to the meeting, which is a blatant violation of the CPSU Constitution.

It is time finally to realize that it is unethical to assume that the Armenian people of the NKAO, in contrast to all the other Soviet peoples, cannot aspire for the revival of national self-awareness and real self-determination.

It is also unethical to put the blame for the existence of an unwholesome nationalistic movement in Azerbaijan on specific leaders of natural processes taking place in a country moving along the road of democratization. Otherwise, thousands should be expelled from the party. It is high time to assume a responsible stance toward the developments and not to put all the blame on ethnic minorities which have already been (?accused) of many things in the last seven decades. There cannot be any talk of friendship of peoples without mutual understanding and reciprocal respect for the rights of the peoples.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet To Meet 26 Jun

NC2506123190 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 22 Jun 90

[Text] To the attention of the deputies of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet:

The 13th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet will meet in the meeting hall of the republic's supreme soviet at 1000 on 26 June. The deputies will be registered in the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's building from 1000 to 1900 on 25 June.

Two Azerbaijanis Killed by Armenian 'Bandits'

NC2506105990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Excerpt] Kemal Salimov, 53, and his son, El'chin Salimov, 14, were treacherously murdered by Armenian bandits in Lachinskiy Rayon's Kohnekend (?on 21 June). Asad Kerimov, 24, the only witness of the incident, who has remained alive by chance, has disclosed this regrettable incident.

The employees of the procuracy in Lachinskiy Rayon and the military servicemen who arrived at the place where the crime was committed discovered the bodies and a number of cartridges that were fired from automatic weapons. The search for the criminals continued the next day. The operations and inquiry group of the USSR Interior Ministry has also been (?alerted). A search is being carried out for the bandits in three of the Armenian residential areas in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast that are close to Kohnekend. As indicated by the previous incidents in Lachinskiy Rayon, the culprits of crimes committed in that rayon come from these residential areas.

Major General Malushkin, deputy head of the USSR Interior Ministry troops in the northern Caucasus and the Transcaucasus regions, said the following during the funeral ceremony: We shall make every effort to see to it that this tragic incident will be the last. Forgive us for being unable to protect the people who are close to you. [passage omitted]

Expulsion of Azeris From Gadrutskiy Urged

NC2306125990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] Shdzors Davityan [editor of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN], in an article entitled "Yet Another [word indistinct] Political Move," writes that urgent measures must be taken to expel from Gadrutskiy Rayon the occupants sent there by the Organizational Committee, and to return the rayon to its legal owners. We must all give our support to Gadrutskiy Rayon, otherwise the impression will be created that our only desire is to constantly formulate decisions for the formal unification of Artsakh [NKAO] with Armenia, and not in countering the illegal acts being committed there. We also think that such aggressive steps taken by the Azerbaijani leadership are the consequence of our retreat from our demands on the NKAO.

Gadrutskiy Raykom First Secretary Removed

NC2206120290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 20 Jun 90

[Text] The decision of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee to the establish a temporary organization bureau in Gadrutskiy Rayon in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] notes that Azerbaijan's party and soviet organs are efficiently working for interethnic peace in the NKAO. However, a number of party committees in the NKAO, lured by the leaders of the inauspicious Nagorno-Karabakh Movement, are not fulfilling the decisions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Government, the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and the republic's Supreme Soviet in connection with the question of normalizing the situation in the region. Furthermore, they seem to be eager to obstruct the NKAO Organization Committee's work.

The Gadrutskiy Rayon party committee [raykom] bureau and Grisha Bageyan, first secretary of the Gadrutskiy Rayon, have adopted a stand which conflicts with the constitution. They displayed lack of principle, were conciliatory, abandoned party positions, and actively pursued a nationalist and separatist policy. Contrary to

the decision adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 3 March 1990, which declared that the elections in the NKAO for the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] peoples deputies are not valid and to the recommendations made by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, a campaign was launched for those elections. The move was actually an illegal step by the Gadrutskiy Raykom and its bureau. Furthermore, Bageyan agreed to be elected as an Armenian SSR people's deputy from the Gadrutskiy electoral okrug.

As a result of this arrangement, the situation in the towns of the rayon was strained. Furthermore, residential areas were frequently fired on and roads were blocked. The internal troops detained armed men in the rayon and seized explosives and arms several times.

The leaders of the republic and the NKAO Organization Committee cautioned Bageyan several times that illegal activities are impermissible. However, no practical measure was put into effect to normalize the situation in the rayon.

The Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has adopted the following decision:

1. That Grisha Levonovich Bageyan, first secretary of the Gadrutskiy Raykom, be removed from the CPSU ranks and from his present post for grossly violating the USSR Constitution and the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution, participating in preparations for the holding of illegal elections in the NKAO for the Armenian SSR people's deputies, and obstructing the realization of the decisions adopted by the party and the government for the normalization of the situation in the NKAO.

2. Considering the situation in the rayon, that the plenum of the raykom and the work of the raykom bureau be suspended.

3. That a temporary organization bureau be established in the Gadrutskiy Rayon to give operative guidance to the rayon's social, political, and economic life. (?Rhyzkov), second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Nizami Raykom, labor representative of the local people, and chief of the political department of the Gadrutskiy border unit, be appointed as the head of the bureau.

A decree issued by President Ayaz Mutalibov has suspended the powers of the Gadrutskiy Rayon People's Deputies Soviet and its Executive Committee until new elections are held for the new structure of the soviet. The duties of the soviet Executive Committee have been transferred to the Gadrutskiy Rayon's temporary organization bureau.

Georgian-Armenian Group Established in Yerevan

NC2705122990 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Dear compatriots, the constituent conference of the compatriotic charity society of the Armenians of Georgia has been held in Yerevan. A total of 260 delegates representing the Armenian-inhabited regions of Georgia and Georgian-Armenians residing in Armenia took part.

The need for such an organization had been long felt. Both Armenia and Georgia are today experiencing a complex transitional period of profound social, political, and economic changes.

One of the basic tasks of the society is the maintenance of the national identity of the Armenians of Georgia and the furtherance of cultural ties with Armenia. An assessment of the lessons of history of the two peoples allows us to conclude that the good-neighborly and friendly relations emanate from the fundamental interests of the Armenians and Georgians, and that these relations are mutually advantageous. We are convinced that there is no other alternative to this. What is most important is that we must be aware of all sorts of intrigues and adventures which are being instigated by the enemies of our people.

Georgian Supreme Soviet Reasserts Independence

PM2506080590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jun 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Besik Urigashvili report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Georgian Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, which ended 20 June, laid the practical foundations for elaborating the legal mechanism to restore Georgia's state independence.

In his speech, Givi Gumbaridze, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium, urged deputies to take responsible and well balanced decisions. He stated that the Supreme Soviet must proceed from the realities now existing in the republic and the Union. At the same time, Gumbaridze stressed that Georgia will move steadfastly toward its planned goal—the restoration of state independence.

The session adopted a number of resolutions aimed at strengthening the guarantees of the republic's state sovereignty. The Georgian Supreme Soviet adopted an appeal to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet on the evaluation of the legal and political consequences of the violation of the treaty of 7 May 1920 between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the RSFSR.

The session adopted a resolution on creating a legal mechanism for the restoration of Georgia's state independence.

In response to a proposal from deputies, a Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet statement was adopted which recognizes the right to self-determination and the political will of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and of other union republics

to create truly sovereign states. A readiness to establish direct interstate, political, economic, and other relations with them was expressed.

The deputies approved the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers' proposal on the abolition of "standard ["dekretnoye"] time" on the republic's territory. At 0200 hours on 24 June clocks throughout the republic will be turned back 1 hour.

Central Asia

Internal Troops Move Into Kirghiz Resort Town

PM2306182590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 23 Jun 90 p 1

[K. Karabekov report: "Troop 'Resort'"]

[Text] Frunze—Internal Troops subunits have been moved into the resort city of Dzhalal-Abad, and today there are considerably more military men than vacationers there. Passions are not abating in Uzgenskiy Rayon, either; shooting is continuing and people are dying. The ancient city of Uzgen is in ruins. A total of 193 people have been killed and 1,275 wounded since the bloodshed began.

The names of the officials responsible for the development of the conflict have been published. They are Osh Gorkom [city committee] and Uzgenskiy Raykom [rayon committee] First Secretaries A. Sadykov and Zh. Asanov, who a week ago were elected to the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee.

For A. Sadykov, for example, "the democracy game" is the explanation for perestroyka's difficulties. "In our view the CPSU Central Committee and its general staff frequently display hesitancy and excessive punctiliousness. You only have to mention the creation of a monarchist party, the crowd of courtiers, the unbridled and permissive press..."

The curfew is still operating in the Kirghiz capital although the city is getting back to life as usual.

Reportage on Central Asian Leaders Meeting

Nazarbayev Speaks

LD2206174190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 22 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today, a meeting of the leaders of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan took place in Alma-Ata.

[A. Nugmanova] They gathered together on the initiative of Nazarbayev, the president of the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic. Our republics are not only close in a geographical sense. We have much in common in the history, culture, and traditions of the peoples. And, there are also many common problems today; interethnic ones, economic ones. Take for example the Aral tragedy. Incidentally, the parties at the meeting have ruled it necessry to declare the area adjacent to the Aral [Priaralye] a national disaster zone.

One of the main documents adopted here is an agreement on the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation among Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia. The joint agreement will facilitate the development of an all-Union market and make it possible, in the opinion of the parties at the meeting, to strengthen the economic unity of the USSR. [video shows meeting in session, people getting out of a bus]

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] At the last council of the federation under Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president, we agreed that intensive work will be carried out to draw up a new Union treaty. For the first time the thought was heard that our Union should be a union of sovereign states. The administrative-command vertical system which has practically dominated the whole economy in our republics was the main link which has been hindering us from actively cooperating with neighboring republics. Therefore, we now consider that prior to the drafting of the union treaty is the very time for the republics to set up horizontal relations between themselves. Moreover, in all our documents we say that our treaty remains open for all Union republics, and even for foreign businessmen, who can enter into this agreement, the more so, because we consider that our next step should...[changes thought] At present preparation of a similar treaty with Belorussia, with the Ukraine, and with neighboring oblasts of Russia is proceeding. That is, horizontal relations are the beginning of the creation of a new federation in our country. [end recording]

Meeting Ends

LD2306213190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In Alma-Ata the meeting of leaders of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan ended today.

[Unidentified correspondent] The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are united by common historical destinies, similarities of cultures, traditions and customs, and even of character, being all generous of spirit. And in my view the chief, incomparable significance of this meeting lies in the fact that they have finally recalled their deep ties of brotherhood and have decided to strengthen them.

Following some intense joint work and detailed clarification of points of view on various points on the agenda, a whole collection of documents was signed. Special mention is made of ecological matters in reference to the setting-up of an interrepublican commission on problems of the Aral Sea, the declaration of this zone as a national disaster zone, and the involvement of the

United Nations, UNESCO, and WHO institutions in the Aral tragedy agreements were also signed on economic, scientific, and technical and cultural cooperation among the five republics. In addition priority lines have been defined in the field of economic problems and credit policy. This concerns development of the consumer market, the production of consumer goods, improvements in the social sphere, and the expansion of diplomatic and foreign economic links.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] The document we have signed—the declaration by the leaders of the republics—says basically that our agreements between the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan are open to all the union republics. We believe that this is the way the drawing-up of a new union treaty should begin. We feel that this initiative of ours is just the event to strengthen our union, our federation as a whole.

Agreements Signed

LD2406045590 Moscow TASS in English 2106 GMT 23 Jun 90

[Text] Alma Ata June 24 TASS—A meeting of the leaders of Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan ended here on Saturday.

The main event was the signing by them of a joint statement as well as an intergovernmental agreement on economic. Scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia.

The agreement determines their economic policy with due regard for the common interests and the needs of social progress in the region.

The sides agreed to remove the existing restrictions on the exportation of consumer goods, retaining mutually beneficial deliveries of raw materials and products.

The agreement has been concluded for a period until January 1, 1996, and is subject to confirmation by the Supreme Soviets of the republics and is open for accession to it by any union or autonomous republic.

It was recognised essential to set up a permanently functioning business cooperation coordinating council with a working group based in Alma Ata.

The joint statement emphasises not only the republics' geographical neighbourhood but also the similarity of their historical destinies and the affinity of cultures, traditions and customs of the peoples of Central Asia.

It was decided to set up an inter-republican commission to coordinate efforts to restore the ecological balance in the near-Aral area and to establish a fund for aid to the population of the ecological diaster zone and to form the inter-republican "Sredazecoprom" scientific and production association. It was also agreed to hold such meetings every year.

The leaders of the republics aodpted an address to the peoples of the five republics, calling for unity and cohesion in the name of common good, and firmly condemning attempts by some militant groups to question the traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness.

Situation in Kirghizia's Osh 'Stabilizing'

Daily Operations Resume

LD2206120890 Moscow TASS in English 1041 GMT 22 Jun 90

[By TASS correspondent Boris Mainayev]

[Text] Frunze June 22 TASS—The situation in Kirghizia's Osh region is stabilising, the Interior Ministry of this Soviet Central Asian republic has reported.

Offices, shops and the majority of industrial enterprises are working. Public traffic has resumed operation.

The state of emergency was introduced in the region on June 4 after clashes between Uzbek and Kirghiz groups. The disturbances were triggered by a conflict over land plots for the construction of private housing.

The bloody showdown was stopped only after the entry of Interior Ministry troops.

The death toll has now reached 193. More than 1,000 people have been wounded.

A total of 733 fire-arms, 151 side-arms and 72 petrol bombs have been confiscated. A search for victims is continuing.

At rural meetings involving representatives of various ethnic groups, people discuss ways to break the deadlock. Party and local government officials were voted out of their posts in many populated localities of the Osh region.

The state of emergency, declared on June 7, remains in force in the republican capital Frunze. The situation in the city is calm.

Citizens' Meetings Held

LD2306133490 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 23 Jun 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" program; INTERFAKS correspondent reports from Kirghizia]

[Text] In the republic's Osh Oblast, where interethnic clashes occured recently, 236 citizens' meetings were held to settle the situation. In the oblast center all public catering and communications enterprises and medical institutions were operating.

In the town of Uzgen, during an inspection of dwelling houses which had burned down, six charred corpses were discovered. Their identity has not yet been established.

A local resident with three convictions, an Uzbek, attacked an army patrol at the local bazaar in Vzgen yesterday in order to seize a weapon. The criminal was killed in the attack.

Tajikistan Bans Exports of Goods, Foodstuffs

LD0106160290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1130 GMT 31 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Nina Merezhnivkova]

[Text] Dushanbe, 31 May (TASS)—The government of Soviet Tajikistan has decided to limit the export of industrial goods and foodstuffs outside the boundaries of the republic. It is forbidden to export all types of foodstuffs, electrical-household and several other types of goods in high demand. The dispatch of scarce goods via local post offices has also been limited. The above-plan products of agricultural cooperatives and industrial enterprises will be sold only to local consumers.

During recent times, limitations on the export of scarce goods have been introduced in many regions of the country, also including Moscow.

Karaganda Oblast Elects New Party Leader

LD2406173990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 24 Jun 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Our correspondent, Gennadiy Sytykh, reports on the Karaganda Oblast party organization. [Begin Sytykh recording] [passage omitted] The delegates to the recent oblast party conference have decided things in their own way. They withdrew their trust in the former oblast committee first secretary and elected to that post Vitaliy Stepanovich Garkusha, an engineer who knows and understands production matters well, and one of the few party workers who were able to hold a dialogue on an equal level with the striking miners last year. [passage omitted] [end recording]